With infinite utility, more needn’t be better

[bibtex key=HamkinsMontero2000:MoreBetter]

Barbara Gail Montero

Utilitarianism in infinite worlds

[bibtex key=HamkinsMontero2000:InfiniteWorlds]

Recently in the philosophical literature there has been some effort made to understand the proper application of the theory of utilitarianism to worlds in which there are infinitely many bearers of utility. Here, we point out that one of the best, most inclusive principles proposed to date contradicts fundamental utilitarian ideas, such as the idea that adding more utility makes a better world.

Barbara Gail Montero

Book review of The Higher Infinite, Akihiro Kanamori

[bibtex key=Hamkins2000:BookReviewKanamori]

Akihiro Kanamori. The Higher Infinite.    Large cardinals, stealing upwards through the clouds of imagined limitation like the steel skyscrapers of a ever-growing set-theoretic skyline, reach towards the stratosphere of Cantor’s absolute. In this century we have axiomatized larger and larger notions of infinity, and as we live amongst these giants, the formerly tall now seem small. Weakly inaccessible cardinals, for example, first considered by Hausdorff as a natural transfinite limit of set-theoretic operations, now occupy a floor at the entryway to the large cardinal hierarchy. In time over the past century we had Mahlo cardinals, strongly inaccessible cardinals, measurable cardinals, indescribable cardinals, weakly-compact cardinals, strongly-compact cardinals, super-compact cardinals, huge cardinals, almost huge cardinals, superhuge cardinals, and so on. And while when it comes to naming these enormous magnitudes, words have perhaps failed us, the mathematics is perfectly precise and fascinating.

Professor Kanamori has written—beautifully so—the book we large cardinal set-theorists have been lacking, a book spanning the possibilities from inaccessible to superhuge cardinals and beyond, a book full of historical insight, clear writing, interesting theorems and elegant proofs. This book is destined to become, if it has not already become, the standard reference in its field.

Finding that “a genetic account through historical progression…provides the most coherent exposition of the mathematics and holds the key to any epistemological concerns,” (p. XI) Kanamori weaves a historical perspective into the mathematics, deepening our understanding and appreciation of it. He sprinkles the text with quotations of Gödel and others, giving their mathematical-philosophical views on the mathematical developments. The introduction stands alone as a non-technical essay introducing the entire subject. From there, Kanamori begins with the smaller large cardinals, inaccessible and Mahlo cardinals, and then moves in time up to the strongest hypotheses.

So let me begin to explain a little about large cardinals. A cardinal $\kappa$ is inaccessible when it cannot be constructed from smaller cardinals, so that first, it is not the supremum of fewer than $\kappa$ many cardinals each of size less than $\kappa$ (as, for example, $\aleph_\omega=\sup_n\aleph_n$ is), and second, it cannot be reached by the power set operation in the sense that whenever $\delta$ is smaller than $\kappa$ then $2^\delta$ is also smaller than $\kappa$. It is relatively straightforward to show that if $\kappa$ is inaccessible, then $V_\kappa$ is a model of ZFC. In particular, if $\kappa$ is the least inaccessible cardinal, then $V_\kappa$ will be a model of ZFC in which there are no inaccessible cardinals. So it is relatively consistent with ZFC that there are no large cardinals at all. Furthermore, since the mere existence of an inaccessible cardinal provides a full model of ZFC, we cannot hope even for a relative consistency result of the form “If ZFC is consistent, then so is ZFC $+$ there is an inaccessible cardinal” (in the manner of results proved for the Continuum Hypothesis and the Axiom of Choice), for then the theory “ZFC $+$ there is an inaccessible cardinal” would imply its own consistency, contrary to Gödel’s Incompleteness Theorem. In short, the consistency strength of the existence of an inaccessible cardinal is greater than that of ZFC alone. At first glance, then, the logical status of the existence of even the smallest of the large cardinals is a bit startling: we can’t prove they exist; it is consistent that they don’t exist; and we can prove that we cannot prove that their existence is relatively consistent. What, then, is the point of them?

The point is that such a transcendence over ZFC in consistency strength is exactly what we want and what we need. In the decades since the invention of Cohen’s forcing technique, set theorists have set marching an infinite parade of independence results; indeed, it often seems as though almost all the interesting set-theoretic questions are independent of our ZFC axioms. We all know now that the cardinality of the set $\mathbb{R}$ of reals can be $\aleph_1$ or $\aleph_2$ or $\aleph_{1776}$ or $\aleph_{\omega+1776}$ or any cardinal you like within reason, and this unfinished nature of ZFC when it comes to basic set theoretic questions is the norm. We have learned in this sense that ZFC is a weak theory. The large cardinal axioms provide strengthenings of it, strengthenings which are fundamentally different from the strengthenings of ZFC provided by the Continuum Hypothesis, the Generalized Continuum Hypothesis, Souslin’s Hypothesis, Martin’s Axiom and many of the other principles that we know to properly extend ZFC, in that large cardinals transcend even the consistency strength of ZFC. The large cardinal hierarchy, therefore, in addition to its intrinsic mathematical interest, provides a natural structure which can be used to gauge the consistency strength of general mathematical propositions.

