The hierarchy of equivalence relations on the natural numbers under computable reducibility, Chicheley Hall, June 2012

 

This will be a talk at The Incomputable, a workshop held June 12-15, 2012 at the Kavli Royal Society International Centre at Chicheley Hall as a part of the program Semantics and Syntax: A Legacy of Alan Turing organized by the Isaac Newton Institute of Mathematical Sciences in Cambridge, UK.

Abstract.  I will speak on the computable analogue of the theory of equivalence relations on the reals under Borel reducibility.  The Borel theory has been enormously successful in clarifying the hierarchy of classification problems arising throughout mathematics.  The computable analogue, meanwhile, appears to be particularly well-suited for an analysis of the c.e. instances of those problems, a rich context with many natural examples, such as the isomorphism relation on c.e. graphs or on computably presented groups.  In particular, every equivalence relation on countable structures has its natural restriction to the c.e. instances, which may be viewed as an equivalence relation on the indices of those c.e. sets.  Specifically, one equivalence relation E on the natural numbers is computably reducible to another F, if there is a computable function f such that n E m if and only if f(n) F f(m).   This reduction notion has beenMathematical discussions with Philip Welch introduced and studied independently by several different researchers and research groups.  In this talk, I will describe recent joint work with Sam Coskey and Russell Miller that fills out parts of the hierarchy.  An abundance of questions remain open.

Article | Slides | Workshop abstract 

The countable models of ZFC, up to isomorphism, are linearly pre-ordered by the submodel relation; indeed, every countable model of ZFC, including every transitive model, is isomorphic to a submodel of its own $L$, New York, 2012

This will be a talk on May 18, 2012 for the CUNY Logic Workshop on some extremely new work. The proof uses finitary digraph combinatorics, including the countable random digraph and higher analogues involving uncountable Fraisse limits, the surreal numbers and the hypnagogic digraph.

The story begins with Ressayre’s remarkable 1983 result that if $M$ is any nonstandard model of PA, with $\langle\text{HF}^M,{\in^M}\rangle$ the corresponding nonstandard hereditary finite sets of $M$, then for any consistent computably axiomatized theory $T$ in the language of set theory, with $T\supset ZF$, there is a submodel $N\subset\langle\text{HF}^M,{\in^M}\rangle$ such that $N\models T$. In particular, one may find models of ZFC or even ZFC + large cardinals as submodels of $\text{HF}^M$, a land where everything is thought to be finite. Incredible! Ressayre’s proof uses partial saturation and resplendency to prove that one can find the submodel of the desired theory $T$.

My new theorem strengthens Ressayre’s theorem, while simplifying the proof, by removing the theory $T$. We need not assume $T$ is computable, and we don’t just get one model of $T$, but rather all models—the fact is that the nonstandard models of set theory are universal for all countable acyclic binary relations. So every model of set theory is a submodel of $\langle\text{HF}^M,{\in^M}\rangle$.

Theorem.(JDH) Every countable model of set theory is isomorphic to a submodel of any nonstandard model of finite set theory. Indeed, every nonstandard model of finite set theory is universal for all countable acyclic binary relations.

The proof involves the construction of what I call the countable random $\mathbb{Q}$-graded digraph, a countable homogeneous acyclic digraph that is universal for all countable acyclic digraphs, and proving that it is realized as a submodel of the nonstandard model $\langle M,\in^M\rangle$. Having then realized a universal object as a submodel, it follows that every countable structure with an acyclic binary relation, including every countable model of ZFC, is realized as a submodel of $M$.

