Tag Archives: ZFC-

Bi-interpretation of weak set theories, Oxford Set Theory Seminar, May 2020

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This will be a talk for the newly founded Oxford Set Theory Seminar, May 20, 2020. Contact Sam Adam-Day (me@samadamday.com) for the Zoom access codes. 

Abstract: Set theory exhibits a truly robust mutual interpretability phenomenon: in any model of one set theory we can define models of diverse other set theories and vice versa. In any model of ZFC, we can define models of ZFC + GCH and also of ZFC + ¬CH and so on in hundreds of cases. And yet, it turns out, in no instance do these mutual interpretations rise to the level of bi-interpretation. Ali Enayat proved that distinct theories extending ZF are never bi-interpretable, and models of ZF are bi-interpretable only when they are isomorphic. So there is no nontrivial bi-interpretation phenomenon in set theory at the level of ZF or above.  Nevertheless, for natural weaker set theories, we prove, including ZFC- without power set and Zermelo set theory Z, there are nontrivial instances of bi-interpretation. Specifically, there are well-founded models of ZFC- that are bi-interpretable, but not isomorphic—even $\langle H_{\omega_1},\in\rangle$ and $\langle H_{\omega_2},\in\rangle$ can be bi-interpretable—and there are distinct bi-interpretable theories extending ZFC-. Similarly, using a construction of Mathias, we prove that every model of ZF is bi-interpretable with a model of Zermelo set theory in which the replacement axiom fails. This is joint work with Alfredo Roque Freire.

This is a version of the talk that I had planned to give at the 2020 Set Theory meeting Oberwolfach, before that meeting was canceled on account of the Covid-19 situation.

Slides

Bi-interpretation-in-set-theory-Oxford-Set-Theory-Seminar-2020Download

Bi-interpretation in weak set theories

  • [bibtex key=”FreireHamkins:Bi-interpretation-in-weak-set-theories”]

Bi-interpretation of weak set theories, Oberwolfach, April 2020

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This will be a talk for the workshop in Set Theory at the Mathematisches Forschungsinstitute Oberwolfach, April 5-11, 2020. 

Note: the conference has been cancelled due to concerns over the Coronavirus-19. (Meanwhile, I have given the talk for the Oxford Set Theory Seminar — see below.)

Abstract: Set theory exhibits a truly robust mutual interpretability phenomenon: in any model of one set theory we can define models of diverse other set theories and vice versa. In any model of ZFC, we can define models of ZFC + GCH and also of ZFC + ¬CH and so on in hundreds of cases. And yet, it turns out, in no instance do these mutual interpretations rise to the level of bi-interpretation. Ali Enayat proved that distinct theories extending ZF are never bi-interpretable, and models of ZF are bi-interpretable only when they are isomorphic. So there is no nontrivial bi-interpretation phenomenon in set theory at the level of ZF or above.  Nevertheless, for natural weaker set theories, we prove, including ZFC- without power set and Zermelo set theory Z, there are nontrivial instances of bi-interpretation. Specifically, there are well-founded models of ZFC- that are bi-interpretable, but not isomorphic—even $\langle H_{\omega_1},\in\rangle$ and $\langle H_{\omega_2},\in\rangle$ can be bi-interpretable—and there are distinct bi-interpretable theories extending ZFC-. Similarly, using a construction of Mathias, we prove that every model of ZF is bi-interpretable with a model of Zermelo set theory in which the replacement axiom fails. This is joint work with Alfredo Roque Freire.

Slides – Bi-interpretation-in-set-theory-Oberwolfach-2020Download

Since the Oberwolfach meeting had been canceled, I gave the talk for the Oxford Set Theory Seminar on 20 May 2020.

Bi-interpretation in weak set theories

  • [bibtex key=”FreireHamkins:Bi-interpretation-in-weak-set-theories”]

Bi-interpretation in set theory, Bristol, February 2020

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This will be a talk for the Logic and Set Theory seminar at the University of Bristol, on 25 February, 2020.

