Tag Archives: Victoria Gitman

Kelley-Morse set theory does not prove the class Fodor principle

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    1. [bibtex key=”GitmanHamkinsKaragila:KM-set-theory-does-not-prove-the-class-Fodor-theorem”]

Abstract.
We show that Kelley-Morse (KM) set theory does not prove the class Fodor principle, the assertion that every regressive class function $F:S\to\newcommand\Ord{\text{Ord}}\Ord$ defined on a stationary class $S$ is constant on a stationary subclass. Indeed, it is relatively consistent with KM for any infinite $\lambda$ with $\omega\leq\lambda\leq\Ord$ that there is a class function $F:\Ord\to\lambda$ that is not constant on any stationary class. Strikingly, it is consistent with KM that there is a class $A\subseteq\omega\times\Ord$, such that each section $A_n=\{\alpha\mid (n,\alpha)\in A\}$ contains a class club, but $\bigcap_n A_n$ is empty. Consequently, it is relatively consistent with KM that the class club filter is not $\sigma$-closed.

The class Fodor principle is the assertion that every regressive class function $F:S\to\Ord$ defined on a stationary class $S$ is constant on a stationary subclass of $S$. This statement can be expressed in the usual second-order language of set theory, and the principle can therefore be sensibly considered in the context of any of the various second-order set-theoretic systems, such as Gödel-Bernays (GBC) set theory or Kelley-Morse (KM) set theory. Just as with the classical Fodor’s lemma in first-order set theory, the class Fodor principle is equivalent, over a weak base theory, to the assertion that the class club filter is normal. We shall investigate the strength of the class Fodor principle and try to find its place within the natural hierarchy of second-order set theories. We shall also define and study weaker versions of the class Fodor principle.

If one tries to prove the class Fodor principle by adapting one of the classical proofs of the first-order Fodor’s lemma, then one inevitably finds oneself needing to appeal to a certain second-order class-choice principle, which goes beyond the axiom of choice and the global choice principle, but which is not available in Kelley-Morse set theory. For example, in one standard proof, we would want for a given $\Ord$-indexed sequence of non-stationary classes to be able to choose for each member of it a class club that it misses. This would be an instance of class-choice, since we seek to choose classes here, rather than sets. The class choice principle $\text{CC}(\Pi^0_1)$, it turns out, is sufficient for us to make these choices, for this principle states that if every ordinal $\alpha$ admits a class $A$ witnessing a $\Pi^0_1$-assertion $\varphi(\alpha,A)$, allowing class parameters, then there is a single class $B\subseteq \Ord\times V$, whose slices $B_\alpha$ witness $\varphi(\alpha,B_\alpha)$; and the property of being a class club avoiding a given class is $\Pi^0_1$ expressible.

Thus, the class Fodor principle, and consequently also the normality of the class club filter, is provable in the relatively weak second-order set theory $\text{GBC}+\text{CC}(\Pi^0_1)$. This theory is known to be weaker in consistency strength than the theory $\text{GBC}+\Pi^1_1$-comprehension, which is itself strictly weaker in consistency strength than KM.

But meanwhile, although the class choice principle is weak in consistency strength, it is not actually provable in KM; indeed, even the weak fragment $\text{CC}(\Pi^0_1)$ is not provable in KM. Those results were proved several years ago by the first two authors, but they can now be seen as consequences of the main result of this article (see corollary 15. In light of that result, however, one should perhaps not have expected to be able to prove the class Fodor principle in KM.

Indeed, it follows similarly from arguments of the third author in his dissertation that if $\kappa$ is an inaccessible cardinal, then there is a forcing extension $V[G]$ with a symmetric submodel $M$ such that $V_\kappa^M=V_\kappa$, which implies that $\mathcal M=(V_\kappa,\in, V^M_{\kappa+1})$ is a model of Kelley-Morse, and in $\mathcal M$, the class Fodor principle fails in a very strong sense.

In this article, adapting the ideas of Karagila to the second-order set-theoretic context and using similar methods as in Gitman and Hamkins’s previous work on KM, we shall prove that every model of KM has an extension in which the class Fodor principle fails in that strong sense: there can be a class function $F:\Ord\to\omega$, which is not constant on any stationary class. In particular, in these models, the class club filter is not $\sigma$-closed: there is a class $B\subseteq\omega\times\Ord$, each of whose vertical slices $B_n$ contains a class club, but $\bigcap B_n$ is empty.

Main Theorem. Kelley-Morse set theory KM, if consistent, does not prove the class Fodor principle. Indeed, if there is a model of KM, then there is a model of KM with a class function $F:\Ord\to \omega$, which is not constant on any stationary class; in this model, therefore, the class club filter is not $\sigma$-closed.

We shall also investigate various weak versions of the class Fodor principle.

Definition.

  1. For a cardinal $\kappa$, the class $\kappa$-Fodor principle asserts that every class function $F:S\to\kappa$ defined on a stationary class $S\subseteq\Ord$ is constant on a stationary subclass of $S$.
  2. The class ${<}\Ord$-Fodor principle is the assertion that the $\kappa$-class Fodor principle holds for every cardinal $\kappa$.
  3. The bounded class Fodor principle asserts that every regressive class function $F:S\to\Ord$ on a stationary class $S\subseteq\Ord$ is bounded on a stationary subclass of $S$.
  4. The very weak class Fodor principle asserts that every regressive class function $F:S\to\Ord$ on a stationary class $S\subseteq\Ord$ is constant on an unbounded subclass of $S$.

