The modal logic of forcing

  • J. D. Hamkins and B. Löwe, “The modal logic of forcing,” Trans.~Amer.~Math.~Soc., vol. 360, iss. 4, pp. 1793-1817, 2008.  
    AUTHOR = {Hamkins, Joel David and L{\"o}we, Benedikt},
    TITLE = {The modal logic of forcing},
    JOURNAL = {Trans.~Amer.~Math.~Soc.},
    FJOURNAL = {Transactions of the American Mathematical Society},
    VOLUME = {360},
    YEAR = {2008},
    NUMBER = {4},
    PAGES = {1793--1817},
    ISSN = {0002-9947},
    MRCLASS = {03E40 (03B45)},
    MRNUMBER = {2366963 (2009h:03068)},
    MRREVIEWER = {Andreas Blass},
    DOI = {10.1090/S0002-9947-07-04297-3},
    URL = {},
    eprint = {math/0509616},
    archivePrefix = {arXiv},
    primaryClass = {math.LO},
    file = F

What are the most general principles in set theory relating forceability and truth? As with Solovay’s celebrated analysis of provability, both this question and its answer are naturally formulated with modal logic. We aim to do for forceability what Solovay did for provability. A set theoretical assertion $\psi$ is forceable or possible, if $\psi$ holds in some forcing extension, and necessary, if $\psi$ holds in all forcing extensions. In this forcing interpretation of modal logic, we establish that if ZFC is consistent, then the ZFC-provable principles of forcing are exactly those in the modal theory known as S4.2.

Follow-up article:  Structural connections between a forcing class and its modal logic