New inconsistencies in infinite utilitarianism

  • D. Fishkind, J. D. Hamkins, and B. Montero, “New inconsistencies in infinite utilitarianism,” Australasian J.~Philosophy, vol. 80, iss. 2, pp. 178-190, 2002.  
    @article{FishkindHamkinsMontero2002:NewInconsistencies,
    author = {Donniell Fishkind and Joel David Hamkins and Barbara Montero},
    title = {New inconsistencies in infinite utilitarianism},
    journal = {Australasian J.~Philosophy},
    year = {2002},
    volume = {80},
    number = {2},
    pages = {178--190},
    month = {},
    note = {},
    key = {},
    annote = {},
    url = {http://jdh.hamkins.org/newinconsistencies},
    doi = {10.1093/ajp/80.2.178},
    note = {},
    }

In the context of worlds with infinitely many bearers of utility, we argue that several collections of natural Utilitarian principles–principles which are certainly true in the classical finite Utilitarian context and which any Utilitarian would find appealing–are inconsistent.

Barbara Gail Montero

With infinite utility, more needn’t be better

  • J. D. Hamkins and B. Montero, “With infinite utility, more needn’t be better,” Australasian J.~Philosophy, vol. 78, iss. 2, pp. 231-240, 2000.  
    @article{HamkinsMontero2000:MoreBetter,
    author = {Joel David Hamkins and Barbara Montero},
    title = {With infinite utility, more needn't be better},
    journal = {Australasian J.~Philosophy},
    volume = {78},
    number = {2},
    year = {2000},
    pages = {231--240},
    url = {http://jdh.hamkins.org/infinite-utility-more-better},
    doi = {10.1080/00048400012349511},
    }

Barbara Gail Montero

Utilitarianism in infinite worlds

  • J. D. Hamkins and B. Montero, “Utilitarianism in infinite worlds,” Utilitas, vol. 12, iss. 1, pp. 91-96, 2000.  
    @article{HamkinsMontero2000:InfiniteWorlds,
    author = {Joel David Hamkins and Barbara Montero},
    title = {Utilitarianism in infinite worlds},
    journal = {Utilitas},
    volume = {12},
    number = {1},
    year = {2000},
    pages = {91--96},
    url = {http://jdh.hamkins.org/infiniteworlds},
    doi = {10.1017/S0953820800002648},
    }

Recently in the philosophical literature there has been some effort made to understand the proper application of the theory of utilitarianism to worlds in which there are infinitely many bearers of utility. Here, we point out that one of the best, most inclusive principles proposed to date contradicts fundamental utilitarian ideas, such as the idea that adding more utility makes a better world.

Barbara Gail Montero