We shall separate these principles as follows.

Theorem. Suppose KM is consistent.

  1. There is a model of KM in which the class Fodor principle fails, but the class ${<}\Ord$-Fodor principle holds.
  2. There is a model of KM in which the class $\omega$-Fodor principle fails, but the bounded class Fodor principle holds.
  3. There is a model of KM in which the class $\omega$-Fodor principle holds, but the bounded class Fodor principle fails.
  4. $\text{GB}^-$ proves the very weak class Fodor principle.

Finally, we show that the class Fodor principle can neither be created nor destroyed by set forcing.

Theorem. The class Fodor principle is invariant by set forcing over models of $\text{GBC}^-$. That is, it holds in an extension if and only if it holds in the ground model.

Let us conclude this brief introduction by mentioning the following easy negative instance of the class Fodor principle for certain GBC models. This argument seems to be a part of set-theoretic folklore. Namely, consider an $\omega$-standard model of GBC set theory $M$ having no $V_\kappa^M$ that is a model of ZFC. A minimal transitive model of ZFC, for example, has this property. Inside $M$, let $F(\kappa)$ be the least $n$ such that $V_\kappa^M$ fails to satisfy $\Sigma_n$-collection. This is a definable class function $F:\Ord^M\to\omega$ in $M$, but it cannot be constant on any stationary class in $M$, because by the reflection theorem there is a class club of cardinals $\kappa$ such that $V_\kappa^M$ satisfies $\Sigma_n$-collection.

Read more by going to the full article: [bibtex key=”GitmanHamkinsKaragila:KM-set-theory-does-not-prove-the-class-Fodor-theorem”]

 

 

The exact strength of the class forcing theorem

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[bibtex key=”GitmanHamkinsHolySchlichtWilliams2020:The-exact-strength-of-the-class-forcing-theorem”]

Abstract. The class forcing theorem, which asserts that every class forcing notion $\newcommand\P{\mathbb{P}}\P$ admits a forcing relation $\newcommand\forces{\Vdash}\forces_\P$, that is, a relation satisfying the forcing relation recursion — it follows that statements true in the corresponding forcing extensions are forced and forced statements are true — is equivalent over Gödel-Bernays set theory GBC to the principle of elementary transfinite recursion $\newcommand\Ord{\text{Ord}}\newcommand\ETR{\text{ETR}}\ETR_{\Ord}$ for class recursions of length $\Ord$. It is also equivalent to the existence of truth predicates for the infinitary languages $\mathcal{L}_{\Ord,\omega}(\in,A)$, allowing any class parameter $A$; to the existence of truth predicates for the language $\mathcal{L}_{\Ord,\Ord}(\in,A)$; to the existence of $\Ord$-iterated truth predicates for first-order set theory $\mathcal{L}_{\omega,\omega}(\in,A)$; to the assertion that every separative class partial order $\P$ has a set-complete class Boolean completion; to a class-join separation principle; and to the principle of determinacy for clopen class games of rank at most $\Ord+1$. Unlike set forcing, if every class forcing relation $\P$ has a forcing relation merely for atomic formulas, then every such $\P$ has a uniform forcing relation that applies uniformly to all formulas. Our results situate the class forcing theorem in the rich hierarchy of theories between GBC and Kelley-Morse set theory KM.

We shall characterize the exact strength of the class forcing theorem, which asserts that every class forcing notion $\P$ has a corresponding forcing relation $\forces_\P$, a relation satisfying the forcing relation recursion. When there is such a forcing relation, then statements true in any corresponding forcing extension are forced and forced statements are true in those extensions.

Unlike the case of set forcing, where one may prove in ZFC that every set forcing notion has corresponding forcing relations, for class forcing it is consistent with Gödel-Bernays set theory GBC that there is a proper class forcing notion lacking a corresponding forcing relation, even merely for the atomic formulas. For certain forcing notions, the existence of an atomic forcing relation implies Con(ZFC) and much more, and so the consistency strength of the class forcing theorem strictly exceeds GBC, if this theory is consistent. Nevertheless, the class forcing theorem is provable in stronger theories, such as Kelley-Morse set theory. What is the exact strength of the class forcing theorem?

Our project here is to identify the strength of the class forcing theorem by situating it in the rich hierarchy of theories between GBC and KM, displayed in part in the figure above, with the class forcing theorem highlighted in blue. It turns out that the class forcing theorem is equivalent over GBC to an attractive collection of several other natural set-theoretic assertions; it is a robust axiomatic principle.

Hierarchy between GBC and KM

The main theorem is naturally part of the emerging subject we call the reverse mathematics of second-order set theory, a higher analogue of the perhaps more familiar reverse mathematics of second-order arithmetic. In this new research area, we are concerned with the hierarchy of second-order set theories between GBC and KM and beyond, analyzing the strength of various assertions in second-order set theory, such as the principle ETR of elementary transfinite recursion, the principle of $\Pi^1_1$-comprehension or the principle of determinacy for clopen class games. We fit these set-theoretic principles into the hierarchy of theories over the base theory GBC. The main theorem of this article does exactly this with the class forcing theorem by finding its exact strength in relation to nearby theories in this hierarchy.

