I would like to thank the many people who had made helpful suggestions concerning my poster, including Andrej Bauer and especially Saul Schleimer, who offered many detailed suggestions.

I was interviewed 26 August 2021 by mathematician Daniel Rubin on his show, and we had a lively, wideranging discussion spanning mathematics, infinity, and the philosophy of mathematics. Please enjoy!

This will be a talk for the conference Fudan Model Theory and Philosophy of Mathematics, held at Fudan University in Shanghai and online, 21-24 August 2021. My talk will take place on Zoom on 23 August 20:00 Beijing time (1pm BST).

Abstract. Tennenbaum famously proved that there is no computable presentation of a nonstandard model of arithmetic or indeed of any model of set theory. In this talk, I shall discuss the Tennenbaum phenomenon as it arises for computable quotient presentations of models. Quotient presentations offer a philosophically attractive treatment of identity, a realm in which questions of identity are not necessarily computable. Objects in the presentation serve in effect as names for objects in the final quotient structure, names that may represent the same or different items in that structure, but one cannot necessarily tell which. Bakhadyr Khoussainov outlined a sweeping vision for quotient presentations in computable model theory and made several conjectures concerning the Tennenbaum phenomenon. In this talk, I shall discuss joint work with Michał Godziszewski that settles and addresses several of these conjectures.

I was so glad to be involved with this project of Hannah Hoffman. She had inquired on Twitter whether mathematicians could provide a proof of the irrationality of root two that rhymes. I set off immediately, of course, to answer the challenge. My wife Barbara Gail Montero and our daughter Hypatia and I spent a day thinking, writing, revising, rewriting, rethinking, rewriting, and eventually we had a set lyrics providing the proof, in rhyme and meter. We had wanted specifically to highlight not only the logic of the proof, but also to tell the fateful story of Hippasus, credited with the discovery.

Hannah proceeded to create the amazing musical version:

The diagonal of a square is incommensurable with its side
an astounding fact the Pythagoreans did hide

but Hippasus rebelled and spoke the truth
making his point with irrefutable proof

it’s absurd to suppose that the root of two
is rational, namely, p over q

square both sides and you will see
that twice q squared is the square of p

since p squared is even, then p is as well
now, if p as 2k you alternately spell

2q squared will to 4k squared equate
revealing, when halved, q’s even fate

thus, root two as fraction, p over q
must have numerator and denomerator with factors of two

to lowest terms, therefore, it can’t be reduced
root two is irrational, Hippasus deduced

as retribution for revealing this irrationality
Hippasus, it is said, was drowned in the sea

but his proof live on for the whole world to admire
a truth of elegance that will ever inspire.

This was a talk for the Kobe Set Theory Workshop, held on the occasion of Sakaé Fuchino’s retirement, 9-11 March 2021.

Abstract. I shall discuss senses in which set-theoretic forcing can be seen as a computational process on the models of set theory. Given an oracle for the atomic or elementary diagram of a model of set theory $\langle M,\in^M\rangle$, for example, one may in various senses compute $M$-generic filters $G\subset P\in M$ and the corresponding forcing extensions $M[G]$. Meanwhile, no such computational process is functorial, for there must always be isomorphic alternative presentations of the same model of set theory $M$ that lead by the computational process to non-isomorphic forcing extensions $M[G]\not\cong M[G’]$. Indeed, there is no Borel function providing generic filters that is functorial in this sense.

This is joint work with Russell Miller and Kameryn Williams.

This will be a talk for a new mathematical logic seminar at the University of Warsaw in the Department of Hhilosophy, entitled Epistemic and Semantic Commitments of Foundational Theories, devoted to formal truth theories and implicit commitments of foundational theories as well as their conceptual surroundings.

