The omega one of chess, CUNY, March, 2013

This is a talk for the New York Set Theory Seminar on March 1, 2013.

This talk will be based on my recent paper with C. D. A. Evans, Transfinite game values in infinite chess.

Infinite chess is chess played on an infinite chessboard.  Since checkmate, when it occurs, does so after finitely many moves, this is technically what is known as an open game, and is therefore subject to the theory of open games, including the theory of ordinal game values.  In this talk, I will give a general introduction to the theory of ordinal game values for ordinal games, before diving into several examples illustrating high transfinite game values in infinite chess.  The supremum of these values is the omega one of chess, denoted by ω1Ch in the context of finite positions and by ω1Ch  in the context of all positions, including those with infinitely many pieces. For lower bounds, we have specific positions with transfinite game values of ω, ω2, ω2k and ω3. By embedding trees into chess, we show that there is a computable infinite chess position that is a win for white if the players are required to play according to a deterministic computable strategy, but which is a draw without that restriction. Finally, we prove that every countable ordinal arises as the game value of a position in infinite three-dimensional chess, and consequently the omega one of infinite three-dimensional chess is as large as it can be, namely, true ω1.

On the axiom of constructibility and Maddy’s conception of restrictive theories, Logic Workshop, February 2013

This is a talk for the CUNY Logic Workshop on February 15, 2013.

This talk will be based on my paper, A multiverse perspective on the axiom of constructibility.

Set-theorists often argue against the axiom of constructibility V=L on the grounds that it is restrictive, that we have no reason to suppose that every set should be constructible and that it places an artificial limitation on set-theoretic possibility to suppose that every set is constructible.  Penelope Maddy, in her work on naturalism in mathematics, sought to explain this perspective by means of the MAXIMIZE principle, and further to give substance to the concept of what it means for a theory to be restrictive, as a purely formal property of the theory.

In this talk, I shall criticize Maddy’s specific proposal.  For example, it turns out that the fairly-interpreted-in relation on theories is not transitive, and similarly the maximizes-over and strongly-maximizes-over relations are not transitive.  Further, the theory ZFC + `there is a proper class of inaccessible cardinals’ is formally restrictive on Maddy’s proposal, although this is not what she had desired.

Ultimately, I argue that the VL via maximize position loses its force on a multiverse conception of set theory, in light of the classical facts that models of set theory can generally be extended to (taller) models of V=L.  In particular, every countable model of set theory is a transitive set inside a model of V=L.  I shall conclude the talk by explaining various senses in which V=L remains compatible with strength in set theory.

Superstrong cardinals are never Laver indestructible, and neither are extendible, almost huge and rank-into-rank cardinals, CUNY, January 2013

This is a talk for the CUNY Set Theory Seminar on February 1, 2013, 10:00 am.

Abstract.  Although the large cardinal indestructibility phenomenon, initiated with Laver’s seminal 1978 result that any supercompact cardinal κ can be made indestructible by <κ-directed closed forcing and continued with the Gitik-Shelah treatment of strong cardinals, is by now nearly pervasive in set theory, nevertheless I shall show that no superstrong strong cardinal—and hence also no 1-extendible cardinal, no almost huge cardinal and no rank-into-rank cardinal—can be made indestructible, even by comparatively mild forcing: all such cardinals κ are destroyed by Add(κ,1), by Add(κ,κ+), by Add(κ+,1) and by many other commonly considered forcing notions.

This is very recent joint work with Konstantinos Tsaprounis and Joan Bagaria.

nylogic.org | Set Theory Seminar |

Pluralism in set theory: does every mathematical statement have a definite truth value? GC Philosophy Colloquium, 2012

This will be my talk for the CUNY Graduate Center Philosophy Colloquium on November 28, 2012.

