Famous quotations in their original first-order language

Historians everywhere are shocked by the recent discovery that many of our greatest thinkers and poets had first expressed their thoughts and ideas in the language of first-order predicate logic, and sometimes modal logic, rather than in natural language. Some early indications of this were revealed in the pioneering historical research of Henle, Garfield and Tymoczko, in their work Sweet Reason:

We now know that the phenomenon is widespread!  As shown below, virtually all of our cultural leaders have first expressed themselves in the language of first-order predicate logic, before having been compromised by translations into the vernacular.

Rolling Stones 04.jpg

Hamletstrat.JPG

Lorde Laneway 7 (cropped).jpg

(Β¬βˆƒπ‘‘ βˆƒπ‘‘ π·β‘(𝑑)∧𝐹⁑(𝑑)βˆ§π‘†π‘‘β‘(𝑖,𝑑)) ∧(Β¬βˆƒπ‘‘ π‘€βˆˆπ‘‘Ro) ∧(Ru⁑(𝑖,𝑦)β†’β—ŠC⁑(𝑦,𝑖,π‘žβ’π‘)∧Ru⁑(𝑖)∧Ru⁑(𝑖)∧Ru⁑(𝑖)∧Ru⁑(𝑖))

βˆƒ!𝑑 π‘‡β‘(𝑑) βˆ§βˆ€π‘‘ (𝑇⁑(𝑑) →𝐺⁑(𝑑))

Dawkins aaconf.jpg

Β¬π΅π‘–βˆƒπ‘” πΊβ‘(𝑔)

Do Mayor armadura.svg

βˆ€π‘ (𝐺⁑(𝑏)∧𝐡⁑(𝑏)β†’βˆƒπ‘₯ (𝐷⁑(𝑏,π‘₯)∧𝐹⁑(π‘₯)))

Moby Dick final chase

(βˆƒ!𝑀 π‘Š1⁑(𝑀) βˆ§π‘Š2⁑(𝑀)),  βˆƒπ‘€ π‘Š1⁑(𝑀) βˆ§π‘Š2⁑(𝑀) βˆ§π‘†β‘(𝑦,𝑀)?

The Beatles in America

βˆƒπ‘  π‘Œβ‘(𝑠) βˆ§π‘†β‘(𝑠) βˆ§βˆ€π‘₯ πΏβ‘(π‘₯,𝑠)

Statue of Peter Pan and Tinkerbell in Dunedin Botanic Gardens, Dunedin, New Zealand.jpg

βˆƒπ‘ [βˆ€π‘ (𝑐≠𝑝→𝐺⁑(𝑐))] ∧¬𝐺⁑(𝑝)

Robert-Plant.jpg

βˆƒπ‘™ [𝐿⁑(𝑙)βˆ§β—»π‘™(βŒœβˆ€π‘” Gl⁑(𝑔)β†’Gd⁑(𝑔)⁒⌝)βˆ§βˆƒπ‘  (𝑆⁒𝐻⁑(𝑠)∧𝐡⁑(𝑙,𝑠))]

(βˆ€π‘ βˆˆπ‘ƒ βˆƒπ‘ ∈Ch π‘ βˆˆπ‘) ∧(βˆ€π‘” ∈𝐺 βˆƒπ‘ ∈Cr π‘ βˆˆπ‘”)

FDRfiresidechat2.jpg

βˆ€π‘₯⁑(𝐹⁑(𝑀,π‘₯) ↔π‘₯ =𝐹)

Lewis Carroll Self Portrait 1856 circa.jpg

𝐡 βˆ§βˆ€π‘₯ [𝑆⁑(π‘₯)βˆ§π‘‡β‘(π‘₯)β†’βˆƒ!𝑀 π‘Šβ‘(𝑀)∧Gy⁑(π‘₯,𝑀)∧Gi⁑(π‘₯,𝑀)]

Oscar Wilde portrait by Napoleon Sarony - albumen.jpg

βˆƒ!π‘₯ π·β‘(π‘₯) ∧𝐷⁑( βŒœβ’𝐷⁑(𝑖)⁒⌝ )

Tolstoy by Repin 1901 cropped.jpg

βˆ€π‘“ βˆ€π‘” (𝐻⁑(𝑓)∧𝐻⁑(𝑔)β†’π‘“βˆΌπ‘”) βˆ§βˆ€π‘“ βˆ€π‘” (¬𝐻⁑(𝑓)∧¬𝐻⁑(𝑔)β†’Β¬ π‘“βˆΌπ‘”)

There Was An Old Woman Who Lived In A Shoe - WW Denslow - Project Gutenberg etext 18546.jpg

βˆƒπ‘€ (𝑂⁑(𝑀)βˆ§π‘Šβ‘(𝑀)βˆ§βˆƒπ‘  (𝑆⁑(𝑠)∧𝐿⁑(𝑀,𝑠)))

Frans Hals - Portret van RenΓ© Descartes.jpg

𝐢⁑(𝑖) β†’βˆƒπ‘₯ π‘₯ =𝑖

Elvis Presley first national television appearance 1956.jpg

¬¬(𝐻⁑(𝑦)∧𝐷⁑(𝑦))

Judy Garland in The Wizard of Oz trailer 2.jpg

Β¬(𝑑 ∈𝐾) ∧¬(𝑑 ∈𝐾)

Meat Loaf in performance (New York, 2004).jpg

π‘Šβ‘(𝑖,𝑦) βˆ§π‘β‘(𝑖,𝑦) βˆ§Β¬Β¬β—ŠπΏβ‘(𝑖,𝑦) ∧(Β¬ 23<0→¬𝑆⁑(𝑦))

Marlon brando waterfront 6.jpg

β—ŠCL⁑(𝑖) βˆ§β—ŠπΆβ‘(𝑖) βˆ§β—Š(βˆƒπ‘₯ π‘₯ =𝑖) ∧𝐡⁑(𝑖)

βˆ€π‘₯ πΎπ‘₯⁑(βŒœβˆ€π‘š [𝑀⁑(π‘š)βˆ§π‘†β‘(π‘š)∧𝐹⁑(π‘š)β†’β—» βˆƒπ‘€ π‘€β‘(π‘š,𝑀)]⁒⌝)

Theodor Seuss Geisel (01037v).jpg

βˆ€π‘’βˆ€β„Ž (𝐺⁑(𝑒)∧𝐸⁑(𝑒)∧𝐻⁑(β„Ž)→¬𝐿⁑(𝑖,𝑒,β„Ž))

Bob Dylan June 23 1978.jpg

βˆ€π‘ β—»St⁑(𝑝)

The Beach Boys Lost Concert.jpg

β—Šπ‘€π‘– βˆ€π‘” ∈𝐺 β—Š(𝑔 ∈𝐢)

T S Eliot Simon Fieldhouse.jpg

βˆ€π‘š (π‘Ž β‰€πΆπ‘š)

Charles Dickens - Project Gutenberg eText 13103.jpg

βˆ€π‘‘ (𝑝 β‰₯𝑑) βˆ§βˆ€π‘‘ (𝑝 ≀𝑑)

Emily Dickinson daguerreotype (cropped).jpg

βˆ€π‘₯ (𝐹⁑(π‘₯) ⟺ π‘₯ =β„Ž)

George Orwell.jpg

(βˆ€π‘₯ βˆ€π‘¦ π‘₯ =𝑦) ∧(βˆƒπ‘₯ βˆƒπ‘¦β‘([[π‘₯ =π‘₯]] >[[𝑦 =𝑦]]))

Ebcosette.jpg

βˆ€π‘ (Β¬π‘Šβ‘(𝑝)→¬𝑆⁑(𝑝))

βˆƒπ‘₯β—»β—»π‘₯ βˆ§βˆƒπ‘₯β—»Β¬β—»π‘₯ βˆ§βˆƒπ‘₯Β¬β—»Β¬β—»π‘₯

Gustave DorΓ© - Dante Alighieri - Inferno - Plate 8 (Canto III - Abandon all hope ye who enter here)

βˆ€π‘β‘(𝐸⁑(𝑝)β†’βˆ€β„Žβˆˆπ» π΄β‘(𝑝,β„Ž))

Dear readers, in order to assist with this important historical work, please provide translations into ordinary English in the comment section below of any or all of the assertions listed above. We are interested to make sure that all our assertions and translations are accurate.

