Generalizations of the Kunen inconsistency, KGRC, Vienna 2011

This is a talk at the research seminar of the Kurt Gödel Research Center, November 3, 2011.

I shall present several generalizations of the well-known Kunen inconsistency that there is no nontrivial elementary embedding from the set-theoretic universe V to itself, including generalizations-of-generalizations previously established by Woodin and others.  For example, there is no nontrivial elementary embedding from the universe V to a set-forcing extension V[G], or conversely from V[G] to V, or more generally from one ground model of the universe to another, or between any two models that are eventually stationary correct, or from V to HOD, or conversely from HOD to V, or from V to the gHOD, or conversely from gHOD to V; indeed, there can be no nontrivial elementary embedding from any definable class to V.  Other results concern generic embeddings, definable embeddings and results not requiring the axiom of choice.  I will aim for a unified presentation that weaves together previously known unpublished or folklore results along with some new contributions.  This is joint work with Greg Kirmayer and Norman Perlmutter.

Slides | Article

Generalizations of the Kunen inconsistency

[bibtex key=HamkinsKirmayerPerlmutter2012:GeneralizationsOfKunenInconsistency]

We present several generalizations of the well-known Kunen inconsistency that there is no nontrivial elementary embedding from the set-theoretic universe V to itself. For example, there is no elementary embedding from the universe V to a set-forcing extension V[G], or conversely from V[G] to V, or more generally from one ground model of the universe to another, or between any two models that are eventually stationary correct, or from V to HOD, or conversely from HOD to V, or indeed from any definable class to V, among many other possibilities we consider, including generic embeddings, definable embeddings and results not requiring the axiom of choice. We have aimed in this article for a unified presentation that weaves together some previously known unpublished or folklore results, several due to Woodin and others, along with our new contributions.

Indestructible strong unfoldability

[bibtex key=HamkinsJohnstone2010:IndestructibleStrongUnfoldability]

Using the lottery preparation, we prove that any strongly unfoldable cardinal $\kappa$ can be made indestructible by all ${\lt}\kappa$-closed + $\kappa^+$-preserving forcing. This degree of indestructibility, we prove, is the best possible from this hypothesis within the class of ${\lt}\kappa$-closed forcing. From a stronger hypothesis, however, we prove that the strong unfoldability of $\kappa$ can be made indestructible by all ${\lt}\kappa$-closed forcing. Such indestructibility, we prove, does not follow from indestructibility merely by ${\lt}\kappa$-directed closed forcing. Finally, we obtain global and universal forms of indestructibility for strong unfoldability, finding the exact consistency strength of universal indestructibility for strong unfoldability.

Tall cardinals

[bibtex key=Hamkins2009:TallCardinals]

A cardinal $\kappa$ is tall if for every ordinal $\theta$ there is an embedding $j:V\to M$ with critical point $\kappa$ such that $j(\kappa)\gt\theta$ and $M^\kappa\subset M$.  Every strong cardinal is tall and every strongly compact cardinal is tall, but measurable cardinals are not necessarily tall. It is relatively consistent, however, that the least measurable cardinal is tall. Nevertheless, the existence of a tall cardinal is equiconsistent with the existence of a strong cardinal. Any tall cardinal $\kappa$ can be made indestructible by a variety of forcing notions, including forcing that pumps up the value of $2^\kappa$ as high as desired.

The proper and semi-proper forcing axioms for forcing notions that preserve $\aleph_2$ or $\aleph_3$

[bibtex key=HamkinsJohnstone2009:PFA(aleph_2-preserving)]

We prove that the PFA lottery preparation of a strongly unfoldable cardinal $\kappa$ under $\neg 0^\sharp$ forces $\text{PFA}(\aleph_2\text{-preserving})$, $\text{PFA}(\aleph_3\text{-preserving})$ and $\text{PFA}_{\aleph_2}$, with $2^\omega=\kappa=\aleph_2$.  The method adapts to semi-proper forcing, giving $\text{SPFA}(\aleph_2\text{-preserving})$, $\text{SPFA}(\aleph_3\text{-preserving})$ and $\text{SPFA}_{\aleph_2}$ from the same hypothesis. It follows by a result of Miyamoto that the existence of a strongly unfoldable cardinal is equiconsistent with the conjunction $\text{SPFA}(\aleph_2\text{-preserving})+\text{SPFA}(\aleph_3\text{-preserving})+\text{SPFA}_{\aleph_2}+2^\omega=\aleph_2$.  Since unfoldable cardinals are relatively weak as large cardinal notions, our summary conclusion is that in order to extract significant strength from PFA or SPFA, one must collapse $\aleph_3$ to $\aleph_1$.