Main Theorem. The following are equivalent over Gödel-Bernays set theory.

  1. The atomic class forcing theorem: every class forcing notion admits forcing relations for atomic formulas $$p\forces\sigma=\tau\qquad\qquad p\forces\sigma\in\tau.$$
  2. The class forcing theorem scheme: for each first-order formula $\varphi$ in the forcing language, with finitely many class names $\dot \Gamma_i$, there is a forcing relation applicable to this formula and its subformulas
    $$p\forces\varphi(\vec \tau,\dot\Gamma_0,\ldots,\dot\Gamma_m).$$
  3. The uniform first-order class forcing theorem: every class forcing notion $\P$ admits a uniform forcing relation $$p\forces\varphi(\vec \tau),$$ applicable to all assertions $\varphi$ in the first-order forcing language with finitely many class names $\mathcal{L}_{\omega,\omega}(\in,V^\P,\dot\Gamma_0,\ldots,\dot\Gamma_m)$.
  4. The uniform infinitary class forcing theorem: every class forcing notion $\P$ admits a uniform forcing relation $$p\forces\varphi(\vec \tau),$$ applicable to all assertions $\varphi$ in the infinitary forcing language with finitely many class names $\mathcal{L}_{\Ord,\Ord}(\in,V^\P,\dot\Gamma_0,\ldots,\dot\Gamma_m)$.
  5. Names for truth predicates: every class forcing notion $\P$ has a class name $\newcommand\T{{\rm T}}\dot\T$ and a forcing relation for which $1\forces\dot\T$ is a truth-predicate for the first-order forcing language with finitely many class names $\mathcal{L}_{\omega,\omega}(\in,V^\P,\dot\Gamma_0,\ldots,\dot\Gamma_m)$.
  6. Every class forcing notion $\P$, that is, every separative class partial order, admits a Boolean completion $\mathbb{B}$, a set-complete class Boolean algebra into which $\P$ densely embeds.
  7. The class-join separation principle plus $\ETR_{\Ord}$-foundation.
  8. For every class $A$, there is a truth predicate for $\mathcal{L}_{\Ord,\omega}(\in,A)$.
  9. For every class $A$, there is a truth predicate for $\mathcal{L}_{\Ord,\Ord}(\in,A)$.
  10. For every class $A$, there is an $\Ord$-iterated truth predicate for $\mathcal{L}_{\omega,\omega}(\in,A)$.
  11. The principle of determinacy for clopen class games of rank at most $\Ord+1$.
  12. The principle $\ETR_{\Ord}$ of elementary transfinite recursion for $\Ord$-length recursions of first-order properties, using any class parameter.

Implication cycle 12

We prove the theorem by establishing the complete cycle of indicated implications. The red arrows indicate more difficult or substantive implications, while the blue arrows indicate easier or nearly immediate implications. The green dashed implication from statement (12) to statement (1), while not needed for the completeness of the implication cycle, is nevertheless used in the proof that (12) implies (4). The proof of (12) implies (7) also uses (8), which follows from the fact that (12) implies (9) implies (8).

For more, download the paper from the arxiv: [bibtex key=”GitmanHamkinsHolySchlichtWilliams:The-exact-strength-of-the-class-forcing-theorem”]

See also Victoria’s post, Kameryn’s post.

A model of the generic Vopěnka principle in which the ordinals are not $\Delta_2$-Mahlo

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[bibtex key=”GitmanHamkins2018:A-model-of-the-generic-Vopenka-principle-in-which-the-ordinals-are-not-Mahlo”]

Abstract. The generic Vopěnka principle, we prove, is relatively consistent with the ordinals being non-Mahlo. Similarly, the generic Vopěnka scheme is relatively consistent with the ordinals being definably non-Mahlo. Indeed, the generic Vopěnka scheme is relatively consistent with the existence of a $\Delta_2$-definable class containing no regular cardinals. In such a model, there can be no $\Sigma_2$-reflecting cardinals and hence also no remarkable cardinals. This latter fact answers negatively a question of Bagaria, Gitman and Schindler.

 

The Vopěnka principle is the assertion that for every proper class of first-order structures in a fixed language, one of the structures embeds elementarily into another. This principle can be formalized as a single second-order statement in Gödel-Bernays set-theory GBC, and it has a variety of useful equivalent characterizations. For example, the Vopěnka principle holds precisely when for every class $A$, the universe has an $A$-extendible cardinal, and it is also equivalent to the assertion that for every class $A$, there is a stationary proper class of $A$-extendible cardinals (see theorem 6 in my paper The Vopěnka principle is inequivalent to but conservative over the Vopěnka scheme) In particular, the Vopěnka principle implies that ORD is Mahlo: every class club contains a regular cardinal and indeed, an extendible cardinal and more.