In addition, any readers who have any knowledge of additional instances of famous quotations that were actually first made in the language of first-order predicate logic (or similar) are encouraged to post comments below detailing their knowledge. I will endeavor to add such additional examples to the list.

Thanks to Philip Welch, to my brother Jonathan, and to Ali Sadegh Daghighi (in the comments) for providing some of the examples, and to Timothy Gowers for some improvements.

Please post comments or send me email if hints are desired.

A Mathematician's Year in Japan, by Joel David Hamkins, available on Amazon Kindle Books

Giorgio Audrito, PhD 2016, University of Torino

Dr. Giorgio Audrito has successfully defended his dissertation, β€œGeneric large cardinals and absoluteness,” at the University of Torino under the supervision of Matteo Viale.

The dissertation Examing Board consisted of myself (serving as Presidente), Alessandro Andretta and Sean Cox.  The defense took place March 2, 2016.

Giorgio Audrito defense (small)

The dissertation was impressive, introducing (in joint work with Matteo Viale) the iterated resurrection axioms RA𝛼⁒(Ξ“) for a forcing class Ξ“, which extend the idea of the resurrection axioms from my work with Thomas Johnstone, The resurrection axioms and uplifting cardinals, by making successive extensions of the same type, forming the resurrection game, and insisting that that the resurrection player have a winning strategy with game value 𝛼. A similar iterative game idea underlies the (𝛼)-uplifting cardinals, from which the consistency of the iterated resurrection axioms can be proved. A final chapter of the dissertation (joint with Silvia Steila), develops the notion of 𝐢-systems of filters, generalizing the more familiar concepts of extenders and towers.

Open determinacy for games on the ordinals, Torino, March 2016

Loggiato

 

 

 

 

The Minerva Statue in front of the Rectorate Palace at the University of Turin.This will be a seminar talk I shall give on March 3, 2016 at the University of Torino, Italy, in the same department where Giuseppe Peano had his position.  I shall be in Italy for the dissertation defense of Giorgio Audrito, on whose dissertation committee I am serving as president.

Abstract. The principle of open determinacy for class games β€” two-player games of perfect information with plays of length πœ”, where the moves are chosen from a possibly proper class, such as games on the ordinals β€” is not provable in Zermelo-Fraenkel set theory ZFC or GΓΆdel-Bernays set theory GBC, if these theories are consistent, because provably in ZFC there is a definable open proper class game with no definable winning strategy. In fact, the principle of open determinacy and even merely clopen determinacy for class games implies Con(ZFC) and iterated instances Con(Con(ZFC)) and more, because it implies that there is a satisfaction class for first-order truth, and indeed a transfinite tower of truth predicates Tr𝛼 for iterated truth-about-truth, relative to any class parameter. This is perhaps explained, in light of the Tarskian recursive definition of truth, by the more general fact that the principle of clopen determinacy is exactly equivalent over GBC to the principle of elementary transfinite recursion ETR over well-founded class relations. Meanwhile, the principle of open determinacy for class games is provable in the stronger theory GBC+Ξ 11-comprehension, a proper fragment of Kelley-Morse set theory KM.

Lewis ChessmenThis is joint work with Victoria Gitman. See our article, Open determinacy for class games, which is currently under review.

Math for nine-year-olds: fold, punch and cut for symmetry!

 

IMG_20160222_071711

Today I had the pleasure to visit my daughter’s fourth-grade classroom for some fun mathematical activities. The topic was Symmetry!   I planned some paper-folding activities, involving hole-punching and cutting, aiming to display the dynamism that is present in the concept of symmetry. Symmetry occurs when a figure can leap up, transforming itself through space, and land again exactly upon itself in different ways.  I sought to have the students experience this dynamic action not only in their minds, as they imagined various symmetries for the figures we considered, but also physically, as they folded a paper along a line of symmetry, checking that this fold brought the figure exactly to itself.

The exercises were good plain fun, and some of the kids wanted to do them again and again, the very same ones.  Here is the pdf file for the entire project.

To get started, we began with a very simple case, a square with two dots on it, which the girls folded and then punched through with a hole punch, so that one punch would punch through both holes at once.

Fold punch and cut-page-001

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Fold punch and cut-page-002
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Next, we handled a few patterns that required two folds. I told the kids to look for the lines of symmetry and fold on them.  Fold the paper in such a way that with ONE punch, you can make exactly the whole pattern.

Don’t worry if the holes you punch do not line up exactly perfectly with the dots β€” if the holes are all touching their intended target and there are the right number of holes, then I told the kids it is great!

IMG_20160222_071730
Fold punch and cut-page-003

The three-fold patterns are a bit more challenging, but almost all of the kids were able to do it.  They did need some help punching through, however, since it sometimes requires some strength to punch through many layers.

IMG_20160222_071736

Fold punch and cut-page-004

With these further patterns, some of the folds don’t completely cover the paper. So double-check and make sure that you won’t end up with unwanted extra holes!

 

 

The second half of the project involved several cutting challenges.  To begin, let’s suppose that you wanted to cut a square out of the middle of a piece of paper. How would you do it?  Perhaps you might want to poke your scissors through and then cut around the square in four cuts.  But can you do it in just ONE cut?  Yes!  If you fold the paper on the diagonals of the square, then you can make one quick snip to cut out exactly the square, leaving the frame completely intact.

 

 

Fold punch and cut-page-005
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Fold punch and cut-page-006

Similarly, one can cut out many other shapes in just one cut.  The rectangle and triangle are a little trickier than you might think at first, since at a middle stage of folding, you’ll find that you end up folding a shorter line onto a longer one, but the point is that this is completely fine, since one cut will go through both.  Give it a try!

 

Fold punch and cut-page-007

 

 

IMG_20160222_072122

Here are a few harder shapes, requiring more folds.

 

 

 

IMG_20160222_072230
Fold punch and cut-page-008


It is an amazing mathematical fact, the fold-and-cut theorem, that ANY shape consisting of finitely many straight line segments can be made with just one cut after folding.  Here are a few challenges, which many of the fourth-graders were able to do during my visit.

IMG_20160222_072257

What a lot of fun the visit was!  I shall look forward to returning to the school next time.

In case anyone is interested, I have made available a pdf file of this project, below:

 

 I would like to thank Mike Lawler, whose tweet put me onto the topic.  And see also the awesome Numberphile video on the fold-and-cut theorem, featuring mathematician Katie Steckles.

See more of my Math for Kids!

