Universal indestructibility

[bibtex key=ApterHamkins99:UniversalIndestructibility]

From a suitable large cardinal hypothesis, we provide a model with a supercompact cardinal in which universal indestructibility holds: every supercompact and partially supercompact cardinal kappa is fully indestructible by kappa-directed closed forcing. Such a state of affairs is impossible with two supercompact cardinals or even with a cardinal which is supercompact beyond a measurable cardinal.

Superdestructibility: a dual to Laver's indestructibility

[bibtex key=HamkinsShelah98:Dual]

After small forcing, any $<\kappa$-closed forcing will destroy the supercompactness, even the strong compactness, of $\kappa$.

Small forcing makes any cardinal superdestructible

[bibtex key=Hamkins98:SmallForcing]

Destruction or preservation as you like it

[bibtex key=Hamkins98:AsYouLikeIt]

The Gap Forcing Theorem, a key contribution of this paper, implies essentially that after any reverse Easton iteration of closed forcing, such as the Laver preparation, every supercompactness measure on a supercompact cardinal extends a measure from the ground model. Thus, such forcing can create no new supercompact cardinals, and, if the GCH holds, neither can it increase the degree of supercompactness of any cardinal; in particular, it can create no new measurable cardinals. In a crescendo of what I call exact preservation theorems, I use this new technology to perform a kind of partial Laver preparation, and thereby finely control the class of posets which preserve a supercompact cardinal. Eventually, I prove the ‘As You Like It’ Theorem, which asserts that the class of ${<}\kappa$-directed closed posets which preserve a supercompact cardinal $\kappa$ can be made by forcing to conform with any pre-selected local definition which respects the equivalence of forcing. Along the way I separate completely the levels of the superdestructibility hierarchy, and, in an epilogue, prove that the notions of fragility and superdestructibility are orthogonal — all four combinations are possible.

Every group has a terminating transfinite automorphism tower

[bibtex key=Hamkins98:EveryGroup]

The automorphism tower of a group is obtained by computing its automorphism group, the automorphism group of that group, and so on, iterating transfinitely. Each group maps canonically into the next using inner automorphisms, and so at limit stages one can take a direct limit and continue the iteration. The tower is said to terminate if a fixed point is reached, that is, if a group is reached which is isomorphic to its automorphism group by the natural map. This occurs if a complete group is reached, one which is centerless and has only inner automorphisms. Wielandt [1939] proved the classical result that the automorphism tower of any centerless finite group terminates in finitely many steps. Rae and Roseblade [1970] proved that the automorphism tower of any centerless Cernikov group terminates in finitely many steps. Hulse [1970] proved that the the automorphism tower of any centerless polycyclic group terminates in countably many steps. Simon Thomas [1985] proved that the automorphism tower of any centerless group eventually terminates. In this paper, I remove the centerless assumption, and prove that every group has a terminating transfinite automorphism tower.

Book review of Notes on Set Theory, Moschovakis

[bibtex key=Hamkins1998:BookReviewMoschovakis]

Yiannis N. Moschovakis. Notes on Set Theory. This is a sophisticated undergraduate set theory text, packed with elegant proofs, historical explanations, and enlightening exercises, all presented at just the right level for a first course in set theory. Moschovakis focuses strongly on the Zermelo axioms, and shows clearly that much if not all of classical mathematics needs nothing more. Indeed, he says, “all the objects studied in classical algebra, analysis, functional analysis, topology, probability, differential equations, etc. can be found in [the least Zermelo universe] $\cal Z$” (p. 179). The analysis of this universe $\cal Z$ and the other set-theoretic universes like it at the book’s conclusion has the metamathematical flavor of the forcing arguments one might find in a more advanced text, and ultimately spurs one deeper into set theory.

The Notes begin, pre-axiomatically, with functions and equinumerosity, proving, for example, the uncountability of $\mathbb{R}$ and the Schr&ouml;der-Bernstein Theorem. In a dramatic fashion, Moschovakis then slides smoothly into the General Comprehension Principle, citing its strong intuitive appeal, and then BOOM! the Russell paradox appears.  With it, the need for an axiomatic approach is made plain. Introducing the basic Zermelo axioms of Extensionality, Empty-set, Pairing, Separation, Power set, Union, and a version of Infinity (but not yet the axioms of Choice, Foundation, or Replacement), he proceeds to found the familiar set theory on them.

