

Self-reference in computability theory and the universal algorithm

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Ouroboros: Formal Criteria of Self-Reference
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Introduction

A delightful theorem

The universal algorithm

and its generalization to set theory,

The universal finite set.

Both rely fundamentally on self-reference.

Self-reference in computability

Definition

A *Quine* is a program that gives as output its own source code.

Imagine a Turing machine program that prints out its own source code on the tape.

Since this output can be used in further computation, a Quine is a program able to handle itself computationally.

Quine examples

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C Quine

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int main(){char*s="int main(){char*s=%c%s%c;printf(s,34,s,34);return 0;}";printf(s,34,s,34);r
```

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SQL Quine

```
SELECT REPLACE(REPLACE('SELECT REPLACE(REPLACE("$",CHAR(34),CHAR(39)),CHAR(36),"$") AS Quine'
```

From the Quine page and StackOverflow.

Quines are not a computability concept

The Quine concept is not actually computability theoretic.

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Reason:

- It does not respect the equivalence of programs.
- It is sensitive to the computational model.

If you replace a program with another that computes the same function, or with an equivalent program in a different computational language, then it is no longer a Quine.

Nevertheless, Quines are fascinating!

Quines exist

Fact

Every Turing-complete programming language admits Quines.

Let me explain how this follows from the Kleene recursion theorem.

Recursion theorem: self-reference in computability

Kleene recursion theorem

For every computable transformation of the space of programs,

$$e \mapsto f(e)$$

there is a program e such that e and $f(e)$ compute the same function.

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Kleene recursion theorem

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there is a program e such that e and $f(e)$ compute the same function.

The program $f(e)$ can make explicit reference to e , and so the fixed point e in effect makes reference to itself.

The recursion theorem is a computability analogue of the Gödel-Carnap fixed-point lemma: for every $\varphi(x)$ in language of arithmetic, there is a sentence σ with

$$\sigma \leftrightarrow \varphi(\ulcorner \sigma \urcorner).$$

Quines exist in every Turing-complete language

Theorem

Every Turing-complete programming language admits a Quine, a program e that gives itself as output.

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Proof.

Let $f(e)$ be a program that gives e as output. By the recursion theorem, there is a program e such that e and $f(e)$ give the same output. So program e gives e as output. □

Since the proof of the recursion theorem is constructive, this argument can produce explicit Quines.

T_EX is Turing-complete and therefore admits a Quine

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T_EX source code:

```
\def\T{
\tt \hsize 32.5em\parindent 0pt\def \S {\def \S ##1>{}}\S \string
\def \string \T \string {\par \expandafter \S \meaning \T \string
}\par \expandafter \S \meaning \T \footline {} \end }
\tt \hsize 32.5em\parindent 0pt\def \S {\def \S ##1>{}}\S \string
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Output:

```

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Ouroboros program: a Quine cycle

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Java program

