Iterated Skolem paradox

On Skolem's paradox and the transitive submodel theorem

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Joint work with Timothy Button, UCL.

With thanks also to W. Hugh Woodin, Harvard.

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Thus our notions of countability and uncountability are not absolute.

Transitive models of set theory

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Also natural to focus on *transitive* models $\langle W, \in \rangle$, those for which all the actual elements of any set $a \in W$ are also in W.

Transitive models know fully about their sets.

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Note that the submodel $\langle U, \in \rangle$ may not be transitive.

In the nontransitive case, elements of U can be uncountable, even though U is countable.

A better paradox via Mostowski

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Mostowski collapse

Every well-founded extensional structure $\langle U, E \rangle$ is isomorphic to a transitive set via the Mostowski collapse

 $\pi(\mathbf{y}) = \{ \pi(\mathbf{x}) \mid \mathbf{x} \mathbf{E} \mathbf{y} \}.$

The range $M = \{ \pi(y) \mid y \in U \}$ is transitive, and

$$x E y \iff \pi(x) \in \pi(y).$$

So $\pi: \langle U, E \rangle \cong \langle M, \in \rangle$.

Main counterexample

Iterated Skolem paradox

Countable transitive models

Putting it together:




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
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


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Conclusion

If there is a transitive model of ZFC, then there is a countable transitive model of ZFC.

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Given Löwenheim-Skolem context, natural to take him as intending elementary submodel. Or just same theory?

From the Skolem paradox context, it is clear that he wants at least submodel \models ZF.

Stronger form in SEP

SEP entry on Skolem's paradox, Bays 2014

The *Downward Löwenheim-Skolem Theorem* says that if *N* is a model of (infinite) cardinality κ and if λ is an infinite cardinal smaller than κ , then *N* has a submodel of cardinality λ which satisfies exactly the same sentences as *N* itself does.

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Finally, the *Transitive Submodel Theorem* strengthens the downward Löwenheim-Skolem theorem by saying that if our initial *N* happens to be a so-called transitive model for the language of set theory, then the submodel generated by the downward theorem can also be chosen to be transitive.

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
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Seems to assert only the same theory for the submodel, rather than being an elementary submodel.

Main counterexample

The intended proof


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


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Indeed, we would expect an elementary embedding $j : M \to W$, since $j = \pi^{-1} : M \cong X \prec W$.

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
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


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Why should it stay as a submodel of W? I couldn't see why.

It was called the Transitive Submodel Theorem, but is it actually a theorem? We don't seem to have much reason to expect a transitive *submodel* $M \subseteq W$ with the same theory.

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A spectrum of Skolem reflection principles

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For every transitive $W \models$ ZFC, there is a countable transitive model *M* and elementary embedding *j* : *M* \rightarrow *W*.

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Transitive submodel of ZFC (weak reading of Benacerraf)

Every transitive model of set theory $W \models$ ZFC has a countable transitive submodel $M \subseteq W$ with $M \models$ ZFC.

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Transitive elementary submodel theorem (strong Benacerraf)

For every transitive model $W \models ZFC$ there is a countable transitive elementary submodel $M \prec W$.

Sorting it out

I should like to sort out the various principles, identify which are theorems, which are not, which are independent of ZFC, and investigate the consistency strengths of the principles and their negations.

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- For models $W \models \mathsf{ZFC} + V = L$
- For models $W \models$ ZFC with height having uncountable cofinality
- In particular, for models W of height ω_1
- For models $W \models \mathsf{ZFC}$ for which $\operatorname{Th}(W) \in W$.

Let me go through some of these arguments now.

Theorem

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 $j = \pi^{-1} : M \to W$ is elementary.

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Getting countable transitive submodels of ZFC

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This argument essentially proves the existence of the Shepherdson-Cohen model, the least $L_{\alpha} \models$ ZFC. This model is a submodel of all transitive models of ZF.