The proof, in brief:  for every countable acyclic digraph, consider the partial order induced by the edge relation, and extend this order to a total order, which may be embedded in the rational order $\mathbb{Q}$.  Thus, every countable acyclic digraph admits a $\mathbb{Q}$-grading, an assignmment of rational numbers to nodes such that all edges point upwards. Next, one can build a countable homogeneous, universal, existentially closed $\mathbb{Q}$-graded digraph, simply by starting with nothing, and then adding finitely many nodes at each stage, so as to realize the finite pattern property. The result is a computable presentation of what I call the countable random $\mathbb{Q}$-graded digraph $\Gamma$.  If $M$ is any nonstandard model of finite set theory, then we may run this computable construction inside $M$ for a nonstandard number of steps.  The standard part of this nonstandard finite graph includes a copy of $\Gamma$.  Furthermore, since $M$ thinks it is finite and acyclic, it can perform a modified Mostowski collapse to realize the graph in the hereditary finite sets of $M$.  By looking at the sets corresponding to the nodes in the copy of $\Gamma$, we find a submodel of $M$ that is isomorphic to $\Gamma$, which is universal for all countable acyclic binary relations. So every model of ZFC isomorphic to a submodel of $M$.

The proof idea adapts, with complications, to the case of well-founded models, via the countable random $\lambda$-graded digraph, as well as the internal construction of what I call the hypnagogic digraph, a proper class homogeneous surreal-numbers-graded digraph, which is universal for all class acyclic digraphs.

Theorem.(JDH) Every countable model $\langle M,\in^M\rangle$ of ZFC, including the transitive models, is isomorphic to a submodel of its own constructible universe $\langle L^M,\in^M\rangle$. In other words, there is an embedding $j:M\to L^M$ that is quantifier-free-elementary.

The proof is guided by the idea of finding a universal submodel inside $L^M$. The embedding $j$ is constructed completely externally to $M$.

Corollary.(JDH) The countable models of ZFC are linearly ordered and even well-ordered, up to isomorphism, by the submodel relation. Namely, any two countable models of ZFC with the same well-founded height are bi-embeddable as submodels of each other, and all models embed into any nonstandard model.

The work opens up numerous questions on the extent to which we may expect in ZFC that $V$ might be isomorphic to a subclass of $L$. To what extent can we expect to have or to refute embeddings $j:V\to L$, elementary for quantifier-free assertions?

Article | CUNY Logic Workshop

The omega one of infinite chess, New York, 2012

This will be a talk on May 18, 2012 for the CUNY Set Theory Seminar.

Infinite chess is chess played on an infinite edgeless chessboard. The familiar chess pieces move about according to their usual chess rules, and each player strives to place the opposing king into checkmate.  The mate-in-$n$ problem of infinite chess is the problem of determining whether a designated player can force a win from a given finite position in at most $n$ moves.  A naive formulation of this problem leads to assertions of high arithmetic complexity with $2n$ alternating quantifiers—there is a move for white, such that for every black reply, there is a countermove for white, and so on. In such a formulation, the problem does not appear to be decidable; and one cannot expect to search an infinitely branching game tree even to finite depth. Nevertheless, in joint work with Dan Brumleve and Philipp Schlicht, confirming a conjecture of myself and C. D. A. Evans, we establish that the mate-in-$n$ problem of infinite chess is computably decidable, uniformly in the position and in $n$. Furthermore, there is a computable strategy for optimal play from such mate-in-$n$ positions. The proof proceeds by showing that the mate-in-$n$ problem is expressible in what we call the first-order structure of chess, which we prove (in the relevant fragment) is an automatic structure, whose theory is therefore decidable.  An equivalent account of the result arises from the realization that the structure of chess is interpretable in the standard model of Presburger arithmetic $\langle\mathbb{N},+\rangle$.  Unfortunately, this resolution of the mate-in-$n$ problem does not appear to settle the decidability of the more general winning-position problem, the problem of determining whether a designated player has a winning strategy from a given position, since a position may admit a winning strategy without any bound on the number of moves required. This issue is connected with transfinite game values in infinite chess, and the exact value of the omega one of chess $\omega_1^{\rm chess}$ is not known. I will also discuss recent joint work with C. D. A. Evans and W. Hugh Woodin showing that the omega one of infinite positions in three-dimensional infinite chess is true $\omega_1$: every countable ordinal is realized as the game value of such a position.

article | slides

Must there be numbers we cannot describe or define? Pointwise definability and the Math Tea argument, Bristol, April 2012

This is a talk I plan to give to the set theory seminar at the University of Bristol on April 18, 2012.