I will be speaking on topics from some of my recent articles:

I shall give a summary account of some current issues in the philosophy of set theory, specifically, the debate on pluralism and the question of the determinateness of set-theoretical and mathematical truth.  The traditional Platonist view in set theory, what I call the universe view, holds that there is an absolute background concept of set and a corresponding absolute background set-theoretic universe in which every set-theoretic assertion has a final, definitive truth value.  What I would like to do is to tease apart two often-blurred aspects of this perspective, namely, to separate the claim that the set-theoretic universe has a real mathematical existence from the claim that it is unique.  A competing view, which I call the multiverse view, accepts the former claim and rejects the latter, by holding that there are many distinct concepts of set, each instantiated in a corresponding set-theoretic universe, and a corresponding pluralism of set-theoretic truths.  After framing the dispute, I shall argue that the multiverse position explains our experience with the enormous diversity of set-theoretic possibility, a phenomenon that is one of the central set-theoretic discoveries of the past fifty years and one which challenges the universe view. In particular, I shall argue that the continuum hypothesis is settled on the multiverse view by our extensive knowledge about how it behaves in the multiverse, and as a result it can no longer be settled in the manner formerly hoped for.

Slides

The countable models of set theory are linearly pre-ordered by embeddability, Rutgers, November 2012

This will be a talk for the Rutgers Logic Seminar on November 19, 2012.

Abstract.  I will speak on my recent theorem that every countable model of set theory M, including every well-founded model, is isomorphic to a submodel of its own constructible universe. In other words, there is an embedding j:MLM that is elementary for quantifier-free assertions. The proof uses universal digraph combinatorics, including an acyclic version of the countable random digraph, which I call the countable random Q-graded digraph, and higher analogues arising as uncountable Fraisse limits, leading to the hypnagogic digraph, a set-homogeneous, class-universal, surreal-numbers-graded acyclic class digraph, closely connected with the surreal numbers. The proof shows that LM contains a submodel that is a universal acyclic digraph of rank OrdM. The method of proof also establishes that the countable models of set theory are linearly pre-ordered by embeddability: for any two countable models of set theory, one of them is isomorphic to a submodel of the other.  Indeed, the bi-embeddability classes form a well-ordered chain of length ω1+1.  Specifically, the countable well-founded models are ordered by embeddability in accordance with the heights of their ordinals; every shorter model embeds into every taller model; every model of set theory M is universal for all countable well-founded binary relations of rank at most OrdM; and every ill-founded model of set theory is universal for all countable acyclic binary relations. Finally, strengthening a classical theorem of Ressayre, the same proof method shows that if M is any nonstandard model of PA, then every countable model of set theory—in particular, every model of ZFC—is isomorphic to a submodel of the hereditarily finite sets HFM of M. Indeed, HFM is universal for all countable acyclic binary relations.

Article | Rutgers Logic Seminar

Every countable model of set theory is isomorphic to a submodel of its own constructible universe, Barcelona, December, 2012

This will be a talk for a set theory workshop at the University of Barcelona on December 15, 2012, organized by Joan Bagaria.

Vestíbul Universitat de Barcelona

Abstract. Every countable model of set theory M, including every well-founded model, is isomorphic to a submodel of its own constructible universe. In other words, there is an embedding j:MLM that is elementary for quantifier-free assertions. The proof uses universal digraph combinatorics, including an acyclic version of the countable random digraph, which I call the countable random Q-graded digraph, and higher analogues arising as uncountable Fraisse limits, leading to the hypnagogic digraph, a set-homogeneous, class-universal, surreal-numbers-graded acyclic class digraph, closely connected with the surreal numbers. The proof shows that LM contains a submodel that is a universal acyclic digraph of rank OrdM. The method of proof also establishes that the countable models of set theory are linearly pre-ordered by embeddability: for any two countable models of set theory, one of them is isomorphic to a submodel of the other.  Indeed, the bi-embeddability classes form a well-ordered chain of length ω1+1.  Specifically, the countable well-founded models are ordered by embeddability in accordance with the heights of their ordinals; every shorter model embeds into every taller model; every model of set theory M is universal for all countable well-founded binary relations of rank at most OrdM; and every ill-founded model of set theory is universal for all countable acyclic binary relations. Finally, strengthening a classical theorem of Ressayre, the same proof method shows that if M is any nonstandard model of PA, then every countable model of set theory—in particular, every model of ZFC—is isomorphic to a submodel of the hereditarily finite sets HFM of M. Indeed, HFM is universal for all countable acyclic binary relations.