Let me give one example. Almost all mathematicians are familiar with Vitali’s construction of a non-Lebesgue measurable set of reals and furthermore believe that the construction makes an essential use of the Axiom of Choice AC. But what does this mean exactly? The impossibility of removing AC from the Vitali construction is equivalent to the consistency (without AC) that every set of reals is Lebesgue measurable. Now of course we need some choice principle to develop a satisfactory theory of Lebesgue measure at all, so let us keep in the base theory the principle of Dependent Choices DC, which allows us to make countably many choices in succession. Thus, we are led to consider the consistency of the theory $T=$ “ZF + DC + every set of reals is Lebesgue measurable”. Solovay [65] proved that if ZFC is consistent with the existence of an inaccessible cardinal, then $T$ is consistent; that is, if inaccessible cardinals are consistent, then we are perfectly correct in believing that you cannot remove AC from Vitali’s construction. Since most mathematicians already believed this conclusion, Solovay’s use of an inaccessible cardinal was widely seen as a defect in his argument. But Shelah [84] exploded this criticism by proving conversely that if $T$ is consistent, then so is the existence of an inaccessible cardinal. That is, the two theories are equiconsistent, and we should be exactly as confident in the consistency of inaccessible cardinals as we are in our belief that Vitali’s use of AC is essential.

After the beginnings, Kanamori moves swiftly through a chapter on partition properties, weak compactness, indiscernibles and $0^\sharp$, before moving into a longer chapter on forcing and sets of reals, in which he introduces forcing, Lebesgue measurability and topics from descriptive set theory. Next, in Chapter Four, he approaches measurability from the direction of saturated ideals, including such topics as Prikry forcing, iterated ultrapower embeddings, the inner model $L[\mu]$, $0^\dagger$ and, curiously, a chess problem for the solution of which he will pay a small prize. The strongest hypotheses appear in Chapter five along with the combinatorial backup needed to support them. Kanamori concludes in Chapter six with the Axiom of Determinacy, giving such connections to large cardinals as can be easily given, and, whetting the appetite of the eager student, surveying the more recent, more difficult, and more amazing results.

Kanamori’s book has already been translated into Japanese by S. Fuchino, and judging by the graduate students I saw last year in Japan pouring over it, the translation seems destined to create a new generation of large cardinal set theorists in Japan.

I do have one reservation about Kanamori’s book, namely, that he didn’t include much material on the interaction between forcing and large cardinals. Admittedly, this being the focus of much of my own work, I harbor some bias in its favor, but the topics of forcing and large cardinals are two major set theoretic research areas, and the intersection is rich. It would have been relatively easy for Kanamori to include a presentation, for example, of the landmark Laver preparation, by which any supercompact cardinal $\kappa$ becomes indestructible by $\kappa$-directed closed forcing. And Laver’s result is really just the beginning of the investigation of how large cardinals are affected by forcing. I trust that much of this work will appear in volume II.

My overall evaluation is entirely positive, and I recommend the book in the strongest possible terms to anyone with an interest in large cardinals. I can hardly wait for the subsequent volume!

[84] Saharon Shelah, “Can you take Solovay’s inaccessible away?” IJM 48 (1984), 1-47.

[65] Robert M. Solovay, “The measure problem,” NAMS 12 (1965), 217.

Gap forcing: generalizing the Lévy-Solovay theorem

[bibtex key=Hamkins99:GapForcingGen]

The landmark Levy-Solovay Theorem limits the kind of large cardinal embeddings that can exist in a small forcing extension. Here I announce a generalization of this theorem to a broad new class of forcing notions. One consequence is that many of the forcing iterations most commonly found in the large cardinal literature create no new weakly compact cardinals, measurable cardinals, strong cardinals, Woodin cardinals, strongly compact cardinals, supercompact cardinals, almost huge cardinals, huge cardinals, and so on.

Universal indestructibility

[bibtex key=ApterHamkins99:UniversalIndestructibility]

From a suitable large cardinal hypothesis, we provide a model with a supercompact cardinal in which universal indestructibility holds: every supercompact and partially supercompact cardinal kappa is fully indestructible by kappa-directed closed forcing. Such a state of affairs is impossible with two supercompact cardinals or even with a cardinal which is supercompact beyond a measurable cardinal.

Superdestructibility: a dual to Laver's indestructibility

[bibtex key=HamkinsShelah98:Dual]

After small forcing, any $<\kappa$-closed forcing will destroy the supercompactness, even the strong compactness, of $\kappa$.