Abstract. According to the math tea argument, perhaps heard at a good afternoon tea, there must be some real numbers that we can neither describe nor define, since there are uncountably many real numbers, but only countably many definitions. Is it correct? In this talk, I shall discuss the phenomenon of pointwise definable structures in mathematics, structures in which every object has a property that only it exhibits. A mathematical structure is Leibnizian, in contrast, if any pair of distinct objects in it exhibit different properties. Is there a Leibnizian structure with no definable elements? We shall discuss many interesting elementary examples, eventually working up to the proof that every countable model of set theory has a pointwise definable extension, in which every mathematical object is definable.

J. D. Hamkins, D. Linetsky, and J. Reitz, “Pointwise definable models of set theory,” Journal of Symbolic Logic, vol. 78, iss. 1, p. 139–156, 2013. [Bibtex]

@article {HamkinsLinetskyReitz2013:PointwiseDefinableModelsOfSetTheory,
AUTHOR = {Hamkins, Joel David and Linetsky, David and Reitz, Jonas},
TITLE = {Pointwise definable models of set theory},
JOURNAL = {Journal of Symbolic Logic},
FJOURNAL = {Journal of Symbolic Logic},
VOLUME = {78},
YEAR = {2013},
NUMBER = {1},
PAGES = {139--156},
ISSN = {0022-4812},
MRCLASS = {03E55},
MRNUMBER = {3087066},
MRREVIEWER = {Bernhard A. König},
DOI = {10.2178/jsl.7801090},
URL = {http://jdh.hamkins.org/pointwisedefinablemodelsofsettheory/},
eprint = "1105.4597",
archivePrefix = {arXiv},
primaryClass = {math.LO},
}

The talk will be held online via Zoom ID: 998 6013 7362.

Abstract. It is a mystery often mentioned in the foundations of mathematics that our best and strongest mathematical theories seem to be linearly ordered and indeed well-ordered by consistency strength. Given any two of the familiar large cardinal hypotheses, for example, generally one of them proves the consistency of the other. Why should this be? The phenomenon is seen as significant for the philosophy of mathematics, perhaps pointing us toward the ultimately correct mathematical theories. And yet, we know as a purely formal matter that the hierarchy of consistency strength is not well-ordered. It is ill-founded, densely ordered, and nonlinear. The statements usually used to illustrate these features are often dismissed as unnatural or as Gödelian trickery. In this talk, I aim to overcome that criticism—as well as I am able to—by presenting a variety of natural hypotheses that reveal ill-foundedness in consistency strength, density in the hierarchy of consistency strength, and incomparability in consistency strength.

The talk should be generally accessible to university logic students, requiring little beyond familiarity with the incompleteness theorem and some elementary ideas from computability theory.

Abstract. Recent years have seen a flurry of mathematical activity in set-theoretic and arithmetic potentialism, in which we investigate a collection of models under various natural extension concepts. These potentialist systems enable a modal perspective—a statement is possible in a model, if it is true in some extension, and necessary, if it is true in all extensions. We consider the models of ZFC set theory, for example, with respect to submodel extensions, rank-extensions, forcing extensions and others, and these various extension concepts exhibit different modal validities. In this talk, I shall describe the state of current developments, including the most recent tools and results.

This will be a talk for the Models of Peano Arithmetic (MOPA) seminar on 11 November 2020, 12 pm EST (5pm GMT). Kindly note the rescheduled date and time.

Abstract. Ali Enayat had asked whether there is a model of Peano arithmetic (PA) that can be represented as $\newcommand\Q{\mathbb{Q}}\langle\Q,\oplus,\otimes\rangle$, where $\oplus$ and $\otimes$ are continuous functions on the rationals $\Q$. We prove, affirmatively, that indeed every countable model of PA has such a continuous presentation on the rationals. More generally, we investigate the topological spaces that arise as such topological models of arithmetic. The reals $\mathbb{R}$, the reals in any finite dimension $\mathbb{R}^n$, the long line and the Cantor space do not, and neither does any Suslin line; many other spaces do; the status of the Baire space is open.

This is joint work with Ali Enayat, myself and Bartosz Wcisło.

This will be a talk for the Oslo potentialism workshop, Varieties of Potentialism, to be held online via Zoom on 23 September 2020, from noon to 18:40 CEST (11am to 17:40 UK time). My talk is scheduled for 13:10 CEST (12:10 UK time). Further details about access and registration are availavle on the conference web page.