A Mathematician's Year in Japan, by Joel David Hamkins, available on Amazon Kindle Books

 

 

 

 

 

Set-theoretic mereology

[bibtex key=HamkinsKikuchi2016:Set-theoreticMereology]

Abstract. We consider a set-theoretic version of mereology based on the inclusion relation βŠ† and analyze how well it might serve as a foundation of mathematics. After establishing the non-definability of ∈ from βŠ†, we identify the natural axioms for βŠ†-based mereology, which constitute a finitely axiomatizable, complete, decidable theory. Ultimately, for these reasons, we conclude that this form of set-theoretic mereology cannot by itself serve as a foundation of mathematics. Meanwhile, augmented forms of set-theoretic mereology, such as that obtained by adding the singleton operator, are foundationally robust.

In light of the comparative success of membership-based set theory in the foundations of mathematics, since the time of Cantor, Zermelo and Hilbert, a mathematical philosopher naturally wonders whether one might find a similar success for mereology, based upon a mathematical or set-theoretic parthood relation rather than the element-of relation ∈. Can set-theoretic mereology serve as a foundation of mathematics? And what should be the central axioms of set-theoretic mereology?

Venn_Diagram_of_sets_((P),(Q),(R))We should like therefore to consider a mereological perspective in set theory, analyzing how well it might serve as a foundation while identifying the central axioms. Although set theory and mereology, of course, are often seen as being in conflict, what we take as the project here is to develop and investigate, within set theory, a set-theoretic interpretation of mereological ideas. Mereology, by placing its focus on the parthood relation, seems naturally interpreted in set theory by means of the inclusion relation βŠ†, so that one set π‘₯ is a part of another 𝑦, just in case π‘₯ is a subset of 𝑦, written π‘₯ βŠ†π‘¦. This interpretation agrees with David Lewis’s Parts of Classes (1991) interpretation of set-theoretic mereology in the context of sets and classes, but we restrict our attention to the universe of sets. So in this article we shall consider the formulation of set-theoretic mereology as the study of the structure βŸ¨π‘‰, βŠ†βŸ©, which we shall take as the canonical fundamental structure of set-theoretic mereology, where 𝑉 is the universe of all sets; this is in contrast to the structure βŸ¨π‘‰, ∈⟩, usually taken as central in set theory. The questions are: How well does this mereological structure serve as a foundation of mathematics? Can we faithfully interpret the rest of mathematics as taking place in βŸ¨π‘‰, βŠ†βŸ© to the same extent that set theorists have argued (with whatever degree of success) that one may find faithful representations in βŸ¨π‘‰, ∈⟩? Can we get by with merely the subset relation βŠ† in place of the membership relation ∈?

Ultimately, we shall identify grounds supporting generally negative answers to these questions. On the basis of various mathematical results, our main philosophical thesis will be that the particular understanding of set-theoretic mereology via the inclusion relation βŠ† cannot adequately serve by itself as a foundation of mathematics. Specifically, the following theorem and corollary show that ∈ is not definable from βŠ†, and we take this to show that one may not interpret membership-based set theory itself within set-theoretic mereology in any straightforward, direct manner.

Theorem. In any universe of set theory βŸ¨π‘‰, ∈⟩, there is a definable relation βˆˆβˆ—, different from ∈, such that βŸ¨π‘‰, βˆˆβˆ—βŸ© is a model of set theory, in fact isomorphic to the original universe βŸ¨π‘‰, ∈⟩, for which the corresponding inclusion relation π‘’βŠ†βˆ—π‘£βŸ·βˆ€π‘Žβ‘(π‘Žβˆˆβˆ—π‘’β†’π‘Žβˆˆβˆ—π‘£) is identical to the usual inclusion relation 𝑒 βŠ†π‘£.

Corollary. One cannot define ∈ from βŠ† in any model of set theory, even allowing parameters in the definition.

A counterpoint to this is provided by the following theorem, however, which identifies a weak sense in which βŠ† may identify ∈ up to definable automorphism of the universe.

Theorem. Assume ZFC in the universe βŸ¨π‘‰, ∈⟩. Suppose that βˆˆβˆ— is a definable class relation in βŸ¨π‘‰, ∈⟩ for which βŸ¨π‘‰, βˆˆβˆ—βŸ© is a model of set theory (a weak set theory suffices), such that the corresponding inclusion relation π‘’βŠ†βˆ—π‘£βŸΊβˆ€π‘Žβ‘(π‘Žβˆˆβˆ—π‘’β†’π‘Žβˆˆβˆ—π‘£)is the same as the usual inclusion relation 𝑒 βŠ†π‘£. Then the two membership relations are isomorphic βŸ¨π‘‰,βˆˆβŸ©β‰…βŸ¨π‘‰,βˆˆβˆ—βŸ©.

That counterpoint is not decisive, however, in light of the question whether we really need βˆˆβˆ— to be a class with respect to ∈, a question resolved by the following theorem, which shows that set-theoretic mereology does not actually determine the ∈-isomorphism class or even the ∈-theory of the ∈-model in which it arises.

Theorem. For any two consistent theories extending ZFC, there are models βŸ¨π‘Š, ∈⟩ and βŸ¨π‘Š, βˆˆβˆ—βŸ© of those theories, respectively, with the same underlying set π‘Š and the same induced inclusion relation βŠ†= βŠ†βˆ—.

For example, we cannot determine in βŠ†-based set-theoretic mereology whether the continuum hypothesis holds or fails, whether the axiom of choice holds or fails or whether there are large cardinals or not. Initially, the following central theorem may appear to be a positive result for mereology, since it identifies precisely what are the principles of set-theoretic mereology, considered as the theory of βŸ¨π‘‰, βŠ†βŸ©. Namely, βŠ† is an atomic unbounded relatively complemented distributive lattice, and this is a finitely axiomatizable complete theory. So in a sense, this theory simply is the theory of βŠ†-based set-theoretic mereology.

Theorem. Set-theoretic mereology, considered as the theory of βŸ¨π‘‰, βŠ†βŸ©, is precisely the theory of an atomic unbounded relatively complemented distributive lattice, and furthermore, this theory is finitely axiomatizable, complete and decidable.

But upon reflection, since every finitely axiomatizable complete theory is decidable, the result actually appears to be devastating for set-theoretic mereology as a foundation of mathematics, because a decidable theory is much too simple to serve as a foundational theory for all mathematics. The full spectrum and complexity of mathematics naturally includes all the instances of many undecidable decision problems and so cannot be founded upon a decidable theory. Finally, it follows as a corollary that the structure consisting of the hereditarily finite sets under inclusion forms an elementary substructure of the full set-theoretic mereological universe ⟨HF,βŠ†βŸ©β‰ΊβŸ¨π‘‰,βŠ†βŸ©. Consequently set-theoretic mereology cannot properly treat or even express the various concepts of infinity that arise in mathematics.

Mereology on MathOverflow | Mereology on Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy | Mereology on Wikipedia

Some previous posts on this blog:

Different models of set theory with same βŠ† | βŠ† is decidable

Freiling’s axiom of symmetry, or throwing darts at the real line, Graduate Student Colloquium, April 2016

This will be a talk I’ll give at the CUNY Graduate Center Graduate Student Colloquium on Monday, April 11 (new date!), 2016, 4-4:45 pm.  The talk will be aimed at a general audience of mathematics graduate students.