Abstract: In contrast to the robust mutual interpretability phenomenon in set theory, Ali Enayat proved that bi-interpretation is absent: distinct theories extending ZF are never bi-interpretable and models of ZF are bi-interpretable only when they are isomorphic. Nevertheless, for natural weaker set theories, we prove, including Zermelo-Fraenkel set theory ZFC- without power set and Zermelo set theory Z, there are nontrivial instances of bi-interpretation. Specifically, there are well-founded models of ZFC- that are bi-interpretable, but not isomorphic—even $\langle H_{\omega_1},\in\rangle$ and $\langle H_{\omega_2},\in\rangle$ can be bi-interpretable—and there are distinct bi-interpretable theories extending ZFC-. Similarly, using a construction of Mathias, we prove that every model of ZF is bi-interpretable with a model of Zermelo set theory in which the replacement axiom fails. This is joint work with Alfredo Roque Freire.

Bi-interpretation-in-set-theory-Bristol-2020Download

Bi-interpretation in weak set theories

[bibtex key=”HamkinsFreire:Bi-interpretation-in-weak-set-theories”]

What is the theory ZFC without power set?

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[bibtex key=”GitmanHamkinsJohnstone2016:WhatIsTheTheoryZFC-Powerset?”]

This is joint work with Victoria Gitman and Thomas Johnstone.

We show that the theory ZFC-, consisting of the usual axioms of ZFC but with the power set axiom removed-specifically axiomatized by extensionality, foundation, pairing, union, infinity, separation, replacement and the assertion that every set can be well-ordered-is weaker than commonly supposed and is inadequate to establish several basic facts often desired in its context. For example, there are models of ZFC- in which $\omega_1$ is singular, in which every set of reals is countable, yet $\omega_1$ exists, in which there are sets of reals of every size $\aleph_n$, but none of size $\aleph_\omega$, and therefore, in which the collection axiom sceme fails; there are models of ZFC- for which the Los theorem fails, even when the ultrapower is well-founded and the measure exists inside the model; there are models of ZFC- for which the Gaifman theorem fails, in that there is an embedding $j:M\to N$ of ZFC- models that is $\Sigma_1$-elementary and cofinal, but not elementary; there are elementary embeddings $j:M\to N$ of ZFC- models whose cofinal restriction $j:M\to \bigcup j“M$ is not elementary. Moreover, the collection of formulas that are provably equivalent in ZFC- to a $\Sigma_1$-formula or a $\Pi_1$-formula is not closed under bounded quantification. Nevertheless, these deficits of ZFC- are completely repaired by strengthening it to the theory $\text{ZFC}^-$, obtained by using collection rather than replacement in the axiomatization above. These results extend prior work of Zarach.

See Victoria Gitman’s summary post on the article

What is the theory of ZFC-Powerset? Toronto 2011

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This was a talk at the Toronto Set Theory Seminar held April 22, 2011 at the Fields Institute in Toronto.

The theory ZFC-, consisting of the usual axioms of ZFC but with the powerset axiom removed, when axiomatized by extensionality, foundation, pairing, union, infinity, separation, replacement and the axiom of choice, is weaker than commonly supposed, and suffices to prove neither that a countable union of countable sets is countable, nor that $\omega_1$ is regular, nor that the Los theorem holds for ultrapowers, even for well-founded ultrapowers on a measurable cardinal, nor that the Gaifman theorem holds, that is, that every $\Sigma_1$-elementary cofinal embedding $j:M\to N$ between models of the theory is fully elementary, nor that $\Sigma_n$ sets are closed under bounded quantification. Nevertheless, these deficits of ZFC- are completely repaired by strengthening it to the theory obtained by using the collection axiom rather than replacement in the axiomatization above. These results extend prior work of Zarach. This is joint work with Victoria Gitman and Thomas Johnstone.

Article | Victoria Gitman’s post