To define these terms, recall that a cardinal $\kappa$ is extendible, if for every $\lambda>\kappa$, there is an ordinal $\theta$ and an elementary embedding $j:V_\lambda\to V_\theta$ with critical point $\kappa$. It turns out that, in light of the Kunen inconsistency, this weak form of extendibility is equivalent to a stronger form, where one insists also that $\lambda<j(\kappa)$; but there is a subtle issue about this that comes up with the virtual forms of these axioms, where the virtual weak and virtual strong forms are no longer equivalent. Relativizing to a class parameter, a cardinal $\kappa$ is $A$-extendible for a class $A$, if for every $\lambda>\kappa$, there is an elementary embedding
$$j:\langle V_\lambda, \in, A\cap V_\lambda\rangle\to \langle V_\theta,\in,A\cap V_\theta\rangle$$
with critical point $\kappa$, and again one may equivalently insist also that $\lambda<j(\kappa)$. Every such $A$-extendible cardinal is therefore extendible and hence inaccessible, measurable, supercompact and more. These are amongst the largest large cardinals.

In the first-order ZFC context, set theorists commonly consider a first-order version of the Vopěnka principle, which we call the Vopěnka scheme, the scheme making the Vopěnka assertion of each definable class separately, allowing parameters. That is, the Vopěnka scheme asserts, of every formula $\varphi$, that for any parameter $p$, if $\{\,x\mid \varphi(x,p)\,\}$ is a proper class of first-order structures in a common language, then one of those structures elementarily embeds into another.

The Vopěnka scheme is naturally stratified by the assertions $\text{VP}(\Sigma_n)$, for the particular natural numbers $n$ in the meta-theory, where $\text{VP}(\Sigma_n)$ makes the Vopěnka assertion for all $\Sigma_n$-definable classes. Using the definable $\Sigma_n$-truth predicate, each assertion $\text{VP}(\Sigma_n)$ can be expressed as a single first-order statement in the language of set theory.

In my previous paper, The Vopěnka principle is inequivalent to but conservative over the Vopěnka scheme, I proved that the Vopěnka principle is not provably equivalent to the Vopěnka scheme, if consistent, although they are equiconsistent over GBC and furthermore, the Vopěnka principle is conservative over the Vopěnka scheme for first-order assertions. That is, over GBC the two versions of the Vopěnka principle have exactly the same consequences in the first-order language of set theory.

In this article, Gitman and I are concerned with the virtual forms of the Vopěnka principles. The main idea of virtualization, due to Schindler, is to weaken elementary-embedding existence assertions to the assertion that such embeddings can be found in a forcing extension of the universe. Gitman and Schindler had emphasized that the remarkable cardinals, for example, instantiate the virtualized form of supercompactness via the Magidor characterization of supercompactness. This virtualization program has now been undertaken with various large cardinals, leading to fruitful new insights.

Carrying out the virtualization idea with the Vopěnka principles, we define the generic Vopěnka principle to be the second-order assertion in GBC that for every proper class of first-order structures in a common language, one of the structures admits, in some forcing extension of the universe, an elementary embedding into another. That is, the structures themselves are in the class in the ground model, but you may have to go to the forcing extension in order to find the elementary embedding.

Similarly, the generic Vopěnka scheme, introduced by Bagaria, Gitman and Schindler, is the assertion (in ZFC or GBC) that for every first-order definable proper class of first-order structures in a common language, one of the structures admits, in some forcing extension, an elementary embedding into another.

On the basis of their work, Bagaria, Gitman and Schindler had asked the following question:

Question. If the generic Vopěnka scheme holds, then must there be a proper class of remarkable cardinals?

There seemed good reason to expect an affirmative answer, even assuming only $\text{gVP}(\Sigma_2)$, based on strong analogies with the non-generic case. Specifically, in the non-generic context Bagaria had proved that $\text{VP}(\Sigma_2)$ was equivalent to the existence of a proper class of supercompact cardinals, while in the virtual context, Bagaria, Gitman and Schindler proved that the generic form $\text{gVP}(\Sigma_2)$ was equiconsistent with a proper class of remarkable cardinals, the virtual form of supercompactness. Similarly, higher up, in the non-generic context Bagaria had proved that $\text{VP}(\Sigma_{n+2})$ is equivalent to the existence of a proper class of $C^{(n)}$-extendible cardinals, while in the virtual context, Bagaria, Gitman and Schindler proved that the generic form $\text{gVP}(\Sigma_{n+2})$ is equiconsistent with a proper class of virtually $C^{(n)}$-extendible cardinals.

But further, they achieved direct implications, with an interesting bifurcation feature that specifically suggested an affirmative answer to the question above. Namely, what they showed at the $\Sigma_2$-level is that if there is a proper class of remarkable cardinals, then $\text{gVP}(\Sigma_2)$ holds, and conversely if $\text{gVP}(\Sigma_2)$ holds, then there is either a proper class of remarkable cardinals or a proper class of virtually rank-into-rank cardinals. And similarly, higher up, if there is a proper class of virtually $C^{(n)}$-extendible cardinals, then $\text{gVP}(\Sigma_{n+2})$ holds, and conversely, if $\text{gVP}(\Sigma_{n+2})$ holds, then either there is a proper class of virtually $C^{(n)}$-extendible cardinals or there is a proper class of virtually rank-into-rank cardinals. So in each case, the converse direction achieves a disjunction with the target cardinal and the virtually rank-into-rank cardinals. But since the consistency strength of the virtually rank-into-rank cardinals is strictly stronger than the generic Vopěnka principle itself, one can conclude on consistency-strength grounds that it isn’t always relevant, and for this reason, it seemed natural to inquire whether this second possibility in the bifurcation could simply be removed. That is, it seemed natural to expect an affirmative answer to the question, even assuming only $\text{gVP}(\Sigma_2)$, since such an answer would resolve the bifurcation issue and make a tighter analogy with the corresponding results in the non-generic/non-virtual case.