Abstract. I shall introduce and describe the subject of modal model theory, in which one studies a mathematical structure within a class of similar structures under an extension concept, giving rise to mathematically natural notions of possibility and necessity, a form of mathematical potentialism. We study the class of all graphs, or all groups, all fields, all orders, or what have you; a natural case is the class $\text{Mod}(T)$ of all models of a fixed first-order theory $T$. In this talk, I shall describe some of the resulting elementary theory, such as the fact that the $\mathcal{L}$ theory of a structure determines a robust fragment of its modal theory, but not all of it. The class of graphs illustrates the remarkable power of the modal vocabulary, for the modal language of graph theory can express connectedness, colorability, finiteness, countability, size continuum, size $\aleph_1$, $\aleph_2$, $\aleph_\omega$, $\beth_\omega$, first $\beth$-fixed point, first $\beth$-hyper-fixed-point and much more. When augmented with the actuality operator @, modal graph theory becomes fully bi-interpretable with truth in the set-theoretic universe. This is joint work with Wojciech Wołoszyn.

Abstract: Zermelo famously characterized the models of second-order Zermelo-Fraenkel set theory $\text{ZFC}_2$ in his 1930 quasi-categoricity result asserting that the models of $\text{ZFC}_2$ are precisely those isomorphic to a rank-initial segment $V_\kappa$ of the cumulative set-theoretic universe $V$ cut off at an inaccessible cardinal $\kappa$. I shall discuss the extent to which Zermelo’s quasi-categoricity analysis can rise fully to the level of categoricity, in light of the observation that many of the $V_\kappa$ universes are categorically characterized by their sentences or theories. For example, if $\kappa$ is the smallest inaccessible cardinal, then up to isomorphism $V_\kappa$ is the unique model of $\text{ZFC}_2$ plus the sentence “there are no inaccessible cardinals.” This cardinal $\kappa$ is therefore an instance of what we call a first-order sententially categorical cardinal. Similarly, many of the other inaccessible universes satisfy categorical extensions of $\text{ZFC}_2$ by a sentence or theory, either in first or second order. I shall thus introduce and investigate the categorical cardinals, a new kind of large cardinal. This is joint work with Robin Solberg (Oxford).

This will be accessible online talk about infinite chess and other infinite games for the Talk Math With Your Friends seminar, June 18, 2020 4 pm EST (9 pm UK). Zoom access information. Please come talk math with me!

Abstract. I will give an introduction to the theory of infinite games, with examples drawn from infinite chess in order to illustrate various concepts, such as the transfinite game value of a position.

This will be a talk for the newly founded Oxford Set Theory Seminar, May 20, 2020. Contact Sam Adam-Day (me@samadamday.com) for the Zoom access codes.

Abstract: Set theory exhibits a truly robust mutual interpretability phenomenon: in any model of one set theory we can define models of diverse other set theories and vice versa. In any model of ZFC, we can define models of ZFC + GCH and also of ZFC + ¬CH and so on in hundreds of cases. And yet, it turns out, in no instance do these mutual interpretations rise to the level of bi-interpretation. Ali Enayat proved that distinct theories extending ZF are never bi-interpretable, and models of ZF are bi-interpretable only when they are isomorphic. So there is no nontrivial bi-interpretation phenomenon in set theory at the level of ZF or above. Nevertheless, for natural weaker set theories, we prove, including ZFC- without power set and Zermelo set theory Z, there are nontrivial instances of bi-interpretation. Specifically, there are well-founded models of ZFC- that are bi-interpretable, but not isomorphic—even $\langle H_{\omega_1},\in\rangle$ and $\langle H_{\omega_2},\in\rangle$ can be bi-interpretable—and there are distinct bi-interpretable theories extending ZFC-. Similarly, using a construction of Mathias, we prove that every model of ZF is bi-interpretable with a model of Zermelo set theory in which the replacement axiom fails. This is joint work with Alfredo Roque Freire.