Theorem

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Let $\kappa = \sup_{n} \kappa_{n}$. Union of progressively elementary chain.

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Inside *W*, find *M* via LS+Mostowski, so $\exists j : M \rightarrow W_{\kappa} \prec W$.

Main counterexample

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Subtle issues about definability

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Indeed, since $W_{\kappa} \prec W$, all definable elements are below κ .

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In general, in ZFC we cannot say, "let κ be the supremum of the first Σ_n -correct cardinal for $n < \omega$."

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Definable cuts work in models of PA also.

Models arising from large cardinals

Corollary

If κ is an inaccessible cardinal, then V_{κ} has a countable transitive submodel $M \subseteq V_{\kappa}$ with the same theory, and indeed, there is such an M with an elementary embedding $j : M \to V_{\kappa}$ with both $M, j \in V_{\kappa}$.

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Does not (yet) cover worldly cardinals, $V_{\kappa} \models$ ZFC, since these can be singular.

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Suppose $W \models ZFC$ is transitive and contains its own theory as an element $Th(W) \in W$. Then there is a countable transitive submodel $M \subseteq W$ with the same theory. For uncountable W, can find $M \in W$.

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Corollary

If V = L, then the transitive submodel theorem is true—every transitive $W \models ZFC$ has countable transitive submodel $M \subseteq W$ with same theory.

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So there is countable transitive $M \subseteq W$ with same theory.

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Can find a club of elementary substructures $(V_{\kappa})^{W} \prec W$, which each serve as an M.

On Skolem's paradox and the transitive submodel theorem

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It was troubling to determine whether it was indeed a theorem or not.

Ultimately, however, it turns out the principle is overstated—it is not a theorem of ZFC.

Let me present a counterexample.

Counterexample theorem

Under suitable assumptions, there is a transitive model of ZFC having no countable transitive submodel with the same theory.

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- There is a nonconstructible real number, and
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Both assumptions are necessary.

- If every real is constructible, the transitive submodel theorem holds.
- If transitive models have height at most ω₁, then strong Benacerraf holds.

Main Lemma

If $L_{\theta}[x]$ is an uncountable transitive model of ZFC, containing x as an element, then the following are equivalent.

- 1 There is a countable transitive submodel $M \subseteq L_{\theta}[x]$ with the same theory as $L_{\theta}[x]$.
- 2 There is a countable transitive model *M* ∈ *L*_θ[*x*] with the same theory as *L*_θ[*x*].
- **3** The theory of $L_{\theta}[x]$ is an element of $L_{\theta}[x]$.

Proof.

Key step, for $(1 \rightarrow 2)$, if $M \subseteq L_{\theta}[x]$ has same theory, then $M = L_{\alpha}[\bar{x}]$ for some $\bar{x} \in M \subseteq W$ and countable α , so $M \in L_{\theta}[x]$.

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Key step, for $(1 \rightarrow 2)$, if $M \subseteq L_{\theta}[x]$ has same theory, then $M = L_{\alpha}[\bar{x}]$ for some $\bar{x} \in M \subseteq W$ and countable α , so $M \in L_{\theta}[x]$.

So containing own theory is necessary and sufficient for the transitive submodel theorem for models of form L[x].

Iterated Skolem paradox

Counterexample proof sketch

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Follows that $\lambda = \sup_{n} \lambda_{n}$. Singular in *V*, regular in L_{θ} .

Similar analysis shows that for any $\leq \omega_1$ -distributive forcing notion $\mathbb{P} \in L_{\theta}$, we can construct in *V* an L_{θ} -generic $G \subseteq \mathbb{P}$.

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So Th(W) $\notin W$.

Since *W* has form $L_{\theta}[x]$, this is a counterexample to the countable transitive submodel theorem. \Box

Iterated Skolem paradox

Necessary and sufficient characterization

Since the hypotheses were necessary, we may deduce:

Corollary

The transitive submodel principle holds if and only if every real is constructible or all transitive models of ZFC have height at most ω_1 .