An old argument, heard at a good math tea, proceeds: “there must be some real numbers that we can neither describe nor define, since there are uncountably many reals, but only countably many definitions.” Does it withstand scrutiny? In this talk, I will discuss the phenomenon of pointwise definable models of set theory, in which every object is definable without parameters. In addition to classical and folklore results on the existence of pointwise definable models of set theory, the main new theorem is that every countable model of ZFC and indeed of GBC has an extension to a model of set theory with the same ordinals, in which every set and class is definable without parameters. This is joint work with Jonas Reitz and David Linetsky, and builds on work of S. Simpson, R. Kossak, J. Schmerl, S. Friedman and A. Enayat.

slides | article

A course in infinitary computability, Fall 2012, CUNY Graduate Center, CSC 85020

In Fall 2012 I will teach a graduate course on infinitary computability theory in the Computer Science program at the CUNY Graduate Center.   This course will be aimed at graduate students in computer science and mathematics who are interested in infinitary computational processes.

Infinitary computability, CSC 85020, Mondays, 9:30 – 11:30 am
CS course listings | this listing

This course will explore all the various infinitary theories of computability, including infinite time Turing machines, Blum-Shub-Smale computability, Büchi automata, ordinal register machines and others. The focus will be on introducing the computability models and comparing them to each other and to standard concepts of computability. In the early part of the course, we shall review the standard finitary computational models, before investigating the infinitary supertask analogues.

Students wishing to prepare for the course should review their understanding of Turing machines and the other theoretical machine models of computation.

Some of my articles on infinitary computability | Student talks on their infinitary computability term papers

Fun and paradox with large numbers, logic and infinity, Philadelphia 2012

This is a fun talk I will give at Temple University for the mathematics undergraduates in the Senior Problem Solving forum.  We’ll be exploring some of the best puzzles and paradoxes I know of that arise with large numbers and infinity.  Many of these paradoxes are connected with deep issues surrounding the nature of mathematical truth, and my intention is to convey some of that depth, while still being accessible and entertaining.

Abstract:  Are there some real numbers that in principle cannot be described?  What is the largest natural number that can be written or described  in ordinary type on a 3×5 index card?  Which is bigger, a googol-bang-plex or a googol-plex-bang? Is every natural number interesting?  Is every true statement provable? Does every mathematical problem ultimately reduce to a computational procedure?  Is every sentence either true or false or neither true nor false?  Can one complete a task involving infinitely many steps?  We will explore these and many other puzzles and paradoxes involving large numbers, logic and infinity, and along the way, learn some interesting mathematics.

What happens when one iteratively computes the automorphism group of a group? Temple University, Philadelphia 2012

This is a talk I shall give for the Mathematics Colloquium at Temple University, April 23, 2012.

The automorphism tower of a group is obtained by computing its automorphism group, the automorphism group of that group, and so on, iterating transfinitely. The question, known as the automorphism tower problem, is whether the tower ever terminates, whether there is eventually a fixed point, a group that is isomorphic to its automorphism group by the natural map. Wielandt (1939) proved the classical result that the automorphism tower of any finite centerless group terminates in finitely many steps. This was successively generalized to larger and larger collections of groups until Thomas (1985) proved that every centerless group has a terminating automorphism tower.  Building on this, I proved (1997) that every group has a terminating automorphism tower.  After giving an account of this theorem, I will give an overview of work with Simon Thomas and newer work with Gunter Fuchs and work of Philipp Lücke, which reveal a set-theoretic essence for the automorphism tower of a group: the very same group can have wildly different towers in different models of set theory.

slides | list of my articles on automorphism towers | announcement poster

The automorphism tower problem for groups, Bristol 2012

Isaac Newton 20th Anniversary Lecture.  This is a talk I shall give at the University of Bristol, School of Mathematics, April 17, 2012, at the invitation of Philip Welch.