Large cardinals with few measures

[bibtex key=ApterCummingsHamkins2006:LargeCardinalsWithFewMeasures]

We show, assuming the consistency of one measurable cardinal, that it is consistent for there to be exactly $\kappa^+$ many normal measures on the least measurable cardinal $\kappa$. This answers a question of Stewart Baldwin. The methods generalize to higher cardinals, showing that the number of $\lambda$-strong compactness or $\lambda$-supercompactness measures on $P_\kappa(\lambda)$ can be exactly $\lambda^+$, if $\lambda>\kappa$ is a regular cardinal. We conclude with a list of open questions. Our proofs use a critical observation due to James Cummings.

Extensions with the approximation and cover properties have no new large cardinals

[bibtex key=Hamkins2003:ExtensionsWithApproximationAndCoverProperties]

If an extension $\bar V$ of $V$ satisfies the $\delta$-approximation and cover properties for classes and $V$ is a class in $\bar V$, then every suitably closed embedding $j:\bar V\to \bar N$ in $\bar V$ with critical point above $\delta$ restricts to an embedding $j\upharpoonright V:V\to N$ amenable to the ground model $V$. In such extensions, therefore, there are no new large cardinals above delta. This result extends work in my article on gap forcing.

Exactly controlling the non-supercompact strongly compact cardinals

[bibtex key=ApterHamkins2003:ExactlyControlling]

We summarize the known methods of producing a non-supercompact strongly compact cardinal and describe some new variants. Our Main Theorem shows how to apply these methods to many cardinals simultaneously and exactly control which cardinals are supercompact and which are only strongly compact in a forcing extension. Depending upon the method, the surviving non-supercompact strongly compact cardinals can be strong cardinals, have trivial Mitchell rank or even contain a club disjoint from the set of measurable cardinals. These results improve and unify previous results of the first author.

A simple maximality principle

[bibtex key=Hamkins2003:MaximalityPrinciple]

In this paper, following an idea of Christophe Chalons, I propose a new kind of forcing axiom, the Maximality Principle, which asserts that any sentence$\varphi$ holding in some forcing extension $V^{\mathbb{P}}$ and all subsequent extensions $V^{\mathbb{P}*\mathbb{Q}}$ holds already in $V$. It follows, in fact, that such sentences must also hold in all forcing extensions of $V$. In modal terms, therefore, the Maximality Principle is expressed by the scheme $(\Diamond\Box\varphi)\to\Box\varphi$, and is equivalent to the modal theory S5. In this article, I prove that the Maximality Principle is relatively consistent with ZFC. A boldface version of the Maximality Principle, obtained by allowing real parameters to appear in $\varphi$, is equiconsistent with the scheme asserting that $V_\delta$ is an elementary substructure of $V$ for an inaccessible cardinal $\delta$, which in turn is equiconsistent with the scheme asserting that ORD is Mahlo. The strongest principle along these lines is the Necessary Maximality Principle, which asserts that the boldface MP holds in V and all forcing extensions. From this, it follows that $0^\sharp$ exists, that $x^\sharp$ exists for every set $x$, that projective truth is invariant by forcing, that Woodin cardinals are consistent and much more. Many open questions remain.

Indestructibility and the level-by-level agreement between strong compactness and supercompactness

[bibtex key=ApterHamkins2002:LevelByLevel]

Can a supercompact cardinal $\kappa$ be Laver indestructible when there is a level-by-level agreement between strong compactness and supercompactness? In this article, we show that if there is a sufficiently large cardinal above $\kappa$, then no, it cannot. Conversely, if one weakens the requirement either by demanding less indestructibility, such as requiring only indestructibility by stratified posets, or less level-by-level agreement, such as requiring it only on measure one sets, then yes, it can.

Indestructible weakly compact cardinals and the necessity of supercompactness for certain proof schemata

[bibtex key=ApterHamkins2001:IndestructibleWC]

We show that if the weak compactness of a cardinal is made indestructible by means of any preparatory forcing of a certain general type, including any forcing naively resembling the Laver preparation, then the cardinal was originally supercompact. We then apply this theorem to show that the hypothesis of supercompactness is necessary for certain proof schemata.

The wholeness axioms and $V=\rm HOD$

[bibtex key=Hamkins2001:WholenessAxiom]

The Wholeness Axioms, proposed by Paul Corazza, axiomatize the existence of an elementary embedding $j:V\to V$. Formalized by augmenting the usual language of set theory with an additional unary function symbol j to represent the embedding, they avoid the Kunen inconsistency by restricting the base theory ZFC to the usual language of set theory. Thus, under the Wholeness Axioms one cannot appeal to the Replacement Axiom in the language with j as Kunen does in his famous inconsistency proof. Indeed, it is easy to see that the Wholeness Axioms have a consistency strength strictly below the existence of an $I_3$ cardinal. In this paper, I prove that if the Wholeness Axiom $WA_0$ is itself consistent, then it is consistent with $V=HOD$. A consequence of the proof is that the various Wholeness Axioms $WA_n$ are not all equivalent. Furthermore, the theory $ZFC+WA_0$ is finitely axiomatizable.