```

public class Quine
{
    public static void main(String[] args)
    {
        char q = 34;
        String[] l = {
            "",
            "===== C++ Code =====",
            "#include <iostream>",
            "#include <string>",
            "using namespace std;",
            "--",
            "int main(int argc, char* argv[])",
            "{",
            "    char q = 34;",
            "    string l[] = {",
            "    }",
            "    for(int i = 20; i <= 25; i++)",
            "        cout << l[i] << endl;",
            "    for(int i = 0; i <= 34; i++)",
            "        cout << l[0] + q + l[i] + q + ',' << endl;",
            "    for(int i = 20; i <= 34; i++)",
            "        cout << l[i] << endl;",
            "    return 0;",
            "}",
            "===== Java Code =====",
            "public class Quine",
            "{",
            "    public static void main( String[] args )",
            "    {",
            "        char q = 34;",
            "        String[] l = {",
            "        }",
            "        for(int i = 2; i <= 9; i++)",
            "            System.out.println(l[i]);",
            "        for(int i = 0; i < l.length; i++)",
            "            System.out.println( l[0] + q + l[i] + q + ',' );",
            "        for(int i = 10; i <= 18; i++)",
            "            System.out.println(l[i]);",
            "        }",
            "    };
        for(int i = 2; i <= 9; i++)
            System.out.println(l[i]);
        for(int i = 0; i < l.length; i++)
            System.out.println( l[0] + q + l[i] + q + ',' );
        for(int i = 10; i <= 18; i++)
            System.out.println(l[i]);
    }
}

```


Universality via self-reference

Let me now explain how the capacity for self-reference in computability leads to universality.

Universal program (warm-up): the petulant child

Consider program e

It searches for a proof in PA of a statement:

“program e does not give output n .”

When found, it gives output n and halts.

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Key Observation: you cannot refute any particular output for this program, since then indeed it would have that output.

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Key Observation: you cannot refute any particular output for this program, since then indeed it would have that output.

Consequently, for any n it is consistent with PA that this program gives output n .

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There is a Turing machine program e , which we can write down, with the following properties.

- When run in the standard model \mathbb{N} , the program never halts.
- For any number n , there is a nonstandard model of arithmetic in which the program eventually gives output n .

Universal algorithm: sequence version

Consider program p

Searches for a proof of:

“program p does not enumerate the finite sequence a_0, a_1, \dots, a_n and then halt.”

When found, enumerate that sequence immediately.

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Searches for a proof of:

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When found, enumerate that sequence immediately.

You cannot refute any particular sequence being enumerated by p .

So it is consistent with PA that p enumerates any desired sequence.

Universal program: function version

Theorem

There is a program p , such that for every function $f : \mathbb{N} \rightarrow \mathbb{N}$, there is a nonstandard model of arithmetic N , such that in N , program p on input $n \in \mathbb{N}$ gives output $f(n)$.

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Proof.

The assertions

“the n^{th} number enumerated by p is $f(n)$ ”

are finitely consistent with PA. So by compactness they are all true in some model. □

The universal algorithm: full extension version

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- 3** *In any model of arithmetic, if e enumerates sequence s and t is an extension of s , then there is an end-extension of the model in which e enumerates t .*

In particular, every finite sequence $s \in \mathbb{N}^{<\omega}$ is enumerated by e in some model $M \models \text{PA}$.

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- Proof idea has affinity with the ‘exile’ argument in Solovay’s analysis of provability logic.
- Related to work of Shavrukov and Visser.
- Weaker forms go back to early 1960s, Mostowski and Kripke.

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- Proceed in stages, releasing the sequence in batches.
- Stage n succeeds, if there is a proof from fragment PA_k , smaller than fragments at earlier stages, of a statement
“it is not the case that e has exactly n stages and releases s at stage n ,”

where s is an explicitly listed sequence of numbers.

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where s is an explicitly listed sequence of numbers.

- In this case, release s at stage n . Proceed to next stage.

Proof of universal algorithm

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Self-reference

Use Kleene recursion theorem to find e , solving the circular definition.

Finiteness

Observation

The universal sequence is finite.

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Proof.

The successful fragments PA_k are getting smaller, so this can happen at most finitely many times.

Thus, the sequence enumerated by e will be finite.

And PA can undertake this argument. □

Empty in the standard model

Claim

If stage n is successful, then fragment PA_{k_n} is nonstandard.

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Consider last stage n . The assertion

“ e enumerates s with exactly n successful stages”

has complexity Σ_2^0 . For standard k , the Mostowski reflection theorem shows $\text{PA} \vdash \text{Con}(\text{Tr}_k)$.

So M cannot have proof from PA_k of something contrary to actual behavior. So k_n must be nonstandard. □

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In particular, e enumerates empty sequence in \mathbb{N} .

Proving the extension property of e

Assume e enumerates s in M and t is an extension of s .

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$PA_k +$ “ e has exactly n stages and enumerates t ”

is consistent.

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So N end-extends M and thinks e enumerates t , as desired. \square

It turns out that a number of classical results can be seen as immediate consequences of the universal algorithm.

Let us give a few of these examples.

Maximal Σ_1 diagrams

Corollary

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Proof.