This is a version of the talk that I had planned to give at the 2020 Set Theory meeting Oberwolfach, before that meeting was canceled on account of the Covid-19 situation.

We focus on all aspects of set theory and the philosophy of set theory. Topics will include forcing, large cardinals, models of set theory, set theory as a foundation, set-theoretic potentialism, cardinal characteristics of the continuum, second-order set theory and class theory, and much more.

Technical topics are completely fine. Speakers are encouraged to pick set-theoretic topics having some philosophical angle or aspect, although it is expected that this might sometimes be a background consideration, while at other times it will be a primary focus.

The seminar will last 60-90 minutes, and are generally held on Wednesdays 4:00 – 5:30 UK time. Speakers are requested to prepare a one hour talk, and we expect a lively discussion with questions.

Trinity Term 2021

The seminar this term is again held jointly with the University of Bristol, organized by myself, Samuel Adam-Day, and Philip Welch.

For the Zoom access code, contact Samuel Adam-Day at me@samadamday.com.

19 May 2021 4:30 pm UK

Samuel Adam-Day

University of Oxford

The continuous gradability of the cut-point orders of $\newcommand\R{\mathbb{R}}\R$-trees

Abstract. An $\R$-tree is a metric space tree in which every point can be branching. Favre and Jonsson posed the following problem in 2004: can the class of orders underlying $\R$-trees be characterised by the fact that every branch is order-isomorphic to a real interval? In the first part of the talk, I answer this question in the negative: there is a branchwise-real tree order which is not continuously gradable. In the second part, I show that a branchwise-real tree order is continuously gradable if and only if every embedded well-stratified (i.e. set-theoretic) tree is $\R$-gradable. This tighter link with set theory is put to work in the third part answering a number of refinements of the main question, yielding several independence results.

26 May 2021 4:30 pm BST

Sandra Müller

TU Wien

The strength of determinacy when all sets are universally Baire

Abstract. The large cardinal strength of the Axiom of Determinacy when enhanced with the hypothesis that all sets of reals are universally Baire is known to be much stronger than the Axiom of Determinacy itself. In fact, Sargsyan conjectured it to be as strong as the existence of a cardinal that is both a limit of Woodin cardinals and a limit of strong cardinals. Larson, Sargsyan and Wilson showed that this would be optimal via a generalization of Woodin’s derived model construction. We will discuss a new translation procedure for hybrid mice extending work of Steel, Zhu and Sargsyan and use this to prove Sargsyan’s conjecture.

1 June 2021 4:30 pm BST

Christopher Turner

Bristol

Forcing Axioms and Name Principles

Abstract.Forcing axioms are a well-known way of expressing the concept ”there are filters in V which are close to being generic”. Name principles are another expression of this concept. A name principle says: ”Let $\sigma$ be any sufficiently nice name which is forced to have some property. Then there is a filter $g\in V$ such that $\sigma^g$ has that property.” Name principles have often been used on an ad-hoc basis in proofs, but have not been studied much as axioms in their own right. In this talk, I will present some of the connections between different name principles, and between name principles and forcing axioms. This is based on joint work with Philipp Schlicht.

16 June 2021 4:30 pm BST

Joan Bagaria

Barcelona

Some recent results on Structural Reflection

Abstract. The general Structural Reflection (SR) principle asserts that for every definable, in the first-order language of set theory, possibly with parameters, class $\mathcal{C}$ of relational structures of the same type there exists an ordinal $\alpha$ that reflects $\mathcal{C}$, i.e., for every $A$ in $\mathcal{C}$ there exists $B$ in $\mathcal{C}\cap V_\alpha$ and an elementary embedding from $B$ into $A$. In this form, SR is equivalent to Vopenka’s Principle (VP). In my talk I will present some different natural variants of SR which are equivalent to the existence some well-known large cardinals weaker than VP. I will also consider some forms of SR, reminiscent of Chang’s Conjecture, which imply the existence of large cardinal principles stronger than VP, at the level of rank-into-rank embeddings and beyond. The latter is a joint work with Philipp Lücke.