The lottery preparation

[bibtex key=Hamkins2000:LotteryPreparation]

The lottery preparation, a new general kind of Laver preparation, works uniformly with supercompact cardinals, strongly compact cardinals, strong cardinals, measurable cardinals, or what have you. And like the Laver preparation, the lottery preparation makes these cardinals indestructible by various kinds of further forcing. A supercompact cardinal $\kappa$, for example, becomes fully indestructible by $\kappa$-directed closed forcing; a strong cardinal $\kappa$ becomes indestructible by less-than-or-equal-$\kappa$-strategically closed forcing; and a strongly compact cardinal $\kappa$ becomes indestructible by, among others, the forcing to add a Cohen subset to $\kappa$, the forcing to shoot a club $C$ in $\kappa$ which avoids the measurable cardinals and the forcing to add various long Prikry sequences. The lottery preparation works best when performed after fast function forcing, which adds a new completely general kind of Laver function for any large cardinal, thereby freeing the Laver function concept from the supercompact cardinal context.

Book review of The Higher Infinite, Akihiro Kanamori

[bibtex key=Hamkins2000:BookReviewKanamori]

Akihiro Kanamori. The Higher Infinite.    Large cardinals, stealing upwards through the clouds of imagined limitation like the steel skyscrapers of a ever-growing set-theoretic skyline, reach towards the stratosphere of Cantor’s absolute. In this century we have axiomatized larger and larger notions of infinity, and as we live amongst these giants, the formerly tall now seem small. Weakly inaccessible cardinals, for example, first considered by Hausdorff as a natural transfinite limit of set-theoretic operations, now occupy a floor at the entryway to the large cardinal hierarchy. In time over the past century we had Mahlo cardinals, strongly inaccessible cardinals, measurable cardinals, indescribable cardinals, weakly-compact cardinals, strongly-compact cardinals, super-compact cardinals, huge cardinals, almost huge cardinals, superhuge cardinals, and so on. And while when it comes to naming these enormous magnitudes, words have perhaps failed us, the mathematics is perfectly precise and fascinating.

Professor Kanamori has written—beautifully so—the book we large cardinal set-theorists have been lacking, a book spanning the possibilities from inaccessible to superhuge cardinals and beyond, a book full of historical insight, clear writing, interesting theorems and elegant proofs. This book is destined to become, if it has not already become, the standard reference in its field.

Finding that “a genetic account through historical progression…provides the most coherent exposition of the mathematics and holds the key to any epistemological concerns,” (p. XI) Kanamori weaves a historical perspective into the mathematics, deepening our understanding and appreciation of it. He sprinkles the text with quotations of Gödel and others, giving their mathematical-philosophical views on the mathematical developments. The introduction stands alone as a non-technical essay introducing the entire subject. From there, Kanamori begins with the smaller large cardinals, inaccessible and Mahlo cardinals, and then moves in time up to the strongest hypotheses.

So let me begin to explain a little about large cardinals. A cardinal $\kappa$ is inaccessible when it cannot be constructed from smaller cardinals, so that first, it is not the supremum of fewer than $\kappa$ many cardinals each of size less than $\kappa$ (as, for example, $\aleph_\omega=\sup_n\aleph_n$ is), and second, it cannot be reached by the power set operation in the sense that whenever $\delta$ is smaller than $\kappa$ then $2^\delta$ is also smaller than $\kappa$. It is relatively straightforward to show that if $\kappa$ is inaccessible, then $V_\kappa$ is a model of ZFC. In particular, if $\kappa$ is the least inaccessible cardinal, then $V_\kappa$ will be a model of ZFC in which there are no inaccessible cardinals. So it is relatively consistent with ZFC that there are no large cardinals at all. Furthermore, since the mere existence of an inaccessible cardinal provides a full model of ZFC, we cannot hope even for a relative consistency result of the form “If ZFC is consistent, then so is ZFC $+$ there is an inaccessible cardinal” (in the manner of results proved for the Continuum Hypothesis and the Axiom of Choice), for then the theory “ZFC $+$ there is an inaccessible cardinal” would imply its own consistency, contrary to Gödel’s Incompleteness Theorem. In short, the consistency strength of the existence of an inaccessible cardinal is greater than that of ZFC alone. At first glance, then, the logical status of the existence of even the smallest of the large cardinals is a bit startling: we can’t prove they exist; it is consistent that they don’t exist; and we can prove that we cannot prove that their existence is relatively consistent. What, then, is the point of them?