Article | Barcelona research group in set theory

A question for the mathematics oracle

At the Workshop on Infinity and Truth in Singapore last year, we had a special session in which the speakers were asked to imagine that they had been granted an audience with an all-knowing mathematical oracle, given the opportunity to ask a single yes-or-no question, to be truthfully answered.  These questions will be gathered together and published in the conference volume.  Here is my account.

 

A question for the mathematics oracle

Joel David Hamkins, The City University of New York

 

Granted an audience with an all-knowing mathematics oracle, we may ask a single yes-or-no question, to be truthfully answered……

I might mischievously ask the question my six-year-old daughter Hypatia often puts to our visitors:  “Answer yes or no.  Will you answer `no’?” They stammer, caught in the liar paradox, as she giggles. But my actual question is:

Are we correct in thinking we have an absolute concept of the finite?

An absolute concept of the finite underlies many mathematician’s understanding of the nature of mathematical truth. Most mathematicians, for example, believe that we have an absolute concept of the finite, which determines the natural numbers as a unique mathematical structure—0,1,2, and so on—in which arithmetic assertions have definitive truth values. We can prove after all that the second-order Peano axioms characterize N,S,0 as the unique inductive structure, determined up to isomorphism by the fact that 0 is not a successor, the successor function S is one-to-one and every set containing 0 and closed under S is the whole of N. And to be finite means simply to be equinumerous with a proper initial segment of this structure. Doesn’t this categoricity proof therefore settle the matter?

I don’t think so. The categoricity proof, which takes place in set theory, seems to my way of thinking merely to push the absoluteness question for finiteness off to the absoluteness question for sets instead. And surely this is a murkier realm, where already mathematicians do not universally agree that we have a single absolute background concept of set. We know by forcing and other means how to construct alternative set concepts, which seem fully as legitimate and set-theoretic as the set concepts from which they are derived. Thus, we have a plurality of set concepts, and our confidence in a unique absolute set-theoretic background is weakened. How then can we sensibly base our confidence in an absolute concept of the finite on set theory? Perhaps this absoluteness is altogether illusory.

My worries are put to rest if the oracle should answer positively. A negative answer, meanwhile, would raise alarms. A negative answer could indicate, on the one hand, that our understanding of the finite is simply incoherent, a catastrophe, where our cherished mathematical theories are all inconsistent. But, more likely in my view, a negative answer could also mean that there is an undiscovered plurality of concepts of the finite. I imagine technical developments arising that would provide us with tools to modify the arithmetic of a model of set theory, for example, with the same power and flexibility that forcing currently allows us to modify higher-order features, while not providing us with any reason to prefer one arithmetic to another (unlike our current methods with non-standard models). The discovery of such tools would be an amazing development in mathematics and lead to radical changes in our conception of mathematical truth.

Let’s have some fun—please post your question for the oracle in the comment fields below.

A question for the math oracle (pdf) | My talk at the Workshop

The least weakly compact cardinal can be unfoldable, weakly measurable and nearly θ-supercompact, New York, September 14, 2012

This will be a talk for the CUNY Set Theory seminar on September 14, 2012.

Abstract.  Starting from suitable large cardinal hypothesis, I will explain how to force the least weakly compact cardinal to be unfoldable, weakly measurable and, indeed, nearly θ-supercompact.  These results, proved in joint work with Jason Schanker, Moti Gitik and Brent Cody, exhibit an identity-crises phenomenon for weak compactness, similar to the phenomenon identified by Magidor for the case of strongly compact cardinals.

 

Recent progress on the modal logic of forcing and grounds, CUNY Logic Workshop, September 2012

This will be a talk for the CUNY Logic Workshop on September 7, 2012.