In this article, however, we shall answer the question negatively. The details of our argument seem to suggest that a robust analogy with the non-generic/non-virtual principles is achieved not with the virtual $C^{(n)}$-cardinals, but with a weakening of that property that drops the requirement that $\lambda<j(\kappa)$. Indeed, our results seems to offer an illuminating resolution of the bifurcation aspect of the results we mentioned from Bagaria, Gitmand and Schindler, because it provides outright virtual large-cardinal equivalents of the stratified generic Vopěnka principles. Because the resulting virtual large cardinals are not necessarily remarkable, however, our main theorem shows that it is relatively consistent with even the full generic Vopěnka principle that there are no $\Sigma_2$-reflecting cardinals and therefore no remarkable cardinals.

Main Theorem.

  1. It is relatively consistent that GBC and the generic Vopěnka principle holds, yet ORD is not Mahlo.
  2. It is relatively consistent that ZFC and the generic Vopěnka scheme holds, yet ORD is not definably Mahlo, and not even $\Delta_2$-Mahlo. In such a model, there can be no $\Sigma_2$-reflecting cardinals and therefore also no remarkable cardinals.

For more, go to the arcticle:

[bibtex key=”GitmanHamkins2018:A-model-of-the-generic-Vopenka-principle-in-which-the-ordinals-are-not-Mahlo”]

Open determinacy for class games

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[bibtex key=GitmanHamkins2016:OpenDeterminacyForClassGames]

Abstract. The principle of open determinacy for class games — two-player games of perfect information with plays of length $\omega$, where the moves are chosen from a possibly proper class, such as games on the ordinals — is not provable in Zermelo-Fraenkel set theory ZFC or Godel-Bernays set theory GBC, if these theories are consistent, because provably in ZFC there is a definable open proper class game with no definable winning strategy. In fact, the principle of open determinacy and even merely clopen determinacy for class games implies Con(ZFC) and iterated instances Con(Con(ZFC)) and more, because it implies that there is a satisfaction class for first-order truth, and indeed a transfinite tower of truth predicates $\text{Tr}_\alpha$ for iterated truth-about-truth, relative to any class parameter. This is perhaps explained, in light of the Tarskian recursive definition of truth, by the more general fact that the principle of clopen determinacy is exactly equivalent over GBC to the principle of transfinite recursion over well-founded class relations. Meanwhile, the principle of open determinacy for class games is provable in the stronger theory GBC$+\Pi^1_1$-comprehension, a proper fragment of Kelley-Morse set theory KM.

See my earlier posts on part of this material:

 

Ehrenfeucht’s lemma in set theory

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[bibtex key=FuchsGitmanHamkins2018:EhrenfeuchtsLemmaInSetTheory]

This is joint work with Gunter Fuchs and Victoria Gitman. $\newcommand\HOD{\text{HOD}}\newcommand\Ehrenfeucht{\text{EL}}$

Abstract. Ehrenfeucht’s lemma asserts that whenever one element of a model of Peano arithmetic is definable from another, then they satisfy different types. We consider here the analogue of Ehrenfeucht’s lemma for models of set theory. The original argument applies directly to the ordinal-definable elements of any model of set theory, and in particular, Ehrenfeucht’s lemma holds fully for models of set theory satisfying $V=\HOD$. We show that the lemma can fail, however, in models of set theory with $V\neq\HOD$, and it necessarily fails in the forcing extension to add a generic Cohen real. We go on to formulate a scheme of natural parametric generalizations of Ehrenfeucht’s lemma, namely, the principles of the form $\Ehrenfeucht(A,P,Q)$, which asserts that whenever an object $b$ is definable in $M$ from some $a\in A$ using parameters in $P$, with $b\neq a$, then the types of $a$ and $b$ over $Q$ in $M$ are different. We also consider various analogues of Ehrenfeucht’s lemma obtained by using algebraicity in place of definability, where a set $b$ is \emph{algebraic} in $a$ if it is a member of a finite set definable from $a$ (as in J. D. Hamkins and C. Leahy, Algebraicity and implicit definability in set theory). Ehrenfeucht’s lemma holds for the ordinal-algebraic sets, we prove, if and only if the ordinal-algebraic and ordinal-definable sets coincide. Using similar analysis, we answer two open questions posed in my paper with Leahy, by showing that (i) algebraicity and definability need not coincide in models of set theory and (ii) the internal and external notions of being ordinal algebraic need not coincide.

Incomparable $\omega_1$-like models of set theory

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[bibtex key=FuchsGitmanHamkins2017:IncomparableOmega1-likeModelsOfSetTheory]

This is joint work with Gunter Fuchs and Victoria Gitman.