Small forcing makes any cardinal superdestructible

[bibtex key=Hamkins98:SmallForcing]

Destruction or preservation as you like it

[bibtex key=Hamkins98:AsYouLikeIt]

The Gap Forcing Theorem, a key contribution of this paper, implies essentially that after any reverse Easton iteration of closed forcing, such as the Laver preparation, every supercompactness measure on a supercompact cardinal extends a measure from the ground model. Thus, such forcing can create no new supercompact cardinals, and, if the GCH holds, neither can it increase the degree of supercompactness of any cardinal; in particular, it can create no new measurable cardinals. In a crescendo of what I call exact preservation theorems, I use this new technology to perform a kind of partial Laver preparation, and thereby finely control the class of posets which preserve a supercompact cardinal. Eventually, I prove the ‘As You Like It’ Theorem, which asserts that the class of ${<}\kappa$-directed closed posets which preserve a supercompact cardinal $\kappa$ can be made by forcing to conform with any pre-selected local definition which respects the equivalence of forcing. Along the way I separate completely the levels of the superdestructibility hierarchy, and, in an epilogue, prove that the notions of fragility and superdestructibility are orthogonal — all four combinations are possible.

Every group has a terminating transfinite automorphism tower

[bibtex key=Hamkins98:EveryGroup]

The automorphism tower of a group is obtained by computing its automorphism group, the automorphism group of that group, and so on, iterating transfinitely. Each group maps canonically into the next using inner automorphisms, and so at limit stages one can take a direct limit and continue the iteration. The tower is said to terminate if a fixed point is reached, that is, if a group is reached which is isomorphic to its automorphism group by the natural map. This occurs if a complete group is reached, one which is centerless and has only inner automorphisms. Wielandt [1939] proved the classical result that the automorphism tower of any centerless finite group terminates in finitely many steps. Rae and Roseblade [1970] proved that the automorphism tower of any centerless Cernikov group terminates in finitely many steps. Hulse [1970] proved that the the automorphism tower of any centerless polycyclic group terminates in countably many steps. Simon Thomas [1985] proved that the automorphism tower of any centerless group eventually terminates. In this paper, I remove the centerless assumption, and prove that every group has a terminating transfinite automorphism tower.

Book review of Notes on Set Theory, Moschovakis

[bibtex key=Hamkins1998:BookReviewMoschovakis]

Yiannis N. Moschovakis. Notes on Set Theory. This is a sophisticated undergraduate set theory text, packed with elegant proofs, historical explanations, and enlightening exercises, all presented at just the right level for a first course in set theory. Moschovakis focuses strongly on the Zermelo axioms, and shows clearly that much if not all of classical mathematics needs nothing more. Indeed, he says, “all the objects studied in classical algebra, analysis, functional analysis, topology, probability, differential equations, etc. can be found in [the least Zermelo universe] $\cal Z$” (p. 179). The analysis of this universe $\cal Z$ and the other set-theoretic universes like it at the book’s conclusion has the metamathematical flavor of the forcing arguments one might find in a more advanced text, and ultimately spurs one deeper into set theory.

The Notes begin, pre-axiomatically, with functions and equinumerosity, proving, for example, the uncountability of $\mathbb{R}$ and the Schr&ouml;der-Bernstein Theorem. In a dramatic fashion, Moschovakis then slides smoothly into the General Comprehension Principle, citing its strong intuitive appeal, and then BOOM! the Russell paradox appears.  With it, the need for an axiomatic approach is made plain. Introducing the basic Zermelo axioms of Extensionality, Empty-set, Pairing, Separation, Power set, Union, and a version of Infinity (but not yet the axioms of Choice, Foundation, or Replacement), he proceeds to found the familiar set theory on them.

Following a philosophy of faithful representation, Moschovakis holds, for example, that while functions may not actually be sets of ordered pairs, mathematics can be developed as if they were.  A lively historical approach, including periodic quotations from Cantor, brings out one’s natural curiosity, and leads to the Cardinal Assignent Problem, the problem of finding a sensible meaning for the cardinality $|A|$ of any set $A$. Among the excellent exercises are several concerning Dedekind-finite sets.

After an axiomatic treatment of the natural numbers, with special attention paid to the Recursion Theorem (three different forms) and the cardinal arithmetic of the continuum (but no definition yet of $|A|$), Moschovakis emphasizes fixed point theorems, proving stronger and better recursion theorems.  Wellorderings are treated in chapter seven, with transfinite arithmetic and recursion, but, lacking the Replacement axiom, without ordinals. After this the axiom of Choice arrives with its equivalents and consequences, but without a solution to the cardinal assignment problem.  Chapter ten, on Baire space, is an excellent introduction to descriptive set theory. The axiom of Replacement finally appears in chapter eleven and is used to analyze the least Zermelo set-theoretic universe. Replacement leads naturally in the very last chapter to the familiar von Neumann ordinals, defined as the image of a wellorder under a von Neumann surjection (like a Mostowski collapse), and with them come the $\aleph_\alpha$, $\beth_\alpha$ and $V_\alpha$ hierarchies. Two well-written appendices, one, a careful construction of $\mathbb{R}$, the other, a brief flight into the meta-mathematical territory of models of set theory and the anti-foundation axiom, conclude the book.