Abstract. The modal logic of forcing arises when one considers a model of set theory in the context of all its forcing extensions, with “true in all forcing extensions” and“true in some forcing extension” as the accompanying modal operators. In this modal language one may easily express sweeping general forcing principles, such asthe assertion that every possibly necessary statement is necessarily possible, which is valid for forcing, orthe assertion that every possibly necessary statement is true, which is the maximality principle, a forcing axiom independent of but equiconsistent with ZFC.  Similarly, the dual modal logic of grounds concerns the modalities “true in all ground models” and “true in some ground model”.  In this talk, I shall survey the recent progress on the modal logic of forcing and the modal logic of grounds. This is joint work with Benedikt Loewe and George Leibman.

 

Every countable model of set theory embeds into its own constructible universe, Fields Institute, Toronto, August 2012

This will be a talk for the  Toronto set theory seminar at the Fields Institute, University of Toronto, on August 24, 2012.

Abstract.  Every countable model of set theory M, including every well-founded model, is isomorphic to a submodel of its own constructible universe. In other words, there is an embedding j:MLM that is elementary for quantifier-free assertions. The proof uses universal digraph combinatorics, including an acyclic version of the countable random digraph, which I call the countable random Q-graded digraph, and higher analogues arising as uncountable Fraisse limits, leading to the hypnagogic digraph, a set-homogeneous, class-universal, surreal-numbers-graded acyclic class digraph, closely connected Image: Igougo.comwith the surreal numbers. The proof shows that LM contains a submodel that is a universal acyclic digraph of rank OrdM. The method of proof also establishes that the countable models of set theory are linearly pre-ordered by embeddability: for any two countable models of set theory, one of them is isomorphic to a submodel of the other.  Indeed, the bi-embeddability classes form a well-ordered chain of length ω1+1.  Specifically, the countable well-founded models are ordered by embeddability in accordance with the heights of their ordinals; every shorter model embeds into every taller model; every model of set theory M is universal for all countable well-founded binary relations of rank at most OrdM; and every ill-founded model of set theory is universal for all countable acyclic binary relations. Finally, strengthening a classical theorem of Ressayre, the same proof method shows that if M is any nonstandard model of PA, then every countable model of set theory—in particular, every model of ZFC—is isomorphic to a submodel of the hereditarily finite sets HFM of M. Indeed, HFM is universal for all countable acyclic binary relations.

Article | my profile at set theory talks | Toronto Set Theory Seminar post

The mate-in-n problem of infinite chess is decidable, Cambridge, June 2012

This will be a contributed talk at the Turing Centenary Conference CiE 2012 held June 18-23, 2012 in Cambridge, UK.

Abstract.  The mate-in-n problem of infinite chess—chess played on an infinite edgeless board—is the problem of determining whether a designated player can force a win from a given finite position in at most n moves. Although a straightforward formulation of this problem leads to assertions of high arithmetic complexity, with 2n alternating quantifiers,  the main theorem of this article nevertheless confirms a conjecture of the second author and C. D. A. Evans by establishing that it is computably decidable, uniformly in the position and in n. Furthermore, there is a computable strategy for optimal play from such mate-in-n positions. The proof proceeds by showing that the mate-in-n problem is expressible in what we call the first-order structure of chess Ch, which we prove (in the relevant fragment) is an automatic structure, whose theory is therefore decidable. The structure is also definable in Presburger arithmetic. Unfortunately, this resolution of the mate-in-n problem does not appear to settle the decidability of the more general winning-position problem, the problem of determining whether a designated player has a winning strategy from a given position, since a position may admit a winning strategy without any bound on the number of moves required. This issue is connected with transfinite game values in infinite chess, and the exact value of the omega one of chess ω1chess is not known.