The point is that such a transcendence over ZFC in consistency strength is exactly what we want and what we need. In the decades since the invention of Cohen’s forcing technique, set theorists have set marching an infinite parade of independence results; indeed, it often seems as though almost all the interesting set-theoretic questions are independent of our ZFC axioms. We all know now that the cardinality of the set $\mathbb{R}$ of reals can be $\aleph_1$ or $\aleph_2$ or $\aleph_{1776}$ or $\aleph_{\omega+1776}$ or any cardinal you like within reason, and this unfinished nature of ZFC when it comes to basic set theoretic questions is the norm. We have learned in this sense that ZFC is a weak theory. The large cardinal axioms provide strengthenings of it, strengthenings which are fundamentally different from the strengthenings of ZFC provided by the Continuum Hypothesis, the Generalized Continuum Hypothesis, Souslin’s Hypothesis, Martin’s Axiom and many of the other principles that we know to properly extend ZFC, in that large cardinals transcend even the consistency strength of ZFC. The large cardinal hierarchy, therefore, in addition to its intrinsic mathematical interest, provides a natural structure which can be used to gauge the consistency strength of general mathematical propositions.

Let me give one example. Almost all mathematicians are familiar with Vitali’s construction of a non-Lebesgue measurable set of reals and furthermore believe that the construction makes an essential use of the Axiom of Choice AC. But what does this mean exactly? The impossibility of removing AC from the Vitali construction is equivalent to the consistency (without AC) that every set of reals is Lebesgue measurable. Now of course we need some choice principle to develop a satisfactory theory of Lebesgue measure at all, so let us keep in the base theory the principle of Dependent Choices DC, which allows us to make countably many choices in succession. Thus, we are led to consider the consistency of the theory $T=$ “ZF + DC + every set of reals is Lebesgue measurable”. Solovay [65] proved that if ZFC is consistent with the existence of an inaccessible cardinal, then $T$ is consistent; that is, if inaccessible cardinals are consistent, then we are perfectly correct in believing that you cannot remove AC from Vitali’s construction. Since most mathematicians already believed this conclusion, Solovay’s use of an inaccessible cardinal was widely seen as a defect in his argument. But Shelah [84] exploded this criticism by proving conversely that if $T$ is consistent, then so is the existence of an inaccessible cardinal. That is, the two theories are equiconsistent, and we should be exactly as confident in the consistency of inaccessible cardinals as we are in our belief that Vitali’s use of AC is essential.

After the beginnings, Kanamori moves swiftly through a chapter on partition properties, weak compactness, indiscernibles and $0^\sharp$, before moving into a longer chapter on forcing and sets of reals, in which he introduces forcing, Lebesgue measurability and topics from descriptive set theory. Next, in Chapter Four, he approaches measurability from the direction of saturated ideals, including such topics as Prikry forcing, iterated ultrapower embeddings, the inner model $L[\mu]$, $0^\dagger$ and, curiously, a chess problem for the solution of which he will pay a small prize. The strongest hypotheses appear in Chapter five along with the combinatorial backup needed to support them. Kanamori concludes in Chapter six with the Axiom of Determinacy, giving such connections to large cardinals as can be easily given, and, whetting the appetite of the eager student, surveying the more recent, more difficult, and more amazing results.

Kanamori’s book has already been translated into Japanese by S. Fuchino, and judging by the graduate students I saw last year in Japan pouring over it, the translation seems destined to create a new generation of large cardinal set theorists in Japan.

I do have one reservation about Kanamori’s book, namely, that he didn’t include much material on the interaction between forcing and large cardinals. Admittedly, this being the focus of much of my own work, I harbor some bias in its favor, but the topics of forcing and large cardinals are two major set theoretic research areas, and the intersection is rich. It would have been relatively easy for Kanamori to include a presentation, for example, of the landmark Laver preparation, by which any supercompact cardinal $\kappa$ becomes indestructible by $\kappa$-directed closed forcing. And Laver’s result is really just the beginning of the investigation of how large cardinals are affected by forcing. I trust that much of this work will appear in volume II.

My overall evaluation is entirely positive, and I recommend the book in the strongest possible terms to anyone with an interest in large cardinals. I can hardly wait for the subsequent volume!

[84] Saharon Shelah, “Can you take Solovay’s inaccessible away?” IJM 48 (1984), 1-47.

[65] Robert M. Solovay, “The measure problem,” NAMS 12 (1965), 217.

Gap forcing: generalizing the Lévy-Solovay theorem

[bibtex key=Hamkins99:GapForcingGen]

The landmark Levy-Solovay Theorem limits the kind of large cardinal embeddings that can exist in a small forcing extension. Here I announce a generalization of this theorem to a broad new class of forcing notions. One consequence is that many of the forcing iterations most commonly found in the large cardinal literature create no new weakly compact cardinals, measurable cardinals, strong cardinals, Woodin cardinals, strongly compact cardinals, supercompact cardinals, almost huge cardinals, huge cardinals, and so on.