Set theory: universe or multiverse? Vienna, 2011

This talk was held as part of the Logic Cafe series at the Institute of Philosophy at the University of Vienna, October 31, 2011.

A traditional Platonist view in set theory, what I call the universe view, holds that there is an absolute background concept of set and a corresponding absolute background set-theoretic universe in which every set-theoretic assertion has a final, definitive truth value. On the multiverse view, in constrast, there are many distinct concepts of set, each instantiated in a corresponding set-theoretic universe, and a corresponding pluralism of set-theoretic truths. In this talk, after framing the debate, I shall argue that the multiverse position explains our experience with the enormous diversity of set-theoretic possibilities, a phenomenon that challenges the universe view. In particular, I shall argue that the continuum hypothesis is settled on the multiverse view by our extensive knowledge about how it behaves in the multiverse, and as a result it can no longer be settled in the manner formerly hoped for.

Slides | Article | Logic Cafe, Uni. Wien

Must there be non-definable numbers? Pointwise definability and the math-tea argument, KGRC, Vienna 2011

This talk will be a part of the “Advanced Introduction” series for graduate students at the the Kurt Gödel Research Center, November 4, 2011.

An old argument, heard perhaps at math tea, proceeds: “there must be some real numbers that we can neither describe nor define, since there are uncountably many reals, but only countably many definitions.” Does it withstand scrutiny? In this talk, I will discuss the phenomenon of pointwise definable models of set theory, in which every object is definable without parameters. In addition to classical and folklore results on the existence of pointwise definable models of set theory, the main new theorem is that every countable model of ZFC and indeed of GBC has an extension to a model of set theory with the same ordinals, in which every set and class is definable without parameters. This is joint work with Jonas Reitz and David Linetsky, and builds on work of S. Simpson, R. Kossak, J. Schmerl, S. Friedman and A. Enayat.

Slides | Article

Generalizations of the Kunen inconsistency, KGRC, Vienna 2011

This is a talk at the research seminar of the Kurt Gödel Research Center, November 3, 2011.

I shall present several generalizations of the well-known Kunen inconsistency that there is no nontrivial elementary embedding from the set-theoretic universe V to itself, including generalizations-of-generalizations previously established by Woodin and others.  For example, there is no nontrivial elementary embedding from the universe V to a set-forcing extension V[G], or conversely from V[G] to V, or more generally from one ground model of the universe to another, or between any two models that are eventually stationary correct, or from V to HOD, or conversely from HOD to V, or from V to the gHOD, or conversely from gHOD to V; indeed, there can be no nontrivial elementary embedding from any definable class to V.  Other results concern generic embeddings, definable embeddings and results not requiring the axiom of choice.  I will aim for a unified presentation that weaves together previously known unpublished or folklore results along with some new contributions.  This is joint work with Greg Kirmayer and Norman Perlmutter.

Slides | Article

Supertask computation

  • J. D. Hamkins, “Supertask computation,” in Classical and new paradigms of computation and their complexity hierarchies, Dordrecht, 2004, pp. 141-158. (Papers of the conference “Foundations of the Formal Sciences III” held in Vienna, September 21-24, 2001)  
    @INPROCEEDINGS{Hamkins2004:SupertaskComputation,
    AUTHOR = {Hamkins, Joel David},
    TITLE = {Supertask computation},
    BOOKTITLE = {Classical and new paradigms of computation and their complexity hierarchies},
    SERIES = {Trends Log.~Stud.~Log.~Libr.},
    VOLUME = {23},
    PAGES = {141--158},
    PUBLISHER = {Kluwer Acad.~Publ.},
    ADDRESS = {Dordrecht},
    YEAR = {2004},
    MRCLASS = {03D10 (03D25 68Q05)},
    MRNUMBER = {2155535},
    DOI = {10.1007/978-1-4020-2776-5_8},
    URL = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4020-2776-5_8},
    note = {Papers of the conference ``Foundations of the Formal Sciences III'' held in Vienna, September 21-24, 2001},
    eprint = {math/0212049},
    archivePrefix = {arXiv},
    primaryClass = {math.LO},
    file = F,
    }

Infinite time Turing machines extend the classical Turing machine concept to transfinite ordinal time, thereby providing a natural model of infinitary computability that sheds light on the power and limitations of supertask algorithms.