By PeterPan23 [Public domain], via Wikimedia Commons

Abstract. I shall give an elementary presentation of Freiling’s axiom of symmetry, which is the principle asserting that if π‘₯ ↦𝐴π‘₯ is a function mapping every real π‘₯ ∈[0,1] in the unit interval to a countable set of such reals 𝐴π‘₯ βŠ‚[0,1], then there are two reals π‘₯ and 𝑦 for which π‘₯ βˆ‰π΄π‘¦ and 𝑦 βˆ‰π΄π‘₯.  To argue for the truth of this principle, Freiling imagined throwing two darts at the real number line, landing at π‘₯ and 𝑦 respectively: almost surely, the location 𝑦 of the second dart is not in the set 𝐴π‘₯ arising from that of the first dart, since that set is countable; and by symmetry, it shouldn’t matter which dart we imagine as being first. So it may seem that almost every pair must fulfill the principle. Nevertheless, the principle is independent of the axioms of ZFC and in fact it is provably equivalent to the failure of the continuum hypothesis.  I’ll introduce the continuum hypothesis in a general way and discuss these foundational matters, before providing a proof of the equivalence of Β¬CH with the axiom of symmetry. The axiom of symmetry admits natural higher dimensional analogues, such as the case of maps (π‘₯,𝑦) ↦𝐴π‘₯,𝑦, where one seeks a triple (π‘₯,𝑦,𝑧) for which no member is in the set arising from the other two, and these principles also have an equivalent formulation in terms of the size of the continuum.

Freiling axiom of symmetry on MathOverflow | On Wikipedia | Graduate Student Colloquium


Set Theory Day at the CUNY Graduate Center, March 11, 2016

Vika Gitman, Roman Kossak and Miha Habič have been very kind to organize what they have called Set Theory Day, to be held Friday March 11 at the CUNY Graduate Center in celebration of my 50th birthday. This will be an informal conference focussing on the research work of my various PhD graduate students, and all the lectures will be given by those who were or are currently a PhD student of mine. It will be great! I am very pleased to count among my former students many who have now become mathematical research colleagues and co-authors of mine, and I am looking forward to hearing the latest. If you want to hear what is going on with infinity, then please join us March 11 at the CUNY Graduate Center!

Set Theory Day 2016

Vika Gitman’s announcement of Set Theory Day |  Set Theory Day conference web page | My graduate students

(The poster was designed by my student Erin Carmody, who graduated last year and now has a position at Nebraska Wesleyan.)

Diamond on the ordinals

I was recently surprised to discover that if there is a definable well-ordering of the universe, then the diamond principle on the ordinals holds for definable classes, automatically. In fact, the diamond principle for definable classes is simply equivalent in ZFC to the existence of a definable well-ordering of the universe. It follows as a consequence that the diamond principle for definable classes, although seeming to be fundamentally scheme-theoretic, is actually expressible in the first-order language of set theory.

In set theory, the diamond principle asserts the existence of a sequence of objects 𝐴𝛼, of growing size, such that any large object at the end is very often anticipated by these approximations.  In the case of diamond on the ordinals, what we will have is a definable sequence of 𝐴𝛼 βŠ†π›Ό, such that for any definable class of ordinals 𝐴 and any definable class club set 𝐢, there are ordinals πœƒ ∈𝐢 with 𝐴 βˆ©πœƒ =π΄πœƒ.  This kind of principle typically allows one to undertake long constructions that will diagonalize against all the large objects, by considering and reacting to their approximations 𝐴𝛼. Since every large object 𝐴 is often correctly approximated that way, this enables many such constructions to succeed.

Let me dive right in to the main part of the argument.

Theorem. In ZFC, if there is a definable well-ordering of the universe, then β—ŠOrd holds for definable classes. That is, there is a 𝑝-definable sequence βŸ¨π΄π›Ό βˆ£π›Ό <Ord⟩, such that for any definable class 𝐴 βŠ†Ord and any definable closed unbounded class of ordinals 𝐢 βŠ†Ord (allowing parameters), there is some πœƒ ∈𝐢 with 𝐴 βˆ©πœƒ =π΄πœƒ.

Proof. The theorem is proved as a theorem scheme; namely, I shall provide a specific definition for the sequence ⃗𝐴 =βŸ¨π΄π›Ό βˆ£π›Ό <Ord⟩, using the same parameter 𝑝 as the definition of the global well-order and with a definition of closely related syntactic complexity, and then prove as a scheme, a separate statement for each definable class 𝐴 βŠ†Ord and class club 𝐢 βŠ†Ord, that there is some 𝛼 ∈𝐢 with 𝐴 βˆ©π›Ό =𝐴𝛼. The definitions of the classes 𝐴 and 𝐢 may involve parameters and have arbitrary complexity.

Let ⊲ be the definable well-ordering of the universe, definable by a specific formula using some parameter 𝑝. I define the β—ŠOrd-sequence ⃗𝐴 =βŸ¨π΄π›Ό βˆ£π›Ό <Ord⟩ by transfinite recursion. Suppose that ⃗𝐴 β†Ύπœƒ has been defined. I shall let π΄πœƒ =βˆ… unless πœƒ is a β„Ά-fixed point above the rank of 𝑝 and there is a set 𝐴 βŠ†πœƒ and a closed unbounded set 𝐢 βŠ†πœƒ, with both 𝐴 and 𝐢 definable in the structure βŸ¨π‘‰πœƒ, ∈⟩ (allowing parameters), such that 𝐴 βˆ©π›Ό ≠𝐴𝛼 for every 𝛼 ∈𝐢. In this case, I choose the least such pair (𝐴,𝐢), minimizing first on the maximum of the logical complexities of the definitions of 𝐴 and of 𝐢, and then minimizing on the total length of the defining formulas of 𝐴 and 𝐢, and then minimizing on the GΓΆdel codes of those formulas, and finally on the parameters used in the definitions, using the well-order βŠ²β†Ύπ‘‰πœƒ. For this minimal pair, let π΄πœƒ =𝐴. This completes the definition of the sequence ⃗𝐴 =βŸ¨π΄π›Ό βˆ£π›Ό ∈Ord⟩.

Let me remark on a subtle point, since the meta-mathematical issues loom large here. The definition of ⃗𝐴 is internal to the model, and at stage πœƒ we ask about subsets of πœƒ definable in βŸ¨π‘‰πœƒ, ∈⟩, using the truth predicate for this structure. If we were to run this definition inside an πœ”-nonstandard model, it could happen that the minimal formula we get is nonstandard, and in this case, the set 𝐴 would not actually be definable by a standard formula. Also, even when 𝐴 is definable by a standard formula, it might be paired (with some constants), with a club set 𝐢 that is defined only by a nonstandard formula (and this is why we minimize on the maximum of the complexities of the definitions of 𝐴 and 𝐢 together). So one must give care in the main argument keeping straight the distinction between the meta-theoretic natural numbers and the internal natural numbers of the object theory ZFC.

