The set-theoretic universe is not necessarily a class-forcing extension of HOD

[bibtex key=”HamkinsReitz:The-set-theoretic-universe-is-not-necessarily-a-forcing-extension-of-HOD”]

Abstract. In light of the celebrated theorem of Vopěnka, proving in ZFC that every set is generic over HOD, it is natural to inquire whether the set-theoretic universe V must be a class-forcing extension of HOD by some possibly proper-class forcing notion in HOD. We show, negatively, that if ZFC is consistent, then there is a model of ZFC that is not a class-forcing extension of its HOD for any class forcing notion definable in HOD and with definable forcing relations there (allowing parameters). Meanwhile, S. Friedman (2012) showed, positively, that if one augments HOD with a certain ZFC-amenable class A, definable in V, then the set-theoretic universe V is a class-forcing extension of the expanded structure HOD,,A. Our result shows that this augmentation process can be necessary. The same example shows that V is not necessarily a class-forcing extension of the mantle, and the method provides a counterexample to the intermediate model property, namely, a class-forcing extension VV[G] by a certain definable tame forcing and a transitive intermediate inner model VWV[G] with WZFC, such that W is not a class-forcing extension of V by any class forcing notion with definable forcing relations in V. This improves upon a previous example of Friedman (1999) by omitting the need for 0.

 

In 1972, Vopěnka proved the following celebrated result.

Theorem. (Vopěnka) If V=L[A] where A is a set of ordinals, then V is a forcing extension of the inner model HOD.

The result is now standard, appearing in Jech (Set Theory 2003, p. 249) and elsewhere, and the usual proof establishes a stronger result, stated in ZFC simply as the assertion: every set is generic over HOD. In other words, for every set a there is a forcing notion BHOD and a HOD-generic filter GB for which aHOD[G]V. The full set-theoretic universe V is therefore the union of all these various set-forcing generic extensions HOD[G].

It is natural to wonder whether these various forcing extensions HOD[G] can be unified or amalgamated to realize V as a single class-forcing extension of HOD by a possibly proper class forcing notion in HOD. We expect that it must be a very high proportion of set theorists and set-theory graduate students, who upon first learning of Vopěnka’s theorem, immediately ask this question.

Main Question. Must the set-theoretic universe V be a class-forcing extension of HOD?

We intend the question to be asking more specifically whether the universe V arises as a bona-fide class-forcing extension of HOD, in the sense that there is a class forcing notion P, possibly a proper class, which is definable in HOD and which has definable forcing relation pφ(τ) there for any desired first-order formula φ, such that V arises as a forcing extension V=HOD[G] for some HOD-generic filter GP, not necessarily definable.

In this article, we shall answer the question negatively, by providing a model of ZFC that cannot be realized as such a class-forcing extension of its HOD.

Main Theorem. If ZFC is consistent, then there is a model of ZFC which is not a forcing extension of its HOD by any class forcing notion definable in that HOD and having a definable forcing relation there.

Throughout this article, when we say that a class is definable, we mean that it is definable in the first-order language of set theory allowing set parameters.

The main theorem should be placed in contrast to the following result of Sy Friedman.

Theorem. (Friedman 2012) There is a definable class A, which is strongly amenable to HOD, such that the set-theoretic universe V is a generic extension of HOD,,A.

This is a postive answer to the main question, if one is willing to augment HOD with a class A that may not be definable in HOD. Our main theorem shows that in general, this kind of augmentation process is necessary.

It is natural to ask a variant of the main question in the context of set-theoretic geology.

Question. Must the set-theoretic universe V be a class-forcing extension of its mantle?

The mantle is the intersection of all set-forcing grounds, and so the universe is close in a sense to the mantle, perhaps one might hope that it is close enough to be realized as a class-forcing extension of it. Nevertheless, the answer is negative.

Theorem. If ZFC is consistent, then there is a model of ZFC that does not arise as a class-forcing extension of its mantle M by any class forcing notion with definable forcing relations in M.

We also use our results to provide some counterexamples to the intermediate-model property for forcing. In the case of set forcing, it is well known that every transitive model W of ZFC set theory that is intermediate VWV[G] a ground model V and a forcing extension V[G], arises itself as a forcing extension W=V[G0].

In the case of class forcing, however, this can fail.

Theorem. If ZFC is consistent, then there are models of ZFC set theory VWV[G], where V[G] is a class-forcing extension of V and W is a transitive inner model of V[G], but W is not a forcing extension of V by any class forcing notion with definable forcing relations in V.

Theorem. If ZFC + Ord is Mahlo is consistent, then one can form such a counterexample to the class-forcing intermediate model property VWV[G], where GB is V-generic for an Ord-c.c. tame definable complete class Boolean algebra B, but nevertheless W does not arise by class forcing over V by any definable forcing notion with a definable forcing relation.

More complete details, please go to the paper (click through to the arxiv for a pdf). [bibtex key=”HamkinsReitz:The-set-theoretic-universe-is-not-necessarily-a-forcing-extension-of-HOD”]

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