The text is engaging, lively, and sophisticated; yet, I would like to point out some minor matters and make one serious criticism. The minor errors which mar the text include a mis-statement of the Generalized Continuum Hypothesis, making it trivially true, and an incorrect definition of continuity in 6.22, making some of the subsequent theorems false. Since there are also some editing failures and typographical errors, an errata sheet would be worthwhile.  Moreover, the index could be improved; I could find, for example, no reference for $N^*$ and the entry for Cantor Set refers to only one of the two independent definitions. It is also curious that when proving the uncountability of $\mathbb{R}$, Moschovakis does not give the proof that many would find to be the easiest for undergraduates to grasp: direct diagonalization against decimal expansions. Rather, he diagonalizes to deduce the uncountability of $2^{\mathbb{N}}$ and then launches into a construction of the Cantor set, obtained by omitting middle thirds; then, appealing to the the completeness property, he injects $2^{\mathbb{N}}$ into it and finishes the argument.

My one serious objection to the text is that while Moschovakis shows impressively that much mathematics can be done with the relatively weak Zermelo axioms, his decision to postpone the Replacement axiom until the end of the book has the consequence that students are deprived of ordinals exactly when ordinals would help them the most: when using well-orders, cardinal arithmetic, and tranfinite recursion. Without ordinals transfinite recursion is encumbered with the notation, such as $\mathop{\rm seg}_{\langle U,\leq_U\rangle}(x)$, which arises when one must carry an arbitrary well-order $\langle U,\leq_U\rangle$ through every proof. And he is forced to be satisfied with weak solutions to the cardinal assignment problem, in which $|A|=_{\rm def}A$ is, tacitly, the best option. Additionally, the late arrival of Replacement also makes students unduly suspicious of it.

In summary, Moschovakis’ view that all of classical mathematics takes place in $\cal Z$ should be tempered by his observation (p. 239) that neither HF nor indeed even $\omega$ exist in $\cal Z$. In this sense, $\cal Z$ is a small town. And so while he says “one can live without knowing the ordinals, but not as well” (p. 189), I wish that they had come much earlier in the book. Otherwise, the book is a gem, densely packed with fantastic problems and clear, elegant proofs.

Canonical seeds and Prikry trees

[bibtex key=Hamkins97:Seeds]

Applying the seed concept to Prikry tree forcing $\mathbb{P}_\mu$, I investigate how well $\mathbb{P}_\mu$ preserves the maximality property of ordinary Prikry forcing and prove that $\mathbb{P}_\mu$ Prikry sequences are maximal exactly when $\mu$ admits no non-canonical seeds via a finite iteration.  In particular, I conclude that if $\mu$ is a strongly normal supercompactness measure, then $\mathbb{P}_\mu$ Prikry sequences are maximal, thereby proving, for a large class of measures, a conjecture of W. H. Woodin’s.

Fragile measurability

[bibtex key=Hamkins94:FragileMeasurability]

Lifting and extending measures; fragile measurability

[bibtex key=Hamkins94:Dissertation]

A scan of the dissertation is available:  Lifting and extending measures; fragile measurability (15 Mb)

 

A class of strong diamond principles

[bibtex key=Hamkins:LaverDiamond]

In the context of large cardinals, the classical diamond principle $\Diamond_\kappa$ is easily strengthened in natural ways. When $\kappa$ is a measurable cardinal, for example, one might ask that a $\Diamond_\kappa$ sequence anticipate every subset of $\kappa$ not merely on a stationary set, but on a set of normal measure one. This is equivalent to the existence of a function $\ell:\kappa\to V_\kappa$ such that for any $A\in H(\kappa^+)$ there is an embedding $j:V\to M$ having critical point $\kappa$ with $j(\ell)(\kappa)=A$. This and similar principles formulated for many other large cardinal notions, including weakly compact, indescribable, unfoldable, Ramsey, strongly unfoldable and strongly compact cardinals, are best conceived as an expression of the Laver function concept from supercompact cardinals for these weaker large cardinal notions. The resulting Laver diamond principles can hold or fail in a variety of interesting ways.

Hello world!

I am pleased to join Booles’ Rings, and looking forward to the goings-on here!  Sam Coskey has been an enormous help in getting me set up here, for which I am very thankful.  I will be adding more information in the near future.