Let me introduce to you the topic of modal model theory, injecting some ideas from modal logic into the traditional subject of model theory in mathematical logic.

For example, we may consider the class of all models of some first-order theory, such as the class of all graphs, or the class of all groups, or all fields or what have you. In general, we have $\newcommand\Mod{\text{Mod}}\Mod(T)$, where $T$ is a first-order theory in some language $L$.

We may consider $\Mod(T)$ as a potentialist system, a Kripke model of possible worlds, where each model accesses the larger models, of which it is a submodel. So $\newcommand\possible{\Diamond}\possible\varphi$ is true at a model $M$, if there is a larger model $N$ in which $\varphi$ holds, and $\newcommand\necessary{\Box}\necessary\varphi$ is true at $M$, if $\varphi$ holds in all larger models.

In this way, we enlarge the language $L$ to include these modal operators. Let $\possible(L)$ be the language obtained by closing $L$ under the modal operators and Boolean connectives; and let $L^\possible$ also close under quantification. The difference is whether a modal operator falls under the scope of a quantifier.

Recently, in a collaborative project with Wojciech Aleksander Wołoszyn, we made some progress, which I’d like to explain. (We also have many further results, concerning the potentialist validities of various natural instances of $\Mod(T)$, but those will wait for another post.)

**Theorem.** If models $M$ and $N$ are elementarily equivalent, that is, if they have the same theory in the language of $L$, then they also have the same theory in the modal language $\possible(L)$.

**Proof.** We show that whenever $M\equiv N$ in the language of $L$, then $M\models\varphi\iff N\models\varphi$ for sentences $\varphi$ in the modal language $\possible(L)$, by induction on $\varphi$.

Of course, by assumption the statement is true for sentences $\varphi$ in the base language $L$. And the property is clearly preserved by Boolean combinations. What remains is the modal case. Suppose that $M\equiv N$ and $M\models\possible\varphi$. So there is some extension model $M\subset W\models\varphi$.

Since $M\equiv N$, it follows by the Keisler-Shelah theorem that $M$ and $N$ have isomorphic ultrapowers $\prod_\mu M\cong\prod_\mu N$, for some ultrafilter $\mu$. It is easy to see that isomorphic structures satisfy exactly the same modal assertions in the class of all models of a theory. Since $M\subset W$, it follows that the ultrapower of $M$ is extended to (a copy of) the ultrapower of $W$, and so $\prod_\mu M\models\possible\varphi$, and therefore also $\prod_\mu N\models\possible\varphi$. From this, since $N$ embeds into its ultrapower $\prod_\mu N$, it follows also that $N\models\possible\varphi$, as desired. $\Box$

**Corollary.** If one model elementarily embeds into another $M\prec N$, in the language $L$ of these structures, then this embedding is also elementary in the language $\possible(L)$.

**Proof.** To say $M\prec N$ in language $L$ is the same as saying that $M\equiv N$ in the language $L_M$, where we have added constants for every element of $M$, and interpreted these constants in $N$ via the embedding. Thus, by the theorem, it follows that $M\equiv N$ in the language $\possible(L_M)$, as desired. $\Box$

For example, every model $M$ is elementarily embedding into its ultrapowers $\prod_\mu M$, in the language $\possible(L)$.

We’d like to point out next that these results do not extend to elementary equivalence in the full modal language $L^\possible$.

For a counterexample, let’s work in the class of all simple graphs, in the language with a binary predicate for the edge relation. (We’ll have no parallel edges, and no self-edges.) So the accessibility relation here is the induced subgraph relation.

**Lemma.** The 2-colorability of a graph is expressible in $\possible(L)$. Similarly for $k$-colorability for any finite $k$.

**Proof.** A graph is 2-colorable if we can partition its vertices into two sets, such that a vertex is in one set if and only if all its neighbors are in the other set. This can be effectively coded by adding two new vertices, call them *red* and *blue*, such that every node (other than *red* and *blue*) is connected to exactly one of these two points, and a vertex is connected to *red* if and only if all its neighbors are connected to *blue*, and vice versa. If the graph is $2$-colorable, then there is an extension realizing this statement, and if there is an extension realizing the statement, then (even if more than two points were added) the original graph must be $2$-colorable. $\Box$

A slightly more refined observation is that for any vertex $x$ in a graph, we can express the assertion, “the component of $x$ is $2$-colorable” by a formula in the language $\possible(L)$. We simply make the same kind of assertion, but drop the requirement that every node gets a color, and insist only that $x$ gets a color and the coloring extends from a node to any neighbor of the node, thereby ensuring the full connected component will be colored.

**Theorem.** There are two graphs that are elementary equivalent in the language $L$ of graph theory, and hence also in the language $\possible(L)$, but they are not elementarily equivalent in the full modal language $L^\possible$.

**Proof.** Let $M$ be a graph consisting of disjoint copies of a 3-cycle, a 5-cycle, a 7-cycle, and so on, with one copy of every odd-length cycle. Let $M^*$ be an ultrapower of $M$ by a nonprincipal ultrafilter.

Thus, $M^*$ will continue to have one 3-cycle, one 5-cycle, one 7-cycle and on on, for all the finite odd-length cycles, but then $M^*$ will have what it thinks are non-standard odd-length cycles, except that it cannot formulate the concept of “odd”. What it actually has are a bunch of $\mathbb{Z}$-chains.

In particular, $M^*$ thinks that there is an $x$ whose component is $2$-colorable, since a $\mathbb{Z}$-chain is $2$-colorable.

But $M$ does not think that there is an $x$ whose component is $2$-colorable, because an odd-length finite cycle is not $2$-colorable. $\Box$.

Since we used an ultrapower, the same example also shows that the corollary above does not generalize to the full modal language. That is, we have $M$ embedding elementarily into its ultrapower $M^*$, but it is not elementary in the language $L^\possible$.

Let us finally notice that the Łoś theorem for ultraproducts fails even in the weaker modal language $\possible(L)$.

**Theorem.** There are models $M_i$ for $i\in\mathbb{N}$ and a sentence $\varphi$ in the language of these models, such that every nonprincipal ultraproduct $\prod_\mu M_i$ satisfies $\possible\varphi$, but no $M_i$ satisfies $\possible\varphi$. .

**Proof.** In the class of all graphs, using the language of graph theory, let the $M_i$ be all the odd-length cycles. The ultraproduct $\prod_\mu M_i$ consists entirely of $\mathbb{Z}$-chains. In particular, the ultraproduct graph is $2$-colorable, but none of the $M_i$ are $2$-colorable. $\Box$

I am so eager to read this, but I am compelled to comment first. This image is by far my favorite image/painting/drawing/dream/vision I have ever seen.

I’m glad you enjoy it. The painting is by

Eduard Hau (1807–1888), and the digital image is public domain. There is a rich collection of paintings of art gallery interiors in the WikiMedia commons at https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/Category:Paintings_of_interiors_of_art_galleries.