In any model of arithmetic M , there is some stage n that is not successful, but can become successful in an end-extension.

So the extension has new Σ_1 facts: “stage n is successful.” \square

Independent Π_1^0 sentences

Corollary (Kripke, Mostowski)

There are infinitely many independent Π_1^0 sentences

$$\eta_0, \eta_1, \eta_2, \dots$$

Any desired true/false pattern is consistent with PA.

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Proof.

Let $\eta_k =$ “ k does not appear on the universal sequence.”

Independent buttons

Corollary “independent buttons”

There are Σ_1^0 sentences, all false in \mathbb{N} .

$$\rho_0, \rho_1, \rho_2, \dots$$

But over any model of arithmetic M , any addition set of them I , coded in M , can become true in an end-extension N .

- 1 $N \models \rho_k$ for all $k \in I$.
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Corollary “independent switches”

There is an infinite list of independent Orey sentences

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Proof.

Let $\sigma_k =$ “ k^{th} binary bit of the last number on the universal sequence is 1.” □

Flexible formulas

Corollary (Kripke)

There is a Σ_n formula $\varphi(x)$, for any $n \geq 2$, that can be made equivalent to any desired Σ_n formula $\phi(x)$ in an end-extension.

That is, for any $M \models \text{PA}$ and ϕ , there is an end-extension satisfying

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Proof.

Let $\varphi(x) = \Phi(k, x)$ where k is the last element of the universal sequence and Φ is a universal Σ_n formula. □

Set-theoretic analogue

What is the set-theoretic analogue of the universal algorithm?

One wants a version of the theorem for models of set theory.

Arithmetic vs. set theory

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$$\{x \mid \varphi(x)\} \quad \varphi(x) \leftrightarrow \exists \alpha V_\alpha \models \psi(x).$$

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Elementary Fact

Locally verifiable sets = Σ_2 definable.

Question

So the set-theoretic analogue of c.e. is Σ_2 definable.

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Question(Hamkins)

Is there a Σ_2 definable set $\{x \mid \varphi(x)\}$ with the following?

- ZFC proves $\{x \mid \varphi(x)\}$ is a set.
- For every countable model $M \models \text{ZFC}$, if

$$M \models \{x \mid \varphi(x)\} = y \subseteq z,$$

then there is top-extension N with

$$N \models \{x \mid \varphi(x)\} = z.$$

Partial progress

I had initially made partial progress.

- I could do it with Π_3 definitions.
- Or with Σ_2 , if you work only in models of certain theories, such as eventual GCH or $V \neq \text{HOD}$.
- Or with Σ_2 , if you allow $\{x \mid \varphi(x)\}$ to sometimes be a proper class.

Woodin and I began to work together on the problem in September.

Universal finite set

The question is answered in joint work with W. Hugh Woodin.

Theorem (Hamkins + Woodin)

There is a Σ_2 definition φ such that

- 1** *ZFC proves $\{x \mid \varphi(x)\}$ is finite.*

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There is a Σ_2 definition φ such that

- 1** *ZFC proves $\{x \mid \varphi(x)\}$ is finite.*
- 2** *If M is transitive, then $M \models \{x \mid \varphi(x)\} = \emptyset$.*
- 3** *If M is a countable model of ZFC with*

$$M \models \{x \mid \varphi(x)\} = y \subseteq z,$$

where z is finite in M , then there is top-extension N with

$$N \models \{x \mid \varphi(x)\} = z.$$

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And so on for other cardinals or other kinds of universal sets.

Also, there is a sequence version of the theorem.

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- Self-reference via Gödel-Carnap fixed-point rather than Kleene recursion.

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- The set is defined in stages.
- Look for absence of top-extensions of $\langle V_\beta, \in \rangle$, rather than for proofs.
- Sets are added at a stage if there is no suitable model in which they are added as the last elements.
- Self-reference via Gödel-Carnap fixed-point rather than Kleene recursion.
- Handling the ω -standard model case involves forcing and rank of well-founded trees.

For a detailed argument, see the paper or my slides from the Prague Gathering, Beauty of Logic 2018 conference last month.

Applications of the universal finite set

Let me mention a few applications of the universal finite set theorem.

No model of set theory has maximal Σ_2 diagram

Theorem

No model of set theory M has a maximal Σ_2 diagram.

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Proof.

If n is the first unsuccessful stage in M , then the assertion
“stage n is successful”

is Σ_2 assertion not yet true, but true in a top-extension of M . \square

Maximal Σ_2 extensions of ZFC

Meanwhile, we can easily construct maximal consistent Σ_2 extensions of ZFC.

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Implications for Maddy's MAXIMIZE in philosophy of set theory.

- Should maximize the sentences verifiable in some V_θ .
- But this never happens in well-founded models.
- Her principle therefore pushes us to ill-foundedness.

Σ_2 definability

Theorem

Every individual in a countable model of set theory M can become Σ_2 definable from a natural number parameter in a top-extension of M .

Indeed, there is a single definition and single parameter $n \in \omega^M$, such that every $a \in M$ is defined by that definition with that parameter in some top-extension N .

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Indeed, there is a single definition and single parameter $n \in \omega^M$, such that every $a \in M$ is defined by that definition with that parameter in some top-extension N .

Proof.

The definition is, “the unique set added at stage n ,” where n is the first unsuccessful stage in M . □

Everybody is possibly necessarily special

Corollary

Every individual in a countable ω -standard model of set theory can become Σ_2 definable, without parameters, in a top-extension.

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
Everybody can become special!

More precisely, in top-extensional potentialism, everybody is possibly necessarily special.

Since N is also ω -standard, the result can be iterated.

The tree of top-extensions

This picture leads into the topic of potentialism, which I recently spoke about at Oxford and at the Winter School in Hejnice.



We analyze the precise modal validities of set-theoretic top-extensional potentialism and other concepts of potentialism.

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Thank you.

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