Let me now prove that the sequence ⃗𝐴 is indeed a β—ŠOrd-sequence for definable classes. The argument follows in spirit the classical proof of β—Š in 𝐿, subject to the mathematical issues I mentioned. If the sequence ⃗𝐴 is not a diamond sequence, then there is some definable class 𝐴 βŠ†Ord, defined in βŸ¨π‘‰, ∈⟩ by a specific formula πœ‘ and parameter 𝑧, and definable club 𝐢 βŠ†Ord, defined by some πœ“ and parameter 𝑦, with 𝐴 βˆ©π›Ό ≠𝐴𝛼 for every 𝛼 ∈𝐢. We may assume without loss that these formulas are chosen so as to be minimal in the sense of the construction, so that the maximum of the complexities of πœ‘ and πœ“ are as small as possible, and the lengths of the formulas, and the GΓΆdel codes and finally the parameters 𝑧,𝑦 are ⊲-minimal, respectively, successively. Let π‘š be a sufficiently large natural number, larger than the complexity of the definitions of ⊲, 𝐴, 𝐢, and large enough so that the minimality condition we just discussed is expressible by a Ξ£π‘š formula. Let πœƒ be any Ξ£π‘š-correct ordinal above the ranks of the parameters used in the definitions. It follows that the restrictions βŠ²β†Ύπ‘‰πœƒ and also 𝐴 βˆ©πœƒ and 𝐢 βˆ©πœƒ and ⃗𝐴 β†Ύπœƒ are definable in βŸ¨π‘‰πœƒ, ∈⟩ by the same definitions and parameters as their counterparts in 𝑉, that 𝐢 βˆ©πœƒ is club in πœƒ, and that 𝐴 βˆ©πœƒ and 𝐢 βˆ©πœƒ form a minimal pair using those definitions with 𝐴 βˆ©π›Ό ≠𝐴𝛼 for any 𝛼 ∈𝐢 βˆ©πœƒ. Thus, by the definition of ⃗𝐴, it follows that π΄πœƒ =𝐴 βˆ©πœƒ. Since 𝐢 βˆ©πœƒ is unbounded in πœƒ and 𝐢 is closed, it follows that πœƒ ∈𝐢, and so π΄πœƒ =𝐴 βˆ©πœƒ contradicts our assumption about 𝐴 and 𝐢. So there are no such counterexample classes, and thus ⃗𝐴 is a β—ŠOrd-sequence with respect to definable classes, as claimed.
QED

Theorem. The following are equivalent over ZFC.

  1. There is a definable well-ordering of the universe, using some set parameter 𝑝.
  2. 𝑉 =HOD{𝑝}, for some set 𝑝.
  3. β—ŠOrd holds for definable classes. That is, there is a set parameter 𝑝 and a definable sequence ⃗𝐴 =βŸ¨π΄π›Ό βˆ£π›Ό <Ord⟩, such that for any definable class 𝐴 βŠ†Ord and definable class club 𝐢 βŠ†Ord, there is some 𝛼 ∈𝐢 with 𝐴 βˆ©π›Ό =𝐴𝛼.

Proof. Let me first give the argument, and then afterward discuss some issues about the formalization, which involves some subtle issues.

(1 β†’2) Suppose that ⊲ is a 𝑝-definable well-ordering of 𝑉, which means that every set has a ⊲-minimal element. Let us refine this order by defining π‘₯ βŠ²β€²π‘¦, just in case rank⁑(π‘₯) <rank⁑(𝑦) or rank⁑(π‘₯) =rank⁑(𝑦) and π‘₯ βŠ²π‘¦. The new order is also a well-order, which now respects rank. In particular, the order βŠ²β€² is set-like, and so every object π‘₯ is the π›Όπ‘‘β’β„Ž element with respect to the βŠ²β€²-order, for some ordinal 𝛼. Thus, every object is definable from 𝑝 and an ordinal, and so 𝑉 =HOD{𝑝}, as desired.

(2 β†’1) If 𝑉 =HOD{𝑝}, then we have the canonical well-order of HOD using parameter 𝑝, similar to how one shows that the axiom of choice holds in HOD. Namely, define π‘₯ βŠ²π‘¦ if and only if rank⁑(π‘₯) <rank⁑(𝑦), or the ranks are the same, but π‘₯ is definable from 𝑝 and ordinal parameters in some π‘‰πœƒ with a smaller πœƒ than 𝑦 is, or the ranks are the same and the πœƒ is the same, but π‘₯ is definable in that π‘‰πœƒ by a formula with a smaller GΓΆdel code, or with the same formula but smaller ordinal parameters. It is easy to see that this is a 𝑝-definable well-ordering of the universe.

(1 β†’3) This is the content of the theorem above.

(3 β†’1) If ⃗𝐴 is a 𝑝-definable β—ŠOrd-sequence for definable classes, then it is easy to see that if 𝐴 is a set of ordinals, then 𝐴 must arise as 𝐴𝛼 for unboundedly many 𝛼. In ZFC, using the axiom of choice, it is a standard fact that every set is coded by a set of ordinals. So let us define that π‘₯ βŠ²π‘¦, just in case π‘₯ is coded by a set of ordinals that appears earlier on ⃗𝐴 than any set of ordinals coding 𝑦. This is clearly a well-ordering, since the map sending π‘₯ to the ordinal 𝛼 for which 𝐴𝛼 codes π‘₯ is an Ord-ranking of ⊲. So there is a 𝑝-definable well-ordering of the universe.
QED

An observant reader will notice some meta-mathematical issues concerning the previous theorem. The issue is that statements 1 and 2 are known to be expressible by statements in the first-order language of set theory, as single statements, but for statement 3 we have previously expressed it only as a scheme of first-order statements. So how can they be equivalent? The answer is that the full scheme-theoretic content of statement 3 follows already from instances in which the complexity of the definitions of 𝐴 and 𝐢 are bounded. Basically, once one gets the global well-order, then one can construct a β—ŠOrd-sequence that works for all definable classes. In this sense, we may regard the diamond principle β—ŠOrd for definable classes as not really a scheme of statements, but rather equivalent to a single first-order assertion.

Lastly, let me consider the content of the theorems in GΓΆdel-Bernays set theory or Kelley-Morse set theory. Of course, we know that there can be models of these theories that do not have β—ŠOrd in the full second-order sense. For example, it is relatively consistent with ZFC that an inaccessible cardinal πœ… does not have β—Šπœ…, and in this case, the structure βŸ¨π‘‰πœ…, ∈,π‘‰πœ…+1⟩ will satisfy GBC and even KM, but it won’t have β—ŠOrd with respect to all classes, even though it has a definable well-ordering of the universe (since there is such a well-ordering in π‘‰πœ…+1). But meanwhile, there will be a β—ŠOrd-sequence that works with respect to classes that are definable from that well-ordering and parameters, simply by following the construction given in the theorem.

This leads to several extremely interesting questions, about which I am currently thinking, concerning instances where we can have β—Šπœ… for definable classes in π‘‰πœ…, even when the full β—Šπœ… fails. Stay tuned!

Set-theoretic mereology: the theory of the subset relation is decidable

In this post I’d like to explain a certain aspect of my on-going project with Makoto Kikuchi on set-theoretic mereology, which is set theory, undertaken in the full set-theoretic universe 𝑉, but using only the inclusion (subset) relation βŠ†, rather than the element-of relation ∈.  (See my earlier post, Different models of set theory with the same subset relation) The subset relation is of course a partial order and indeed a lattice order, since any two sets π‘Ž and 𝑏 have a least upper bound, the union π‘Ž βˆͺ𝑏, and a greatest lower bound, the intersection π‘Ž βˆ©π‘. Furthermore, the lattice has a least element βˆ…, but no greatest element, and for any set π‘Ž, the collection of sets with βˆ… βŠ†π‘ βŠ†π‘Ž forms an atomic Boolean algebra.Venn_Diagram_of_sets_((P),(Q),(R))To assist with the analysis, let’s work a bit more generally. Recall that a partial order is a lattice order, if any two elements have a least upper bound (join) and greatest lower bound (meet), which I shall denote by π‘Ž βˆͺ𝑏 and π‘Ž βˆ©π‘, respectively, since I am interested in the set-theoretic cases; similarly, I’ll denote the order by π‘Ž βŠ†π‘. Let me define that a lattice is locally Boolean, if there is a least element 0, and for every π‘Ž, the interval [0,π‘Ž] is a Boolean algebra. Such a lattice is unbounded, if there is no maximal element. In such a lattice, an atom is a non-zero element that is minimal above 0, and the lattice is atomic, if every element is the least upper bound of the atoms below it. For each natural number 𝑛, let us introduce the unary predicate denoted |π‘₯| β‰₯𝑛, which expresses that π‘₯ admits a decomposition as the join of 𝑛 distinct nonzero incompatible elements: π‘₯ =𝑦1 βˆͺβ‹― βˆͺ𝑦𝑛, where 𝑦𝑖 β‰ 0 and 𝑦𝑖 βˆ©π‘¦π‘— =0 for 𝑖 ≠𝑗. In an atomic locally Boolean lattice, the relation |π‘₯| β‰₯𝑛 holds just in case there are at least 𝑛 atoms π‘Ž ≀π‘₯.