All the usual large cardinals imply that there are transitive models of ZFC taller than ω_1 .

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And all moderately large large cardinals imply that there are nonconstructible reals, such as 0^{\sharp} .

So all such large cardinals directly refute the countable transitive submodel principle.

Thus, the countable transitive submodel principle can be seen as an anti-large-cardinal principle

Consistency strength

It follows that the transitive submodel proposition is equiconsistent with ZFC.

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The reason is simply that the transitive submodel proposition is vacuously true if there are no transitive models of ZFC, or indeed if merely there are no uncountable transitive models.

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The reason is simply that the transitive submodel proposition is vacuously true if there are no transitive models of ZFC, or indeed if merely there are no uncountable transitive models.

Alternative proof: the transitive submodel principle follows from V = L, which is equiconsistent with ZFC.

Since the transitive submodel principle is an anti-large cardinal principle, it is the *negation* that has interesting consistency strength.

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Conversely, if *W* is an uncountable transitive model, then if height of *W* is $> \omega_1$, we get the counterexample in a Cohen extension.

And if height of W is exactly ω_1 , then ω_1 is inaccessible in L, and so there are counterexamples in L.

Provable instances

Main counterexample

Iterated Skolem paradox

Submodels versus elements

A further subtle matter.

On Skolem's paradox and the transitive submodel theorem

Joel David Hamkins

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In most of the instances with uncountable transitive $W \models ZFC$ where we found countable transitive $M \subseteq W$ with same theory, we actually had $M \in W$.

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Is this necessary?

Provable instances

Main counterexample

Iterated Skolem paradox

Submodel but no element

The answer is no.

On Skolem's paradox and the transitive submodel theorem

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Submodel but no element

The answer is no.

Theorem

If there is a nonconstructible real number and there is a transitive model of ZFC with height exceeding ω_1 , then there is an uncountable transitive model W of ZFC that admits a countable transitive submodel $M \subseteq W$ with the same theory, but admits no such model M as an element $M \in W$.

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The proof is a class-forcing version of the main counterexample argument. We arrange a submodel $M \subseteq W$, but $Th(W) \notin W$.

Submodel versus embedding

There are many similar questions regarding the distinction between having $M \subseteq W$ with same theory and having $M \subseteq W$ with $j: M \rightarrow W$.


Submodel versus embedding

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This is part of ongoing work.

Addendum on the iterated Skolem paradox

Skolem observed that a model of set theory M can be wrong in its judgment that a set is uncountable.




If *M* is any countable model of ZFC, then the set of real numbers \mathbb{R}^M is uncountable from *M*'s perspective, but countable outside *M*.

Judgments that a set is countable or uncountable can thus depend on the set-theoretic background in which they are made.

Reverse Skolem paradox


We can also arrange the reverse situation, where a set is countable inside a model W, but uncountable outside.



For example, take the theory ZFC with uncountably many constants n_{α} , asserting they are pairwise distinct natural numbers. By compactness, there is a model.


Extreme reverse Skolem paradox

By pushing this harder, we can have all $n_{\alpha} < x$ for some natural number *x* in *W*.



Iterated nonabsoluteness

There are models $M_0 \subseteq M_1 \subseteq M_2$ of ZFC viewing a set *x* as finite, then uncountable, and finally countably infinite:



Indefinitely iterated indefiniteness

Indeed, we can extend the pattern of indefiniteness indefinitely.

M ₀	<i>M</i> ₁	<i>M</i> ₂	<i>M</i> ₃	<i>M</i> ₄	<i>M</i> 5	
x is finite	<i>x</i> is uncountable	<i>x</i> is countable	<i>x</i> is uncountable	<i>x</i> is countable	<i>x</i> is uncountable	

Finiteness is downwards absolute from any metatheoretic context to the models available there.

Thank you.

Slides and articles available on http://jdh.hamkins.org.

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VRF, Mathematical Intitute University of Oxford

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