Abstract. We show that the analogues of the Hamkins embedding theorems, proved for the countable models of set theory, do not hold when extended to the uncountable realm of $\omega_1$-like models of set theory. Specifically, under the $\diamondsuit$ hypothesis and suitable consistency assumptions, we show that there is a family of $2^{\omega_1}$ many $\omega_1$-like models of $\text{ZFC}$, all with the same ordinals, that are pairwise incomparable under embeddability; there can be a transitive $\omega_1$-like model of ZFC that does not embed into its own constructible universe; and there can be an $\omega_1$-like model of PA whose structure of hereditarily finite sets is not universal for the $\omega_1$-like models of set theory.

In this article, we consider the question of whether the embedding theorems of my article, Every countable model of set theory embeds into its own constructible universe, which concern the countable models of set theory, might extend to the realm of uncountable models. Specifically, in that paper I had proved that (1) any two countable models of set theory are comparable by embeddability; indeed, (2) one countable model of set theory embeds into another just in case the ordinals of the first order-embed into the ordinals of the second; consequently, (3) every countable model of set theory embeds into its own constructible universe; and furthermore, (4) every countable model of set theory embeds into the hereditarily finite sets $\langle\text{HF},{\in}\rangle^M$ of any nonstandard model of arithmetic $M\models\text{PA}$. The question we consider here is, do the analogous results hold for uncountable models? Our answer is that they do not. Indeed, we shall prove that the corresponding statements do not hold even in the special case of $\omega_1$-like models of set theory, which otherwise among uncountable models often exhibit a special affinity with the countable models. Specifically, we shall construct large families of pairwise incomparable $\omega_1$-like models of set theory, even though they all have the same ordinals; we shall construct $\omega_1$-like models of set theory that do not embed into their own $L$; and we shall construct $\omega_1$-like models of \PA\ that are not universal for all $\omega_1$-like models of set theory.

The embedding theorems are expressed collectively in the theorem below. An embedding of one model $\langle M,{\in^M}\rangle$ of set theory into another $\langle N,{\in^N}\rangle$ is simply a function $j:M\to N$ for which $x\in^My\longleftrightarrow j(x)\in^Nj(y)$, for all $x,y\in M$, and in this case we say that $\langle M,{\in^M}\rangle$ embeds into $\langle N,{\in^N}\rangle$; note by extensionality that every embedding is injective. Thus, an embedding is simply an isomorphism of $\langle M,{\in^M}\rangle$ with its range, which is a submodel of $\langle N,{\in^N}\rangle$. Although this is the usual model-theoretic embedding concept for relational structures, the reader should note that it is a considerably weaker embedding concept than commonly encountered in set theory, because this kind of embedding need not be elementary nor even $\Delta_0$-elementary, although clearly every embedding as just defined is elementary at least for quantifier-free assertions. So we caution the reader not to assume a greater degree of elementarity beyond quantifier-free elementarity for the embeddings appearing in this paper.

Theorem.

1. For any two countable models of set theory $\langle M,\in^M\rangle$ and $\langle N,\in^N\rangle$, one of them embeds into the other.

2. Indeed, such an $\langle M,{\in^M}\rangle$ embeds into $\langle N,{\in^N}\rangle$ if and only if the ordinals of $M$ order-embed into the ordinals of $N$.

3. Consequently, every countable model $\langle M,\in^M\rangle$ of set theory embeds into its own constructible universe $\langle L^M,\in^M\rangle$.

4. Furthermore, every countable model of set theory embeds into the hereditary finite sets $\langle \text{HF},{\in}\rangle^M$ of any nonstandard model of arithmetic $M\models\text{PA}$. Indeed, $\text{HF}^M$ is universal for all countable acyclic binary relations.

One can begin to get an appreciation for the difference in embedding concepts by observing that ZFC proves that there is a nontrivial embedding $j:V\to V$, namely, the embedding recursively defined as follows $$j(y)=\bigl\{\ j(x)\ \mid\ x\in y\ \bigr\}\cup\bigl\{\{\emptyset,y\}\bigr\}.$$

We leave it as a fun exercise to verify that $x\in y\longleftrightarrow j(x)\in j(y)$ for the embedding $j$ defined by this recursion. (See my paper Every countable model of set theory embeds into its own constructible universe; but to give a hint here for the impatient, note that every $j(y)$ is nonempty and also $\emptyset\notin j(y)$; it follows that inside $j(y)$ we may identify the pair $\{\emptyset,y\}\in j(y)$; it follows that $j$ is injective and furthermore, the only way to have $j(x)\in j(y)$ is from $x\in y$.} Contrast this situation with the well-known Kunen inconsistency, which asserts that there can be no nontrivial $\Sigma_1$-elementary embedding $j:V\to V$. Similarly, the same recursive definition applied in $L$ leads to nontrivial embeddings $j:L\to L$, regardless of whether $0^\sharp$ exists. But again, the point is that embeddings are not necessarily even $\Delta_0$-elementary, and the familiar equivalence of the existence of $0^\sharp$ with a nontrivial “embedding” $j:L\to L$ actually requires a $\Delta_0$-elementary embedding.)