Article | Slides | CiE 2012 | Contributed talk schedule

The hierarchy of equivalence relations on the natural numbers under computable reducibility, Chicheley Hall, June 2012

 

This will be a talk at The Incomputable, a workshop held June 12-15, 2012 at the Kavli Royal Society International Centre at Chicheley Hall as a part of the program Semantics and Syntax: A Legacy of Alan Turing organized by the Isaac Newton Institute of Mathematical Sciences in Cambridge, UK.

Abstract.  I will speak on the computable analogue of the theory of equivalence relations on the reals under Borel reducibility.  The Borel theory has been enormously successful in clarifying the hierarchy of classification problems arising throughout mathematics.  The computable analogue, meanwhile, appears to be particularly well-suited for an analysis of the c.e. instances of those problems, a rich context with many natural examples, such as the isomorphism relation on c.e. graphs or on computably presented groups.  In particular, every equivalence relation on countable structures has its natural restriction to the c.e. instances, which may be viewed as an equivalence relation on the indices of those c.e. sets.  Specifically, one equivalence relation E on the natural numbers is computably reducible to another F, if there is a computable function f such that n E m if and only if f(n) F f(m).   This reduction notion has beenMathematical discussions with Philip Welch introduced and studied independently by several different researchers and research groups.  In this talk, I will describe recent joint work with Sam Coskey and Russell Miller that fills out parts of the hierarchy.  An abundance of questions remain open.

Article | Slides | Workshop abstract 

The countable models of ZFC, up to isomorphism, are linearly pre-ordered by the submodel relation; indeed, every countable model of ZFC, including every transitive model, is isomorphic to a submodel of its own L, New York, 2012

This will be a talk on May 18, 2012 for the CUNY Logic Workshop on some extremely new work. The proof uses finitary digraph combinatorics, including the countable random digraph and higher analogues involving uncountable Fraisse limits, the surreal numbers and the hypnagogic digraph.

The story begins with Ressayre’s remarkable 1983 result that if M is any nonstandard model of PA, with HFM,M the corresponding nonstandard hereditary finite sets of M, then for any consistent computably axiomatized theory T in the language of set theory, with TZF, there is a submodel NHFM,M such that NT. In particular, one may find models of ZFC or even ZFC + large cardinals as submodels of HFM, a land where everything is thought to be finite. Incredible! Ressayre’s proof uses partial saturation and resplendency to prove that one can find the submodel of the desired theory T.

My new theorem strengthens Ressayre’s theorem, while simplifying the proof, by removing the theory T. We need not assume T is computable, and we don’t just get one model of T, but rather all models—the fact is that the nonstandard models of set theory are universal for all countable acyclic binary relations. So every model of set theory is a submodel of HFM,M.

Theorem.(JDH) Every countable model of set theory is isomorphic to a submodel of any nonstandard model of finite set theory. Indeed, every nonstandard model of finite set theory is universal for all countable acyclic binary relations.

The proof involves the construction of what I call the countable random Q-graded digraph, a countable homogeneous acyclic digraph that is universal for all countable acyclic digraphs, and proving that it is realized as a submodel of the nonstandard model M,M. Having then realized a universal object as a submodel, it follows that every countable structure with an acyclic binary relation, including every countable model of ZFC, is realized as a submodel of M.

The proof, in brief:  for every countable acyclic digraph, consider the partial order induced by the edge relation, and extend this order to a total order, which may be embedded in the rational order Q.  Thus, every countable acyclic digraph admits a Q-grading, an assignmment of rational numbers to nodes such that all edges point upwards. Next, one can build a countable homogeneous, universal, existentially closed Q-graded digraph, simply by starting with nothing, and then adding finitely many nodes at each stage, so as to realize the finite pattern property. The result is a computable presentation of what I call the countable random Q-graded digraph Γ.  If M is any nonstandard model of finite set theory, then we may run this computable construction inside M for a nonstandard number of steps.  The standard part of this nonstandard finite graph includes a copy of Γ.  Furthermore, since M thinks it is finite and acyclic, it can perform a modified Mostowski collapse to realize the graph in the hereditary finite sets of M.  By looking at the sets corresponding to the nodes in the copy of Γ, we find a submodel of M that is isomorphic to Γ, which is universal for all countable acyclic binary relations. So every model of ZFC isomorphic to a submodel of M.