Hilary Term 2021

The seminar this term is again held jointly with the University of Bristol, organized by myself, Samuel Adam-Day, and Philip Welch.

For the Zoom access code, contact Samuel Adam-Day at me@samadamday.com.

Talks are held Wednesdays 4:00 – 5:30 pm UK time.

20 January 2021 4pm UK

Dima Sinapova

University of Illinois at Chicago

Iteration, reflection, and singular cardinals

Abstract. Two classical results of Magidor are: (1) from large cardinals it is consistent to have reflection at $\aleph_{\omega+1}$, and (2) from large cardinals it is consistent to have the failure of SCH at $\aleph_\omega$. These principles are at odds with each other. The former is a compactness type principle. (Compactness is the phenomenon where if a certain property holds for every smaller substructure of an object, then it holds for the entire object.) In contrast, failure of SCH is an instance of incompactness. The natural question is whether we can have both of these simultaneously. We show the answer is yes.

We describe a Prikry style iteration, and use it to force stationary reflection in the presence of not SCH. Then we obtain this situation at $\aleph_\omega$. This is joint work with Alejandro Poveda and Assaf Rinot.

3 February 2021 4pm UK

Spencer Unger

University of Toronto

Stationary reflection at successors of singular cardinals

We survey some recent progress in understanding stationary reflection at successors of singular cardinals and its influence on cardinal arithmetic: 1) In joint work with Yair Hayut, we reduced the consistency strength of stationary reflection at aleph_{omega+1} to an assumption weaker than kappa is kappa+ supercompact. 2) In joint work with Yair Hayut and Omer Ben-Neria, we prove that from large cardinals it is consistent that there is a singular cardinal nu of uncountable cofinality where the singular cardinal hypothesis fails at nu and every collection of fewer than cf(nu) stationary subsets of nu+ reflects at a common point. The statement in the second theorem was not previously known to be consistent. These results make use of analysis of Prikry generic objects over iterated ultrapowers.

24 March 2021 4pm UK

Andrew Marks

UCLA

The decomposability conjecture

Abstract. We characterize which Borel functions are decomposable into a countable union of functions which are piecewise continuous on $\Pi^0_n$ domains, assuming projective determinacy. One ingredient of our proof is a new characterization of what Borel sets are $\Sigma^0_n$ complete. Another important ingredient is a theorem of Harrington that there is no projective sequence of length $\omega_1$ of distinct Borel sets of bounded rank, assuming projective determinacy. This is joint work with Adam Day.

10 March 2021 4pm UK

Peter Koellner

Harvard University

Minimal Models and $\beta$ Categoricity

Abstract. Let us say that a theory $T$ in the language of set theory is $\beta$-consistent at $\alpha$ if there is a transitive model of $T$ of height $\alpha$, and let us say that it is $\beta$-categorical at $\alpha$ iff there is at most one transitive model of $T$ of height $\alpha$. Let us also assume, for ease of formulation, that there are arbitrarily large $\alpha$ such that $\newcommand\ZFC{\text{ZFC}}\ZFC$ is $\beta$-consistent at $\alpha$.

The sentence $\newcommand\VEL{V=L}\VEL$ has the feature that $\ZFC+\VEL$ is $\beta$-categorical at $\alpha$, for every $\alpha$. If we assume in addition that $\ZFC+\VEL$ is $\beta$-consistent at $\alpha$, then the uniquely determined model is $L_\alpha$, and the minimal such model, $L_{\alpha_0}$, is model of determined by the $\beta$-categorical theory $\ZFC+\VEL+M$, where $M$ is the statement “There does not exist a transitive model of $\ZFC$.”