To give a few examples, if HF is the set of hereditarily finite sets, then ⟨HF, βŠ†βŸ©, using the usual subset relation, is an unbounded atomic locally Boolean lattice. More generally, if 𝑉 is any model of set theory (even a very weak theory is sufficient), then βŸ¨π‘‰, βŠ†βŸ© is an unbounded atomic locally Boolean lattice.

I should like to prove here that the theory of unbounded atomic locally Boolean lattice orders is decidable, and furthermore admits elimination of quantifiers down to the language including the Boolean operations and the relations expressing the height or size of an object, |π‘₯| β‰₯𝑛 and |π‘₯| =𝑛.

Theorem. Every formula in the language of lattices is equivalent, over the theory of unbounded atomic locally Boolean lattices, to a quantifier-free formula in the language of the order π‘Ž βŠ†π‘, equality π‘Ž =𝑏, meet π‘Ž βˆ©π‘, join π‘Ž βˆͺ𝑏, relative complement π‘Ž βˆ’π‘, constant 0, the unary relation |π‘₯| β‰₯𝑛, and the unary relation |π‘₯| =𝑛, where 𝑛 is respectively any natural number.

Proof. We prove the result by induction on formulas. The collection of formulas equivalent to a quantifier-free formula in that language clearly includes all atomic formulas and is closed under Boolean combinations. So it suffices to eliminate the quantifier in a formula of the form βˆƒπ‘₯ β’πœ‘β‘(π‘₯,…), where πœ‘β‘(π‘₯,…) is quantifier-free in that language. Let us make a number of observations that will enable various simplifying assumptions about the form of πœ‘.

Because equality of terms is expressible by the identity π‘Ž =𝑏 ⟺ π‘Ž βŠ†π‘ βŠ†π‘Ž, we do not actually need = in the language (and here I refer to the use of equality in atomic formulas of the form 𝑠 =𝑑 where 𝑠 and 𝑑 are terms, and not to the incidental appearance of the symbol = in the unary predicate |π‘₯| =𝑛, which is an unrelated use of this symbol, a mere stylistic flourish). Similarly, in light of the equivalence π‘Ž βŠ†π‘ ⟺ |π‘Ž βˆ’π‘| =0, we do not need to make explicit reference to the order π‘Ž βŠ†π‘. So we may assume that all atomic assertions in πœ‘ have the form |𝑑| β‰₯𝑛 or |𝑑| =𝑛 for some term 𝑑 in the language of meet, join, relative complement and 0. We may omit the need for explicit negation in the formula by systematically applying the equivalences:
Β¬(|𝑑|β‰₯𝑛)βŸΊβ‹π‘˜<𝑛|𝑑|=π‘˜ and
Β¬(|𝑑|=𝑛)⟺(|𝑑|β‰₯𝑛+1)βˆ¨β‹π‘˜<𝑛|𝑑|=π‘˜.
So we have reduced to the case where πœ‘ is a positive Boolean combination of expressions of the form |𝑑| β‰₯𝑛 and |𝑑| =𝑛.

Let us consider the form of the terms 𝑑 that may arise in the formula. List all the variables π‘₯ =π‘₯0,π‘₯1,…,π‘₯𝑁 that arise in any of the terms appearing in πœ‘, and consider the Venn diagram corresponding to these variables. The cells of this Venn diagram can each be described by a term of the form ⋀𝑖≀𝑁 Β±π‘₯𝑖, which I shall refer to as a cell term, where Β±π‘₯𝑖 means that either π‘₯𝑖 appears or else we have subtracted π‘₯𝑖 from the other variables. Since we have only relative complements in a locally Boolean lattice, however, and not absolute complements, we need only consider the cells where at least one variable appears positively, since the exterior region in the Venn diagram is not actually represented by any term. In this way, every term in the language of locally Boolean lattices is a finite union of such cell terms, plus βˆ… (which I suppose can be viewed as an empty union). Note that distinct cell terms are definitely representing disjoint objects in the lattice.

Next, by considering the possible sizes of 𝑠 βˆ’π‘‘, 𝑠 βˆ©π‘‘ and 𝑑 βˆ’π‘ , observe that
|𝑠βˆͺ𝑑|β‰₯π‘›βŸΊβ‹π‘–+𝑗+π‘˜=𝑛(|𝑠|β‰₯𝑖+𝑗)∧(|π‘ βˆ©π‘‘|β‰₯𝑗)∧(|𝑑|β‰₯𝑗+π‘˜).
Through repeated application of this, we may reduce any assertion about |𝑑| for a term to a Boolean combination of assertions about cell terms. (Note that size assertions about βˆ… are trivially settled by the theory and can be eliminated.)

Let us now focus on the quantified variable π‘₯ separately from the other variables, for it may appear either positively or negatively in such a cell term. More precisely, each cell term in the variables π‘₯ =π‘₯0,π‘₯1,…,π‘₯𝑁 is equivalent to π‘₯ βˆ©π‘ or 𝑐 βˆ’π‘₯, for some cell term 𝑐 in the variables π‘₯1,…,π‘₯𝑁, that is, not including π‘₯, or to the term π‘₯ βˆ’(π‘₯1 βˆͺβ‹― βˆͺπ‘₯𝑁), which is the cell term for which π‘₯ is the only positive variable.

We have reduced the problem to the case where we want to eliminate the quantifier from βˆƒπ‘₯ πœ‘, where πœ‘ is a positive Boolean combination of size assertions about cell terms. We may express πœ‘ in disjunctive normal form and then distribute the quantifier over the disjunct to reduce to the case where πœ‘ is a conjunction of size assertions about cell terms. Each cell term has the form π‘₯ βˆ©π‘ or 𝑐 βˆ’π‘₯ or π‘₯ βˆ’(π‘₯1 βˆͺβ‹―π‘₯𝑁), where 𝑐 is a cell term in the list of variables without π‘₯. Group the conjuncts of πœ‘ that use the same cell term 𝑐 in this way together. The point now is that assertions about whether there is an object π‘₯ in the lattice such that certain cell terms obey various size requirements amount to the conjunction of various size requirements about cells in the variables not including π‘₯. For example, the assertion βˆƒπ‘₯⁑(|π‘₯βˆ©π‘|β‰₯3)∧(|π‘₯βˆ©π‘|β‰₯7)∧(|π‘βˆ’π‘₯|=2) is equivalent (over the theory of unbounded atomic locally Boolean lattices) to the assertion |𝑐| β‰₯9, since we may simply let π‘₯ be all but 2 atoms of 𝑐, and this will have size at least 7, which is also at least 3. If contradictory assertions are made, such as βˆƒπ‘₯ ⁑(|π‘₯ βˆ©π‘| β‰₯5 ∧|π‘₯ βˆ©π‘| =3), then the whole formula is equivalent to βŸ‚, which can be expressed without quantifiers as 0 β‰ 0.