We find it interesting to note in contrast to the theorem above that there is no such embedding phenomenon in the the context of the countable models of Peano arithmetic (where an embedding of models of arithmetic is a function preserving all atomic formulas in the language of arithmetic). Perhaps the main reason for this is that embeddings between models of PA are automatically $\Delta_0$-elementary, as a consequence of the MRDP theorem, whereas this is not true for models of set theory, as the example above of the recursively defined embedding $j:V\to V$ shows, since this is an embedding, but it is not $\Delta_0$-elementary, in light of $j(\emptyset)\neq\emptyset$. For countable models of arithmetic $M,N\models\text{PA}$, one can show that there is an embedding $j:M\to N$ if and only if $N$ satisfies the $\Sigma_1$-theory of $M$ and the standard system of $M$ is contained in the standard system of $N$. It follows that there are many instances of incomparability. Meanwhile, it is a consequence of statement (4) that the embedding phenomenon recurs with the countable models of finite set theory $\text{ZFC}^{\neg\infty}$, that is, with $\langle\text{HF},{\in}\rangle^M$ for $M\models\text{PA}$, since all nonstandard such models are universal for all countable acyclic binary relations, and so in the context of countable models of $\text{ZFC}^{\neg\infty}$ there are precisely two bi-embeddability classes, namely, the standard model, which is initial, and the nonstandard countable models, which are universal.

Our main theorems are as follows.

Theorem.

1. If $\diamondsuit$ holds and ZFC is consistent, then there is a family $\mathcal C$ of $2^{\omega_1}$ many pairwise incomparable $\omega_1$-like models of ZFC, meaning that there is no embedding between any two distinct models in $\mathcal C$.

2. The models in statement (1) can be constructed so that their ordinals order-embed into each other and indeed, so that the ordinals of each model is a universal $\omega_1$-like linear order. If ZFC has an $\omega$-model, then the models of statement (1) can be constructed so as to have precisely the same ordinals.

3. If $\diamondsuit$ holds and ZFC is consistent, then there is an $\omega_1$-like model $M\models\text{ZFC}$ and an $\omega_1$-like model $N\models\text{PA}$ such that $M$ does not embed into $\langle\text{HF},{\in}\rangle^N$.

4. If there is a Mahlo cardinal, then in a forcing extension of $L$, there is a transitive $\omega_1$-like model $M\models\text{ZFC}$ that does not embed into its own constructible universe $L^M$.

Note that the size of the family $\mathcal C$ in statement (1) is as large as it could possibly be, given that any two elements in a pairwise incomparable family of structures must be non-isomorphic and there are at most $2^{\omega_1}$ many isomorphism types of $\omega_1$-like models of set theory or indeed of structures of size $\omega_1$ in any first-order finite language. Statement (2) shows that the models of the family $\mathcal C$ serve as $\omega_1$-like counterexamples to the assertion that one model of set theory embeds into another whenever the ordinals of the first order-embed into the ordinals of the second.

Victoria Gitman

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Victoria Gitman earned her Ph.D. under my supervision at the CUNY Graduate Center in June, 2007.  For her dissertation work, Victoria had chosen a very difficult problem, the 1962 question of Dana Scott to characterize the standard systems of models of Peano Arithmetic, a question in the field of models of arithmetic that had been open for over forty years. Victoria was able to make progress, now published in several papers, by using an inter-disciplinary approach, applying set-theoretic ideas—including a use of the proper forcing axiom PFA—to the problem in the area of models of arithmetic, where such methods hadn’t often yet arisen.  Ultimately, she showed under PFA that every arithmetically closed proper Scott set is the standard system of a model of PA.  This result extends the classical result to a large new family of Scott sets, providing for these sets an affirmative solution to Scott’s problem.  In other dissertation work, Victoria untangled the confusing mass of ideas surrounding various Ramsey-like large cardinal concepts, ultimately separating them into a beautiful hierarchy, a neighborhood of the vast large cardinal hierarchy intensely studied by set theorists.  (Please see the diagram in her dissertation.)  Victoria holds a tenure-track position at the New York City College of Technology of CUNY.

Victoria Gitman

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Victoria Gitman, “Applications of the Proper Forcing Axiom to Models of Peano Arithmetic,”  Ph.D. dissertation for the Graduate Center of the City University of New York, June 2007.

Abstract. In Chapter 1, new results are presented on Scott’s Problem in the subject of models of Peano Arithmetic. Some forty years ago, Dana Scott showed that countable Scott sets are exactly the countable standard systems of models of PA, and two decades later, Knight and Nadel extended his result to Scott sets of size $\omega_1$. Here it is shown that assuming the Proper Forcing Axiom, every arithmetically closed proper Scott set is the standard system of a model of PA. In Chapter 2, new large cardinal axioms, based on Ramsey-like embedding properties, are introduced and placed within the large cardinal hierarchy. These notions generalize the seldom encountered embedding characterization of Ramsey cardinals. I also show how these large cardinals can be used to obtain indestructibility results for Ramsey cardinals.

Climb into Cantor's attic

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Please climb into Cantor’s attic, where you will find infinities of all sizes.  The site aims to be a comprehensive resource for the mathematical logic community, containing information about all mathematical concepts of infinity, including especially detailed information about the large cardinal hierarchy, as well as information about all other prominent specific ordinals and cardinals in mathematical logic and set theory, and how they are related.   We aim that Cantor’s attic will be the definitive on-line home of these various notions.  Please link to us whenever you need to link to a large cardinal or ordinal concept.