It is natural to ask whether $\VEL$ is the only sentence that can be $\beta$-categorical at $\alpha$; that is, whether, there can be a sentence $\phi$ such that $\ZFC+\phi$ is $\beta$-categorical at $\alpha$, $\beta$-consistent at $\alpha$, and where the unique model is not $L_\alpha$. In the early 1970s Harvey Friedman proved a partial result in this direction. For a given ordinal $\alpha$, let $n(\alpha)$ be the next admissible ordinal above $\alpha$, and, for the purposes of this discussion, let us say that an ordinal $\alpha$ is minimal iff a bounded subset of $\alpha$ appears in $L_{n(\alpha)}\setminus L_\alpha$. [Note that $\alpha_0$ is minimal (indeed a new subset of $\omega$ appears as soon as possible, namely, in a $\Sigma_1$-definable manner over $L_{\alpha_0+1}$) and an ordinal $\alpha$ is non-minimal iff $L_{n(\alpha)}$ satisfies that $\alpha$ is a cardinal.] Friedman showed that for all $\alpha$ which are non-minimal, $\VEL$ is the only sentence that is $\beta$-categorical at $\alpha$. The question of whether this is also true for $\alpha$ which are minimal has remained open.

In this talk I will describe some joint work with Hugh Woodin that bears on this question. In general, when approaching a “lightface” question (such as the one under consideration) it is easier to first address the “boldface” analogue of the question by shifting from the context of $L$ to the context of $L[x]$, where $x$ is a real. In this new setting everything is relativized to the real $x$: For an ordinal $\alpha$, we let $n_x(\alpha)$ be the first $x$-admissible ordinal above $\alpha$, and we say that $\alpha$ is $x$-minimal iff a bounded subset of $\alpha$ appears in $L_{n_x(\alpha)}[x]\setminus L_{\alpha}[x]$.

Theorem. Assume $M_1^\#$ exists and is fully iterable. There is a sentence $\phi$ in the language of set theory with two additional constants, c and d, such that for a Turing cone of $x$, interpreting c by $x$, for all $\alpha$

if $L_\alpha[x]\models\ZFC$ then there is an interpretation of d by something in $L_\alpha[x]$ such that there is a $\beta$-model of $\ZFC+\phi$ of height $\alpha$ and not equal to $L_\alpha[x]$, and

if, in addition, $\alpha$ is $x$-minimal, then there is a unique $\beta$-model of $\ZFC+\phi$ of height $\alpha$ and not equal to $L_\alpha[x]$.

The sentence $\phi$ asserts the existence of an object which is external to $L_\alpha[x]$ and which, in the case where $\alpha$ is minimal, is canonical. The object is a branch $b$ through a certain tree in $L_\alpha[x]$, and the construction uses techniques from the HOD analysis of models of determinacy.

In this talk I will sketch the proof, describe some additional features of the singleton, and say a few words about why the lightface version looks difficult.

Michaelmas Term 2020

This term, we are coordinating the seminar in collaboration with Bristol, and so let me announce the joint meetings of the Oxford Set Theory Seminar and the Bristol Logic and Set Theory seminar. Organized by myself, Samuel Adam-Day, and Philip Welch.

For the Zoom access code (which is the same as last term), contact Samuel Adam-Day me@samadamday.com.

Talks are held on Wednesdays 4:00 – 5:30 UK time.

21 October 2020 4 pm UK

Andreas Blass

University of Michigan

Ultrafilters on omega versus forcing

Abstract. I plan to survey known facts and open questions about ultrafilters on omega generating (or not generating) ultrafilters in forcing extensions.

4 November 4 pm UK

Mirna Džamonja

Institut for History and Philosophy of Sciences and Techniques, CNRS & Université Panthéon Sorbonne, Paris and Institute of Mathematics, Czech Academy of Sciences, Prague

On wide Aronszajn trees

Aronszajn trees are a staple of set theory, but there are applications where the requirement of all levels being countable is of no importance. This is the case in set-theoretic model theory, where trees of height and size ω1 but with no uncountable branches play an important role by being clocks of Ehrenfeucht–Fraïssé games that measure similarity of model of size ℵ1. We call such trees wide Aronszajn. In this context one can also compare trees T and T’ by saying that T weakly embeds into T’ if there is a function f that map T into T’ while preserving the strict order <_T. This order translates into the comparison of winning strategies for the isomorphism player, where any winning strategy for T’ translates into a winning strategy for T’. Hence it is natural to ask if there is a largest such tree, or as we would say, a universal tree for the class of wood Aronszajn trees with weak embeddings. It was known that there is no such a tree under CH, but in 1994 Mekler and Väänanen conjectured that there would be under MA(ω1).