Next, the key observation of the proof is that assertions about the existence of such π‘₯ for different cell terms in the variables not including π‘₯ will succeed or fail independently, since those cell terms are representing disjoint elements of the lattice, and so one may take the final witnessing π‘₯ to be the union of the witnesses for each piece. So to eliminate the quantifier, we simply group together the atomic assertions being made about the cell terms in the variables without π‘₯, and then express the existence assertion as a size requirement on those cell terms. For example, the assertion βˆƒπ‘₯⁑(|π‘βˆ©π‘₯|β‰₯5)∧(|π‘βˆ’π‘₯|=6)∧(|π‘‘βˆ©π‘₯|β‰₯7), where 𝑐 and 𝑑 are distinct cell terms, is equivalent to (|𝑐|β‰₯11)∧(|𝑑|β‰₯7), since 𝑐 and 𝑑 are disjoint and so we may let π‘₯ be the appropriate part of 𝑐 and a suitable piece of 𝑑. The only remaining complication concerns instances of the term π‘₯ βˆ’(π‘₯1 βˆͺβ‹― βˆͺπ‘₯𝑁). But for these, the thing to notice is that any single positive size assertion about this term is realizable in our theory, since we have assumed that the lattice is unbounded, and so there will always be as many atoms as desired disjoint from any finite list of objects. But we must again pay attention to whether the requirements expressed by distinct clauses are contradictory.

Altogether, I have provided a procedure for eliminating quantifiers from any assertion in the language of locally Boolean lattices, down to the language augmented by unary predicates expressing the size of an object. This procedure works in any unbounded atomic locally Boolean lattice, and so the theorem is proved. QED

Corollary. The theory of unbounded atomic locally Boolean lattices is complete.

Proof. Every sentence in this theory is equivalent by the procedure to a quantifier-free sentence in the stated language. But since such sentences have no variables, they must simply be a Boolean combination of trivial size assertions about 0, such as (|0| β‰₯2) ∨¬(|0| =5), whose truth value is settled by the theory. QED

Corollary. The structure of hereditarily finite sets ⟨HF, βŠ†βŸ© is an elementary substructure of the entire set-theoretic universe βŸ¨π‘‰, βŠ†βŸ©, with the inclusion relation.

Proof. These structures are both unbounded atomic locally Boolean lattices, and so they each support the quantifier-elimination procedure. But they agree on the truth of any quantifier-free assertion about the sizes of hereditarily finite sets, and so they they must agree on all truth assertions about objects in HF. QED

Corollary. The structure βŸ¨π‘‰, βŠ†βŸ© has a decidable theory. The structure ⟨HF, βŠ†βŸ© has a decidable elementary diagram, and hence a computably decidable presentation.

Proof. The theory is the theory of unbounded atomic locally Boolean lattices. Since the structure ⟨HF, βŠ†βŸ© has a computable presentation via the Ackerman coding of hereditarily finite sets, for which the subset relation and the size relations are computable, it follows that we may also compute the truth of any formula by first reducing it to a quantifier-free assertions of those types. So this is a computably decidable presentation. QED

Survey of Logic for Philosophers, CUNY GC PHIL 76500, Spring 2016

CUNY GC

Survey of Logic for Philosophers
PHIL 76500
CUNY Graduate Center
Program in Philosophy
Spring semester 2016
4 credits
Weds. 11:45-1:45
Room 5417

 

This seminar will be a graduate-level survey of topics in logic for philosophers, including propositional logic, modal logic, predicate logic, model theory, completeness, incompleteness, computability theory, set theory and the higher infinite. The material will thus be a mixture of philosophical logic and mathematical logic, and a goal of the course will be to develop the student’s ability to treat the main ideas of logic with clarity and precision.

Students will solve weekly problem sets and write a final paper on a topic chosen in consultation with me.

Students talks on their research projects. The students will give brief talks on their research paper topics on May 25, 2016, 11:45-1:45 in GC 5417. I will post titles and abstracts here when I get them. Among the topics will be the following and others:

  • The problem of aggregating individual preferences to a group preference relation
  • The logic of missing information
  • The hierarchy of expressive power of sets of classical connectives
  • Recovering the accessibility relation from the modal theories of the worlds in a Kripke model
  • The fundamental theorem of finite games of perfect information
  • Multi-valued modal logic
  • Definability via category theory
  • Discernibility and indiscernibility in a language without equality
  • Modal predicate logic and the Barcan formula

Upward closure and amalgamation in the generic multiverse of a countable model of set theory

[bibtex key=Hamkins2016:UpwardClosureAndAmalgamationInTheGenericMultiverse]

Abstract. I prove several theorems concerning upward closure and amalgamation in the generic multiverse of a countable transitive model of set theory. Every such model π‘Š has forcing extensions π‘Šβ‘[𝑐] and π‘Šβ‘[𝑑] by adding a Cohen real, which cannot be amalgamated in any further extension, but some nontrivial forcing notions have all their extensions amalgamable. An increasing chain π‘Šβ‘[𝐺0] βŠ†π‘Šβ‘[𝐺1] βŠ†β‹― has an upper bound π‘Šβ‘[𝐻] if and only if the forcing had uniformly bounded essential size in π‘Š. Every chain π‘Š βŠ†π‘Šβ‘[𝑐0] βŠ†π‘Šβ‘[𝑐1] βŠ†β‹― of extensions adding Cohen reals is bounded above by π‘Šβ‘[𝑑] for some π‘Š-generic Cohen real 𝑑.

This article is based upon I talk I gave at the conference on Recent Developments in Axiomatic Set Theory at the Research Institute for Mathematical Sciences (RIMS) at Kyoto University, Japan in September, 2015, and I am extremely grateful to my Japanese hosts, especially Toshimichi Usuba, for supporting my research visit there and also at the CTFM conference at Tokyo Institute of Technology just preceding it. This article includes material adapted from section section 2 of Set-theoretic geology, joint with G. Fuchs, myself and J. Reitz, and also includes a theorem that was proved in a series of conversations I had with Giorgio Venturi at the Young Set Theory Workshop 2011 in Bonn and continuing at the London 2011 summer school on set theory at Birkbeck University London.

The rearrangement number: how many rearrangements of a series suffice to verify absolute convergence? Vassar Math Colloquium, November 2015

This will be a talk for the Mathematics Colloquium at Vassar College, November 10, 2015, tea at 4:00 pm, talk at 4:15 pm, Rockefeller Hall 310

Abstract. The Riemann rearrangement theorem asserts that a series βˆ‘π‘›π‘Žπ‘› is absolutely convergent if and only if every rearrangement βˆ‘π‘›π‘Žπ‘β‘(𝑛) of it is convergent, and furthermore, any conditionally convergent series can be rearranged so as to converge to any desired extended real value. How many rearrangements 𝑝 suffice to test for absolute convergence in this way? The rearrangement number, a new cardinal characteristic of the continuum introduced just recently, is the smallest size of a family of permutations, such that whenever the convergence and value of a convergent series is invariant by all these permutations, then it is absolutely convergent. The exact value of the rearrangement number turns out to be independent of the axioms of set theory. In this talk, I shall place the rearrangement number into a discussion of cardinal characteristics of the continuum, including an elementary introduction to the continuum hypothesis and an account of Freiling’s axiom of symmetry.