Cantor’s attic is the result of a community effort, and you can help improve this resource by joining our community.  We welcome contributions from knowledgeable experts in mathematical logic.  Please come and make a contribution!  You can create new pages, edit existing pages, add references, all using the same mediawiki software that powers wikipedia.  Further information about how to help is available at the Cantor’s attic community portal.

Cantor’s attic was founded in December 2011 by myself and Victoria Gitman.  We have only just begun, and it is a good time to get involved.  Feel free to contact me for advice or specific suggestions about how you might contribute.

Inner models with large cardinal features usually obtained by forcing

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[bibtex key=ApterGitmanHamkins2012:InnerModelsWithLargeCardinals]

We construct a variety of inner models exhibiting features usually obtained by forcing over universes with large cardinals. For example, if there is a supercompact cardinal, then there is an inner model with a Laver indestructible supercompact cardinal. If there is a supercompact cardinal, then there is an inner model with a supercompact cardinal $\kappa$ for which $2^\kappa=\kappa^+$, another for which $2^\kappa=\kappa^{++}$ and another in which the least strongly compact cardinal is supercompact. If there is a strongly compact cardinal, then there is an inner model with a strongly compact cardinal, for which the measurable cardinals are bounded below it and another inner model $W$ with a strongly compact cardinal $\kappa$, such that $H_{\kappa^+}^V\subseteq HOD^W$. Similar facts hold for supercompact, measurable and strongly Ramsey cardinals. If a cardinal is supercompact up to a weakly iterable cardinal, then there is an inner model of the Proper Forcing Axiom and another inner model with a supercompact cardinal in which GCH+V=HOD holds. Under the same hypothesis, there is an inner model with level by level equivalence between strong compactness and supercompactness, and indeed, another in which there is level by level inequivalence between strong compactness and supercompactness. If a cardinal is strongly compact up to a weakly iterable cardinal, then there is an inner model in which the least measurable cardinal is strongly compact. If there is a weakly iterable limit $\delta$ of ${\lt}\delta$-supercompact cardinals, then there is an inner model with a proper class of Laver-indestructible supercompact cardinals. We describe three general proof methods, which can be used to prove many similar results.

What is the theory ZFC without power set?

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[bibtex key=”GitmanHamkinsJohnstone2016:WhatIsTheTheoryZFC-Powerset?”]

This is joint work with Victoria Gitman and Thomas Johnstone.

We show that the theory ZFC-, consisting of the usual axioms of ZFC but with the power set axiom removed-specifically axiomatized by extensionality, foundation, pairing, union, infinity, separation, replacement and the assertion that every set can be well-ordered-is weaker than commonly supposed and is inadequate to establish several basic facts often desired in its context. For example, there are models of ZFC- in which $\omega_1$ is singular, in which every set of reals is countable, yet $\omega_1$ exists, in which there are sets of reals of every size $\aleph_n$, but none of size $\aleph_\omega$, and therefore, in which the collection axiom sceme fails; there are models of ZFC- for which the Los theorem fails, even when the ultrapower is well-founded and the measure exists inside the model; there are models of ZFC- for which the Gaifman theorem fails, in that there is an embedding $j:M\to N$ of ZFC- models that is $\Sigma_1$-elementary and cofinal, but not elementary; there are elementary embeddings $j:M\to N$ of ZFC- models whose cofinal restriction $j:M\to \bigcup j“M$ is not elementary. Moreover, the collection of formulas that are provably equivalent in ZFC- to a $\Sigma_1$-formula or a $\Pi_1$-formula is not closed under bounded quantification. Nevertheless, these deficits of ZFC- are completely repaired by strengthening it to the theory $\text{ZFC}^-$, obtained by using collection rather than replacement in the axiomatization above. These results extend prior work of Zarach.

See Victoria Gitman’s summary post on the article

A natural model of the multiverse axioms

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[bibtex key=GitmanHamkins2010:NaturalModelOfMultiverseAxioms]

In this article, we prove that if ZFC is consistent, then the collection of countable computably saturated models of ZFC satisfies all of the Multiverse Axioms that I introduced in my paper, “The set-theoretic multiverse.”

What is the theory of ZFC-Powerset? Toronto 2011

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This was a talk at the Toronto Set Theory Seminar held April 22, 2011 at the Fields Institute in Toronto.

The theory ZFC-, consisting of the usual axioms of ZFC but with the powerset axiom removed, when axiomatized by extensionality, foundation, pairing, union, infinity, separation, replacement and the axiom of choice, is weaker than commonly supposed, and suffices to prove neither that a countable union of countable sets is countable, nor that $\omega_1$ is regular, nor that the Los theorem holds for ultrapowers, even for well-founded ultrapowers on a measurable cardinal, nor that the Gaifman theorem holds, that is, that every $\Sigma_1$-elementary cofinal embedding $j:M\to N$ between models of the theory is fully elementary, nor that $\Sigma_n$ sets are closed under bounded quantification. Nevertheless, these deficits of ZFC- are completely repaired by strengthening it to the theory obtained by using the collection axiom rather than replacement in the axiomatization above. These results extend prior work of Zarach. This is joint work with Victoria Gitman and Thomas Johnstone.

Article | Victoria Gitman’s post