In our upcoming JSL paper with Saharon Shelah we prove that this is not the case: under MA(ω1) there is no universal wide Aronszajn tree.

The talk will discuss that paper. The paper is available on the arxiv and on line at JSL in the preproof version doi: 10.1017/jsl.2020.42.

18 November 4 pm UK

Gabriel Goldberg

Harvard University

Even ordinals and the Kunen inconsistency

Abstract. The Burali-Forti paradox suggests that the transfinite cardinals “go on forever,” surpassing any conceivable bound one might try to place on them. The traditional Zermelo-Frankel axioms for set theory fall into a hierarchy of axiomatic systems formulated by reasserting this intuition in increasingly elaborate ways: the large cardinal hierarchy. Or so the story goes. A serious problem for this already naive account of large cardinal set theory is the Kunen inconsistency theorem, which seems to impose an upper bound on the extent of the large cardinal hierarchy itself. If one drops the Axiom of Choice, Kunen’s proof breaks down and a new hierarchy of choiceless large cardinal axioms emerges. These axioms, if consistent, represent a challenge for those “maximalist” foundational stances that take for granted both large cardinal axioms and the Axiom of Choice. This talk concerns some recent advances in our understanding of the weakest of the choiceless large cardinal axioms and the prospect, as yet unrealized, of establishing their consistency and reconciling them with the Axiom of Choice.

2 December 4 pm UK

Kameryn J Williams

University of Hawai’i at Mānoa

The geology of inner mantles

An inner model is a ground if V is a set forcing extension of it. The intersection of the grounds is the mantle, an inner model of ZFC which enjoys many nice properties. Fuchs, Hamkins, and Reitz showed that the mantle is highly malleable. Namely, they showed that every model of set theory is the mantle of a bigger, better universe of sets. This then raises the possibility of iterating the definition of the mantle—the mantle, the mantle of the mantle, and so on, taking intersections at limit stages—to obtain even deeper inner models. Let’s call the inner models in this sequence the inner mantles.

In this talk I will present some results, both positive and negative, about the sequence of inner mantles, answering some questions of Fuchs, Hamkins, and Reitz, results which are analogues of classic results about the sequence of iterated HODs. On the positive side: (Joint with Reitz) Every model of set theory is the eta-th inner mantle of a class forcing extension for any ordinal eta in the model. On the negative side: The sequence of inner mantles may fail to carry through at limit stages. Specifically, it is consistent that the omega-th inner mantle not be a definable class and it is consistent that it be a definable inner model of ¬AC.

Trinity Term 2020

In Trinity term 2020, the seminar is organized by myself and Samuel Adam-Day. In light of the corona virus situation, we will be meeting online via Zoom for the foreseeable future.

For the Zoom access code, contact Samuel Adam-Day me@samadamday.com.

6 May 2020, 4 pm UK

Victoria Gitman, City University of New York

Elementary embeddings and smaller large cardinals

Abstract A common theme in the definitions of larger large cardinals is the existence of elementary embeddings from the universe into an inner model. In contrast, smaller large cardinals, such as weakly compact and Ramsey cardinals, are usually characterized by their combinatorial properties such as existence of large homogeneous sets for colorings. It turns out that many familiar smaller large cardinals have elegant elementary embedding characterizations. The embeddings here are correspondingly ‘small’; they are between transitive set models of set theory, usually the size of the large cardinal in question. The study of these elementary embeddings has led us to isolate certain important properties via which we have defined robust hierarchies of large cardinals below a measurable cardinal. In this talk, I will introduce these types of elementary embeddings and discuss the large cardinal hierarchies that have come out of the analysis of their properties. The more recent results in this area are a joint work with Philipp Schlicht.

