I was interviewed by Francesco Cavina for the Back to the Stone Age series on May 17, 2024, with a sweeping discussion of the philosophy of set theory, infinity, the continuum hypothesis, beauty in mathematics, and much more.

# Category Archives: Talks

# Life Story of Mathematician & Philosopher of Infinity, interviewed by The Human Podcast, May 2024

I was interviewed by The Human Podcast on 17 May 2024. Please enjoy our sweeping conversation about nature of infinity, the nature of abstract mathematical existence, the applicability of mathematical abstractions to physical reality, and more. At the end, you will see that I am caught completely at a loss in answer to the question, “What is it to live a good life?”.

# Forcing is simply the iterative conception undertaken with multivalued logic, ForcingFest, Oslo, June 2024

I shall be speaking at the ForcingFest meeting at the University of Oslo, 21 June 2024.

**Abstract.** I will explain how the forcing construction can be seen as a direct implementation of the iterative conception, giving rise to the cumulative hierarchy, but undertaken in the context of multivalued logic. The shape of the logic that is available in effect enables a certain constructive interference of the truth values in such a way that can affect the truth judgements. The core utility of forcing arises from the fact that we can often control these consequences by making a careful choice of the logic to be used, thereby controlling the truth values even of natural set-theoretic statements such as the continuum hypothesis.

# The continuum hypothesis could have been a fundamental axiom, CFORS Grad Conference, Oslo, June 2024

I shall be giving a keynote lecture for the CFORS Grad Conference at the University of Oslo, 19-20 June 2024.

**Abstract**. I shall describe a simple historical thought experiment showing how our attitude toward the continuum hypothesis could easily have been very different than it is. If our mathematical history had been just a little different, I claim, if certain mathematical discoveries had been made in a slightly different order, then we would naturally view the continuum hypothesis as a fundamental axiom of set theory, one furthermore necessary for mathematics and indeed, indispensable for calculus.

# Failing definite descriptions, Notre Dame Food for Thought Seminar, March 2024

I gave a talk for the Food for Thought seminar for the Notre Dame philosophy department.

The topic concerned definite descriptions, particularly the semantics that might be given when one extends first-order logic to include the iota operator, by which $℩x\varphi(x)$ means “the $x$ such that $\varphi(x)$.” There are a variety of natural ways to define the semantics of iota assertions in a model, and we discussed the advantages and disadvantages of each approach. We concentrated on what I call the strong semantics, the weak semantics, and the natural semantics, respectively. Ultimately, I argue for a deflationary perspective on the debate, as each of the semantics is conservative over the base language, with no iota operator, with no new expressive power. In this sense, I argue, the choice of one semantics over another is purely a matter of convenience or ease of expressibility, as all of the notions are expressible without definite descriptions at all.

My lecture notes are below.

# How the continuum hypothesis could have been a fundamental axiom, UC Irvine Logic & Philosoph of Science Colloquium, March 2024

This will be a talk for the Logic and Philosophy of Science Colloquium at the University of California at Irvine, 15 March 2024.

**Abstract**. With a simple historical thought experiment, I should like to describe how we might easily have come to view the continuum hypothesis as a fundamental axiom, one necessary for mathematics, indispensable even for calculus.

# What if your potentialism is implicitly actualist? Oxford conference, March 2024

This will be a talk at the conference Challenging the Infinite, March 11-12 at Oxford University. (Please register now to book a place.)

**Abstract** Many commonly considered forms of potentialism, I argue, are implicitly actualist in the sense that a corresponding actualist ontology and theory is interpretable within the potentialist framework using only the resources of the potentialist ontology and theory. And vice versa. For these forms of potentialism, therefore, there seems to be little at stake in the debate between potentialism and actualism—the two perspectives are bi-interpretable accounts of the same underlying semantic content. Meanwhile, more radical forms of potentialism, lacking convergence and amalgamation, do not admit such a bi-interpretation with actualism. In light of this, the central dichotomy in potentialism, to my way of thinking, is not concerned with any issue of height or width, but rather with convergent versus divergent possibility.

# The covering reflection principle, Notre Dame Logic Seminar, February 2024

This will be a talk for the Notre Dame Logic Seminar on 6 February 2024, 2:00 pm.

**Abstract.** The principle of *covering reflection* holds of a cardinal $\kappa$ if for every structure $B$ in a countable first-order language there is a structure $A$ of size less than $\kappa$, such that $B$ is covered by elementary images of $A$ in $B$. Is there any such cardinal? Is the principle consistent? This is joint work with myself, Nai-Chung Hou, Andreas Lietz, and Farmer Schlutzenberg.

# The Gödel incompleteness phenomenon, interview with Rahul Sam

Please enjoy my conversation with Rahul Sam for his podcast, a sweeping discussion of topics in the philosophy of mathematics—potentialism, pluralism, Gödel incompleteness, philosophy of set theory, large cardinals, and much more.