The proof idea adapts, with complications, to the case of well-founded models, via the countable random λ-graded digraph, as well as the internal construction of what I call the hypnagogic digraph, a proper class homogeneous surreal-numbers-graded digraph, which is universal for all class acyclic digraphs.

Theorem.(JDH) Every countable model M,M of ZFC, including the transitive models, is isomorphic to a submodel of its own constructible universe LM,M. In other words, there is an embedding j:MLM that is quantifier-free-elementary.

The proof is guided by the idea of finding a universal submodel inside LM. The embedding j is constructed completely externally to M.

Corollary.(JDH) The countable models of ZFC are linearly ordered and even well-ordered, up to isomorphism, by the submodel relation. Namely, any two countable models of ZFC with the same well-founded height are bi-embeddable as submodels of each other, and all models embed into any nonstandard model.

The work opens up numerous questions on the extent to which we may expect in ZFC that V might be isomorphic to a subclass of L. To what extent can we expect to have or to refute embeddings j:VL, elementary for quantifier-free assertions?

Article | CUNY Logic Workshop

The omega one of infinite chess, New York, 2012

This will be a talk on May 18, 2012 for the CUNY Set Theory Seminar.

Infinite chess is chess played on an infinite edgeless chessboard. The familiar chess pieces move about according to their usual chess rules, and each player strives to place the opposing king into checkmate.  The mate-in-n problem of infinite chess is the problem of determining whether a designated player can force a win from a given finite position in at most n moves.  A naive formulation of this problem leads to assertions of high arithmetic complexity with 2n alternating quantifiers—there is a move for white, such that for every black reply, there is a countermove for white, and so on. In such a formulation, the problem does not appear to be decidable; and one cannot expect to search an infinitely branching game tree even to finite depth. Nevertheless, in joint work with Dan Brumleve and Philipp Schlicht, confirming a conjecture of myself and C. D. A. Evans, we establish that the mate-in-n problem of infinite chess is computably decidable, uniformly in the position and in n. Furthermore, there is a computable strategy for optimal play from such mate-in-n positions. The proof proceeds by showing that the mate-in-n problem is expressible in what we call the first-order structure of chess, which we prove (in the relevant fragment) is an automatic structure, whose theory is therefore decidable.  An equivalent account of the result arises from the realization that the structure of chess is interpretable in the standard model of Presburger arithmetic N,+.  Unfortunately, this resolution of the mate-in-n problem does not appear to settle the decidability of the more general winning-position problem, the problem of determining whether a designated player has a winning strategy from a given position, since a position may admit a winning strategy without any bound on the number of moves required. This issue is connected with transfinite game values in infinite chess, and the exact value of the omega one of chess ω1chess is not known. I will also discuss recent joint work with C. D. A. Evans and W. Hugh Woodin showing that the omega one of infinite positions in three-dimensional infinite chess is true ω1: every countable ordinal is realized as the game value of such a position.

article | slides

Must there be numbers we cannot describe or define? Pointwise definability and the Math Tea argument, Bristol, April 2012

This is a talk I plan to give to the set theory seminar at the University of Bristol on April 18, 2012.

An old argument, heard at a good math tea, proceeds: “there must be some real numbers that we can neither describe nor define, since there are uncountably many reals, but only countably many definitions.” Does it withstand scrutiny? In this talk, I will discuss the phenomenon of pointwise definable models of set theory, in which every object is definable without parameters. In addition to classical and folklore results on the existence of pointwise definable models of set theory, the main new theorem is that every countable model of ZFC and indeed of GBC has an extension to a model of set theory with the same ordinals, in which every set and class is definable without parameters. This is joint work with Jonas Reitz and David Linetsky, and builds on work of S. Simpson, R. Kossak, J. Schmerl, S. Friedman and A. Enayat.

slides | article