Following a philosophy of faithful representation, Moschovakis holds, for example, that while functions may not actually be sets of ordered pairs, mathematics can be developed as if they were.  A lively historical approach, including periodic quotations from Cantor, brings out one’s natural curiosity, and leads to the Cardinal Assignent Problem, the problem of finding a sensible meaning for the cardinality $|A|$ of any set $A$. Among the excellent exercises are several concerning Dedekind-finite sets.

After an axiomatic treatment of the natural numbers, with special attention paid to the Recursion Theorem (three different forms) and the cardinal arithmetic of the continuum (but no definition yet of $|A|$), Moschovakis emphasizes fixed point theorems, proving stronger and better recursion theorems.  Wellorderings are treated in chapter seven, with transfinite arithmetic and recursion, but, lacking the Replacement axiom, without ordinals. After this the axiom of Choice arrives with its equivalents and consequences, but without a solution to the cardinal assignment problem.  Chapter ten, on Baire space, is an excellent introduction to descriptive set theory. The axiom of Replacement finally appears in chapter eleven and is used to analyze the least Zermelo set-theoretic universe. Replacement leads naturally in the very last chapter to the familiar von Neumann ordinals, defined as the image of a wellorder under a von Neumann surjection (like a Mostowski collapse), and with them come the $\aleph_\alpha$, $\beth_\alpha$ and $V_\alpha$ hierarchies. Two well-written appendices, one, a careful construction of $\mathbb{R}$, the other, a brief flight into the meta-mathematical territory of models of set theory and the anti-foundation axiom, conclude the book.

The text is engaging, lively, and sophisticated; yet, I would like to point out some minor matters and make one serious criticism. The minor errors which mar the text include a mis-statement of the Generalized Continuum Hypothesis, making it trivially true, and an incorrect definition of continuity in 6.22, making some of the subsequent theorems false. Since there are also some editing failures and typographical errors, an errata sheet would be worthwhile.  Moreover, the index could be improved; I could find, for example, no reference for $N^*$ and the entry for Cantor Set refers to only one of the two independent definitions. It is also curious that when proving the uncountability of $\mathbb{R}$, Moschovakis does not give the proof that many would find to be the easiest for undergraduates to grasp: direct diagonalization against decimal expansions. Rather, he diagonalizes to deduce the uncountability of $2^{\mathbb{N}}$ and then launches into a construction of the Cantor set, obtained by omitting middle thirds; then, appealing to the the completeness property, he injects $2^{\mathbb{N}}$ into it and finishes the argument.

My one serious objection to the text is that while Moschovakis shows impressively that much mathematics can be done with the relatively weak Zermelo axioms, his decision to postpone the Replacement axiom until the end of the book has the consequence that students are deprived of ordinals exactly when ordinals would help them the most: when using well-orders, cardinal arithmetic, and tranfinite recursion. Without ordinals transfinite recursion is encumbered with the notation, such as $\mathop{\rm seg}_{\langle U,\leq_U\rangle}(x)$, which arises when one must carry an arbitrary well-order $\langle U,\leq_U\rangle$ through every proof. And he is forced to be satisfied with weak solutions to the cardinal assignment problem, in which $|A|=_{\rm def}A$ is, tacitly, the best option. Additionally, the late arrival of Replacement also makes students unduly suspicious of it.

In summary, Moschovakis’ view that all of classical mathematics takes place in $\cal Z$ should be tempered by his observation (p. 239) that neither HF nor indeed even $\omega$ exist in $\cal Z$. In this sense, $\cal Z$ is a small town. And so while he says “one can live without knowing the ordinals, but not as well” (p. 189), I wish that they had come much earlier in the book. Otherwise, the book is a gem, densely packed with fantastic problems and clear, elegant proofs.

Canonical seeds and Prikry trees

[bibtex key=Hamkins97:Seeds]

Applying the seed concept to Prikry tree forcing $\mathbb{P}_\mu$, I investigate how well $\mathbb{P}_\mu$ preserves the maximality property of ordinary Prikry forcing and prove that $\mathbb{P}_\mu$ Prikry sequences are maximal exactly when $\mu$ admits no non-canonical seeds via a finite iteration.  In particular, I conclude that if $\mu$ is a strongly normal supercompactness measure, then $\mathbb{P}_\mu$ Prikry sequences are maximal, thereby proving, for a large class of measures, a conjecture of W. H. Woodin’s.