This talk is based in part on current joint work with Andreas Blass, Will Brian, myself, Michael Hardy and Paul Larson.

My Lecture Notes are available. 

A position in infinite chess with game value πœ”4

[bibtex key=EvansHamkinsPerlmutter2017:APositionInInfiniteChessWithGameValueOmega^4]

Abstract.  We present a position in infinite chess exhibiting an ordinal game value of πœ”4, thereby improving on the previously largest-known values of πœ”3 and πœ”3 β‹…4.

This is a joint work with Cory Evans and Norman Perlmutter, continuing the research program of my previous article with Evans, Transfinite game values in infinite chess, namely, the research program of finding positions in infinite chess with large transfinite ordinal game values. In the previous article, Cory and I presented a position with game value πœ”3. In the current paper, with Norman Perlmutter now having joined us accompanied by some outstanding ideas, we present a new position having game value πœ”4, breaking the previous record.

Full position value omega^4

A position in infinite chess with value πœ”4

In the new position, above, the kings sit facing each other in the throne room, an uneasy dΓ©tente, while white makes steady progress in the rook towers. Meanwhile, at every step black, doomed, mounts increasingly desperate bouts of long forced play using the bishop cannon battery, with bishops flying with force out of the cannons, and then each making a long series of forced-reply moves in the terminal gateways. Ultimately, white wins with value omega^4, which exceeds the previously largest known values of omega^3.

In the throne room, if either black or white places a bishop on the corresponding diagonal entryway, then checkmate is very close. A key feature is that for white to place a white-square white bishop on the diagonal marked in red, it is immediate checkmate, whereas if black places a black-square black bishop on the blue diagonal, then checkmate comes three moves later.  The bishop cannon battery arrangement works because black threatens to release a bishop into the free region, and if white does not reply to those threats, then black will be three steps ahead, but otherwise, only two.

           The throne room

The rook towers are similar to the corresponding part of the previous πœ”3 position, and this is where white undertakes most of his main line progress towards checkmate.  Black will move the key bishop out as far as he likes on the first move, past 𝑛 rook towers, and the resulting position will have value πœ”3 ⋅𝑛.  These towers are each activated in turn, leading to a long series of play for white, interrupted at every opportunity by black causing a dramatic spectacle of forced-reply moves down in the bishop cannon battery.

Rook towers

            The rook towers

At every opportunity, black mounts a long distraction down in the bishop cannon battery.  Shown here is one bishop cannon. The cannonballs fire out of the cannon with force, in the sense that when each green bishop fires out, then white must reply by moving the guard pawns into place.

Bishop cannon

Bishop cannon

Upon firing, each bishop will position itself so as to attack the entrance diagonal of a long bishop gateway terminal wing.  This wing is arranged so that black can make a series of forced-reply threats successively, by moving to the attack squares (marked with the blue squares). Black is threatening to exit through the gateway doorway (in brown), but white can answer the threat by moving the white bishop guards (red) into position. Thus, each bishop coming out of a cannon (with force) can position itself at a gateway terminal of length 𝑔, making 𝑔 forced-reply moves in succession.  Since black can initiate firing with an arbitrarily large cannon, this means that at any moment, black can cause a forced-reply delay with game value πœ”2. Since the rook tower also has value πœ”2 by itself, the overall position has value πœ”4 =πœ”2 β‹…πœ”2.

Bishop gateway terminal wing

With future developments in mind, we found that one can make a more compact arrangement of the bishop cannon battery, freeing up a quarter board for perhaps another arrangement that might lead to a higher ordinal values.

Alternative compact version of bishop cannon battery

Read more about it in the article, which is available at the arxiv (pdf).

See also:

The rearrangement number, CUNY set theory seminar, November 2015

This will be a talk for the CUNY Set Theory Seminar on November 6, 2015.

The Riemann rearrangement theorem states that a convergent real series βˆ‘π‘›π‘Žπ‘› is absolutely convergent if and only if the value of the sum is invariant under all rearrangements βˆ‘π‘›π‘Žπ‘β‘(𝑛) by any permutation 𝑝 on the natural numbers; furthermore, if the series is merely conditionally convergent, then one may find rearrangements for which the new sum βˆ‘π‘›π‘Žπ‘β‘(𝑛) has any desired (extended) real value or which becomes non-convergent.  In recent joint work with Andreas Blass, Will Brian, myself, Michael Hardy and Paul Larson, based on an exchange in reply to a Hardy’s MathOverflow question on the topic, we investigate the minimal size of a family of permutations that can be used in this manner to test an arbitrary convergent series for absolute convergence.

Specifically, we define the rearrangement number π”―𝔯 (β€œdouble-r”), a new cardinal characteristic of the continuum, to be the smallest cardinality of a set 𝑃 of permutations of the natural numbers, such that if a convergent real series βˆ‘π‘›π‘Žπ‘› remains convergent and with the same sum after all rearrangements βˆ‘π‘›π‘Žπ‘β‘(𝑛) by a permutation 𝑝 βˆˆπ‘ƒ, then it is absolutely convergent. The corresponding rearrangement number for sums, denoted 𝔯𝔯Σ, is the smallest cardinality of a family 𝑃 of permutations, such that if a series βˆ‘π‘›π‘Žπ‘› is conditionally convergent, then there is a rearrangement βˆ‘π‘›π‘Žπ‘β‘(𝑛), by some permutation 𝑝 βˆˆπ‘ƒ, which converges to a different sum. We investigate the basic properties of these numbers, and explore their relations with other cardinal characteristics of the continuum. Our main results are that π”Ÿ ≀𝔯𝔯 ≀𝐧⁒𝐨⁒𝐧⁑(M), that 𝔑 ≀𝔯𝔯Σ, and that π”Ÿ <𝔯𝔯 is relatively consistent.

MathOverflow question | CUNY Set Theory Seminar

Open determinacy for games on the ordinals is stronger than ZFC, CUNY Logic Workshop, October 2015

This will be a talk for the CUNY Logic Workshop on October 2, 2015.

Abstract. The principle of open determinacy for class games β€” two-player games of perfect information with plays of length πœ”, where the moves are chosen from a possibly proper class, such as games on the ordinals β€” is not provable in Zermelo-Fraenkel set theory ZFC or GΓΆdel-Bernays set theory GBC, if these theories are consistent, because provably in ZFC there is a definable open proper class game with no definable winning strategy. In fact, the principle of open determinacy and even merely clopen determinacy for class games implies Con(ZFC) and iterated instances Con(Con(ZFC)) and more, because it implies that there is a satisfaction class for first-order truth, and indeed a transfinite tower of truth predicates Tr𝛼 for iterated truth-about-truth, relative to any class parameter. This is perhaps explained, in light of the Tarskian recursive definition of truth, by the more general fact that the principle of clopen determinacy is exactly equivalent over GBC to the principle of elementary transfinite recursion ETR over well-founded class relations. Meanwhile, the principle of open determinacy for class games is provable in the stronger theory GBC+Ξ 11-comprehension, a proper fragment of Kelley-Morse set theory KM.

This is joint work with Victoria Gitman, with the helpful participation of Thomas Johnstone.

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