[bibtex key=”HamkinsReitz:The-set-theoretic-universe-is-not-necessarily-a-forcing-extension-of-HOD”]
Abstract. In light of the celebrated theorem of Vopěnka, proving in ZFC that every set is generic over
, it is natural to inquire whether the set-theoretic universe must be a class-forcing extension of by some possibly proper-class forcing notion in . We show, negatively, that if ZFC is consistent, then there is a model of ZFC that is not a class-forcing extension of its for any class forcing notion definable in and with definable forcing relations there (allowing parameters). Meanwhile, S. Friedman (2012) showed, positively, that if one augments with a certain ZFC-amenable class , definable in , then the set-theoretic universe is a class-forcing extension of the expanded structure . Our result shows that this augmentation process can be necessary. The same example shows that is not necessarily a class-forcing extension of the mantle, and the method provides a counterexample to the intermediate model property, namely, a class-forcing extension by a certain definable tame forcing and a transitive intermediate inner model with , such that is not a class-forcing extension of by any class forcing notion with definable forcing relations in . This improves upon a previous example of Friedman (1999) by omitting the need for .
In 1972, Vopěnka proved the following celebrated result.
Theorem. (Vopěnka) If
The result is now standard, appearing in Jech (Set Theory 2003, p. 249) and elsewhere, and the usual proof establishes a stronger result, stated in ZFC simply as the assertion: every set is generic over
It is natural to wonder whether these various forcing extensions
Main Question. Must the set-theoretic universe
We intend the question to be asking more specifically whether the universe
In this article, we shall answer the question negatively, by providing a model of ZFC that cannot be realized as such a class-forcing extension of its
Main Theorem. If ZFC is consistent, then there is a model of ZFC which is not a forcing extension of its
Throughout this article, when we say that a class is definable, we mean that it is definable in the first-order language of set theory allowing set parameters.
The main theorem should be placed in contrast to the following result of Sy Friedman.
Theorem. (Friedman 2012) There is a definable class
This is a postive answer to the main question, if one is willing to augment
It is natural to ask a variant of the main question in the context of set-theoretic geology.
Question. Must the set-theoretic universe
The mantle is the intersection of all set-forcing grounds, and so the universe is close in a sense to the mantle, perhaps one might hope that it is close enough to be realized as a class-forcing extension of it. Nevertheless, the answer is negative.
Theorem. If ZFC is consistent, then there is a model of ZFC that does not arise as a class-forcing extension of its mantle
We also use our results to provide some counterexamples to the intermediate-model property for forcing. In the case of set forcing, it is well known that every transitive model
In the case of class forcing, however, this can fail.
Theorem. If ZFC is consistent, then there are models of ZFC set theory
Theorem. If ZFC + Ord is Mahlo is consistent, then one can form such a counterexample to the class-forcing intermediate model property
More complete details, please go to the paper (click through to the arxiv for a pdf). [bibtex key=”HamkinsReitz:The-set-theoretic-universe-is-not-necessarily-a-forcing-extension-of-HOD”]