Fragile measurability

[bibtex key=Hamkins94:FragileMeasurability]

Lifting and extending measures; fragile measurability

[bibtex key=Hamkins94:Dissertation]

A scan of the dissertation is available:  Lifting and extending measures; fragile measurability (15 Mb)

 

A class of strong diamond principles

[bibtex key=Hamkins:LaverDiamond]

In the context of large cardinals, the classical diamond principle $\Diamond_\kappa$ is easily strengthened in natural ways. When $\kappa$ is a measurable cardinal, for example, one might ask that a $\Diamond_\kappa$ sequence anticipate every subset of $\kappa$ not merely on a stationary set, but on a set of normal measure one. This is equivalent to the existence of a function $\ell:\kappa\to V_\kappa$ such that for any $A\in H(\kappa^+)$ there is an embedding $j:V\to M$ having critical point $\kappa$ with $j(\ell)(\kappa)=A$. This and similar principles formulated for many other large cardinal notions, including weakly compact, indescribable, unfoldable, Ramsey, strongly unfoldable and strongly compact cardinals, are best conceived as an expression of the Laver function concept from supercompact cardinals for these weaker large cardinal notions. The resulting Laver diamond principles can hold or fail in a variety of interesting ways.

Hello world!

I am pleased to join Booles’ Rings, and looking forward to the goings-on here!  Sam Coskey has been an enormous help in getting me set up here, for which I am very thankful.  I will be adding more information in the near future.

The multiverse perspective on determinateness in set theory, Harvard, 2011

This talk, taking place October 19, 2011, is part of the year-long Exploring the Frontiers of Incompleteness (EFI) series at Harvard University, a workshop focused on the question of determinateness in set theory, a central question in the philosophy of set theory. JDH at Harvard Streaming video will be available on-line, and each talk will be associated with an on-line discussion forum, to which links will be made here later.

In this talk, I will discuss the multiverse perspective on determinateness in set theory.  The multiverse view in set theory is the view that there are many distinct concepts of set, each instantiated in a corresponding set-theoretic universe. The universe view, in contrast, asserts that there is an absolute background set concept, with a corresponding absolute set-theoretic universe in which every set-theoretic question has a definite answer.  The multiverse position, I argue, explains our experience with the enormous diversity of set-theoretic possibilities, a phenomenon that challenges the universe view.  In particular, I shall argue that the continuum hypothesis is settled on the multiverse view by our extensive knowledge about how it behaves in the multiverse, and as a result it can no longer be settled in the manner formerly hoped for.

Workshop materials | Article | Slides | EFI discussion forum | Video Stream

The multiverse view in set theory, Singapore 2011

A talk at the Asian Initive for Infinity: Workshop on Infinity and Truth, July 25-29, 2011, National University of Singapore.

I shall outline and defend the Multiverse view in set theory, the view that there are many set-theoretic universes, each instantiating its own concept of set, and contrast it with the Universe view, the view that there is an absolute background set-theoretic universe.  In addition, I will discuss some recent set-theoretic developments that have been motivated and informed by a multiverse perspective, including the modal logic of forcing and the emergence of set-theoretic geology.

Slides  |  Article

Generalizations of the Kunen Inconsistency, Singapore 2011

A talk at the Prospects of Infinity: Workshop on Set Theory  at the National University of Singapore, July 18-22, 2011.

I shall present several generalizations of the well-known Kunen inconsistency that there is no nontrivial elementary embedding from the set-theoretic universe V to itself, including generalizations-of-generalizations previously established by Woodin and others.  For example, there is no nontrivial elementary embedding from the universe V to a set-forcing extension V[G], or conversely from V[G] to V, or more generally from one ground model of the universe to another, or between any two models that are eventually stationary correct, or from V to HOD, or conversely from HOD to V, or from V to the gHOD, or conversely from gHOD to V; indeed, there can be no nontrivial elementary embedding from any definable class to V.  Other results concern generic embeddings, definable embeddings and results not requiring the axiom of choice.  I will aim for a unified presentation that weaves together previously known unpublished or folklore results along with some new contributions.  This is joint work with Greg Kirmayer and Norman Perlmutter.

SlidesArticle 

New York University, Visiting Professor of Philosophy, 2011

NYU PhilosophyI held the position of Visiting Professor of Philosophy at New York University during July-December, 2011.  This was an extremely productive time for me in my research, particularly with regard to my work on the multiverse conception in set theory.  In addition, I taught a course on the Philosophy of set theory while at NYU.