# Pluralism in the foundations of mathematics, ASL invited address, joint APA/ASL meeting, New York, January 2024

This will be an invited ASL address at the joint meeting of the ASL with the APA Eastern Division conference, held in New York 15-18 January 2024. My talk will be 16 January 2024 11:00 am.

**Abstract.** I shall give an account of the debate on set-theoretic pluralism and pluralism generally in the foundations of mathematics, including arithmetic. Is there ultimately just

one mathematical universe, the final background context, in which every mathematical

question has an absolute, determinate answer? Or do we have rather a multiverse of

mathematical foundations? Some mathematicians and philosophers favor a hybrid notion, with pluralism at the higher realms of set theory, but absoluteness for arithmetic.

What grounds are there for these various positions? How are we to adjudicate between

them? What ultimately is the purpose of a foundation of mathematics?

# The computable model theory of forcing, Rutgers Logic Seminar, December 2023

This will be a talk for the Rutgers University Logic Seminar, December 4, 2023.

**Abstract.** I shall discuss the computable model theory of forcing. To what extent can we view forcing as a computational process on the models of set theory? Given an oracle for the atomic or elementary diagram of a model (M,∈M) of set theory, for example, there are senses in which one may compute M-generic filters G⊂ℙ∈M over that model and compute the diagrams of the corresponding forcing extensions M[G]. Meanwhile, no such computational process is functorial, for there must always be isomorphic alternative presentations of the same model of set theory that lead by the computational process to non-isomorphic forcing extensions. Indeed, there is no Borel function providing generic filters that is functorial in this sense. This is joint work with myself, Russell Miller and Kameryn Williams.

The paper is available on the arxiv at https://arxiv.org/abs/2007.00418.

# The Wordle and Absurdle numbers, CUNY Logic Workshop, November 2023

This will be a talk for the CUNY Logic Workshop, 17 November 2023.

**Abstract.** We consider the game of infinite Wordle as played on Baire space $\omega^\omega$. The codebreaker can win in finitely many moves against any countable dictionary $\Delta\subseteq\omega^\omega$, but not against the full dictionary of Baire space. The *Wordle number* is the size of the smallest dictionary admitting such a winning strategy for the codebreaker, the corresponding *Wordle ideal* is the ideal generated by these dictionaries, which under MA includes all dictionaries of size less than the continuum. The *Absurdle number*, meanwhile, is the size of the smallest dictionary admitting a winning strategy for the absurdist in the two-player variant, infinite Absurdle. In ZFC there are nondetermined Absurdle games, with neither player having a winning strategy, but if one drops the axiom of choice, then the principle of Absurdle determinacy has large cardinal consistency strength over ZF+DC. This is joint work in progress with Ben De Bondt (Paris).

Lecture notes are available:

# What is second-order predicate modal logic? FoMoLo Seminar, February 2024

This will be a talk for the First-order Modal Logic (FoMoLo) Seminar, 12 February 2024. The talk will take place online via Zoom—contact the organizers for access.

**Abstract.** What is or should be the potentialist account of classes? There are several natural implementations of second-order logic in a modal potentialist setting, which arise from differing philosophical conceptions of the nature of the second-order resources. I shall introduce the proposals, analyze their comparative expressive and interpretative powers, and explain how various philosophical attitudes are fulfilled or not for each proposal. This is joint work in progress with Øystein Linnebo.

# The surprising strength of second-order reflection in urelement set theory, Luminy, October 2023

This will be a talk at the XVII International Luminy Workshop in Set Theory at the Centre International de Rencontres Mathématiques (CIRM) near Marseille, France, held 9-13 October 2023.

**Abstract.** I shall give a general introduction to urelement set theory and the role of the second-order reflection principle in second-order urelement set theory GBCU and KMU. With the abundant atom axiom, asserting that the class of urelements greatly exceeds the class of pure sets, the second-order reflection principle implies the existence of a supercompact cardinal in an interpreted model of ZFC. The proof uses a reflection characterization of supercompactness: a cardinal is supercompact if and only if for every second-order sentence $\psi$ true in some structure $\langle M,\ldots\rangle$ (of any size) in a language of size less than $\kappa$ is also true in a first-order elementary substructure $m\prec M$ of size less than $\kappa$ with $m\cap\kappa\in\kappa$. This is joint work with Bokai Yao.

# What is potentialist second-order logic? Konstanz Actualism and Potentialism Conference 2023

This is a talk for the Actualism and Potentialism Conference at the University of Konstanz, 28-29 September 2023. Also on Zoom: 928 0804 3434.

**Abstract**. What is or should be the potentialist account of classes? It turns out that there are several natural implementations of second-order logic in a modal potentialist setting, which arise from differing philosophical conceptions of the nature of the second-order resources. I shall introduce the proposals, analyze their comparative expressive and interpretative powers, and explain how various philosophical attitudes are fulfilled or not for each proposal. This is joint work in progress with Øystein Linnebo.