20 May 2020, 4 pm

Joel David Hamkins, Oxford

Bi-interpretation of weak set theories

Abstract. Set theory exhibits a truly robust mutual interpretability phenomenon: in any model of one set theory we can define models of diverse other set theories and vice versa. In any model of ZFC, we can define models of ZFC + GCH and also of ZFC + ¬CH and so on in hundreds of cases. And yet, it turns out, in no instance do these mutual interpretations rise to the level of bi-interpretation. Ali Enayat proved that distinct theories extending ZF are never bi-interpretable, and models of ZF are bi-interpretable only when they are isomorphic. So there is no nontrivial bi-interpretation phenomenon in set theory at the level of ZF or above. Nevertheless, for natural weaker set theories, we prove, including ZFC- without power set and Zermelo set theory Z, there are nontrivial instances of bi-interpretation. Specifically, there are well-founded models of ZFC- that are bi-interpretable, but not isomorphic—even $\langle H_{\omega_1},\in\rangle$ and $\langle H_{\omega_2},\in\rangle$ can be bi-interpretable—and there are distinct bi-interpretable theories extending ZFC-. Similarly, using a construction of Mathias, we prove that every model of ZF is bi-interpretable with a model of Zermelo set theory in which the replacement axiom fails. This is joint work with Alfredo Roque Freire.

27 May 2020, 4 pm

Ali Enayat, Gothenberg

Leibnizian and anti-Leibnizian motifs in set theory

Abstract. Leibniz’s principle of identity of indiscernibles at first sight appears completely unrelated to set theory, but Mycielski (1995) formulated a set-theoretic axiom nowadays referred to as LM (for Leibniz-Mycielski) which captures the spirit of Leibniz’s dictum in the following sense: LM holds in a model M of ZF iff M is elementarily equivalent to a model M* in which there is no pair of indiscernibles. LM was further investigated in a 2004 paper of mine, which includes a proof that LM is equivalent to the global form of the Kinna-Wagner selection principle in set theory. On the other hand, one can formulate a strong negation of Leibniz’s principle by first adding a unary predicate I(x) to the usual language of set theory, and then augmenting ZF with a scheme that ensures that I(x) describes a proper class of indiscernibles, thus giving rise to an extension ZFI of ZF that I showed (2005) to be intimately related to Mahlo cardinals of finite order. In this talk I will give an expository account of the above and related results that attest to a lively interaction between set theory and Leibniz’s principle of identity of indiscernibles.

17 June 2020, 4 pm

Corey Bacal Switzer, City University of New York

Some Set Theory of Kaufmann Models

Abstract. A Kaufmann model is an $\omega_1$-like, recursively saturated, rather classless model of PA. Such models were shown to exist by Kaufmann under the assumption that $\diamondsuit$ holds, and in ZFC by Shelah via an absoluteness argument involving strong logics. They are important in the theory of models of arithmetic notably because they show that many classic results about countable, recursively saturated models of arithmetic cannot be extended to uncountable models. They are also a particularly interesting example of set theoretic incompactness at $\omega_1$, similar to an Aronszajn tree.

In this talk we’ll look at several set theoretic issues relating to this class of models motivated by the seemingly naïve question of whether or not such models can be killed by forcing without collapsing $\omega_1$. Surprisingly the answer to this question turns out to be independent: under $\mathsf{MA}_{\aleph_1}$ no $\omega_1$-preserving forcing can destroy Kaufmann-ness whereas under $\diamondsuit$ there is a Kaufmann model $M$ and a Souslin tree $S$ so that forcing with $S$ adds a satisfaction class to $M$ (thus killing rather classlessness). The techniques involved in these proofs also yield another surprising side of Kaufmann models: it is independent of ZFC whether the class of Kaufmann models can be axiomatized in the logic $L_{\omega_1, \omega}(Q)$ where $Q$ is the quantifier “there exists uncountably many”. This is the logic used in Shelah’s aforementioned result, hence the interest in this level of expressive power.