The automorphism tower of a group is obtained by computing its automorphism group, the automorphism group of that group, and so on, iterating transfinitely. The question, known as the automorphism tower problem, is whether the tower ever terminates, whether there is eventually a fixed point, a group that is isomorphic to its automorphism group by the natural map. Wielandt (1939) proved the classical result that the automorphism tower of any finite centerless group terminates in finitely many steps. This was successively generalized to larger and larger collections of groups until Thomas (1985) proved that every centerless group has a terminating automorphism tower.  Building on this, I proved (1997) that every group has a terminating automorphism tower.  After giving an account of this theorem, I will give an overview of my work with Simon Thomas, as well as newer work with Gunter Fuchs and work of Philipp Lücke, which reveal a set-theoretic essence for the automorphism tower of a group: the very same group can have wildly different towers in different models of set theory.

slides | list of my articles on automorphism towers | abstract at Bristol

The hierarchy of equivalence relations on the natural numbers under computable reducibility, Cambridge, March 2012

This is a talk I shall give at the workshop on Logical Approaches to Barriers in Complexity II, March 26-30, 2012, a part of the program Semantics and Syntax: A Legacy of Alan Turing at the Isaac Newton Institute for Mathematical Sciences in Cambridge, where I am currently a Visiting Fellow.

Many of the naturally arising equivalence relations in mathematics, such as isomorphism relations on various types of countable structures, turn out to be equivalence relations on a standard Borel space, and these relations form an intensely studied hierarchy under Borel reducibility.  The topic of this talk is to introduce and explore the computable analogue of this robust theory, by studying the corresponding hierarchy of equivalence relations on the natural numbers under computable reducibility.  Specifically, one relation $E$ is computably reducible to another $F$ , if there is a unary computable function $f$ such that $x\mathrel{E}y$ if and only if $f(x)\mathrel{F}f(y)$.  This gives rise to a very different hierarchy than the Turing degrees on such relations, since it is connected with the difficulty of the corresponding classification problems, rather than with the difficulty of computing the relations themselves.  The theory is well suited for an analysis of equivalence relations on classes of c.e.  structures, a rich context with many natural examples, such as the isomorphism relation on c.e. graphs or on computably presented groups.  An abundance of open questions remain, and the subject is an attractive mix of methods from mathematical logic, computability, set theory, particularly descriptive set theory, and the rest of mathematics, subjects in which many of the equivalence relations arise.  This is joint work with Sam Coskey and Russell Miller.

Slides | Slides (longer version, from a similar talk) | Article | Conference abstract | Video

Infinite chess: the mate-in-n problem is decidable and the omega-one of chess, Cambridge, March 2012

I have just taken up a visiting fellow position at the Isaac Newton Institute for mathematical sciences in Cambridge, UK, where I am participating in the program Syntax and Semantics:  the legacy of Alan Turing.   I was asked to give a brief introduction to some of my current work, and I chose to speak about infinite chess.

Infinite chess is chess played on an infinite edgeless chessboard. The familiar chess pieces move about according to their usual chess rules, and each player strives to place the opposing king into checkmate. The mate-in-$n$ problem of infinite chess is the problem of determining whether a designated player can force a win from a given finite position in at most $n$ moves. A naive formulation of this problem leads to assertions of high arithmetic complexity with $2n$ alternating quantifiers—there is a move for white, such that for every black reply, there is a countermove for white, and so on. In such a formulation, the problem does not appear to be decidable; and one cannot expect to search an infinitely branching game tree even to finite depth.

Nevertheless, in joint work with Dan Brumleve and Philipp Schlicht, confirming a conjecture of myself and C. D. A. Evans, we establish that the mate-in-$n$ problem of infinite chess is computably decidable, uniformly in the position and in $n$. Furthermore, there is a computable strategy for optimal play from such mate-in-$n$ positions. The proof proceeds by showing that the mate-in-$n$ problem is expressible in what we call the first-order structure of chess, which we prove (in the relevant fragment) is an automatic structure, whose theory is therefore decidable. Unfortunately, this resolution of the mate-in-n problem does not appear to settle the decidability of the more general winning-position problem, the problem of determining whether a designated player has a winning strategy from a given position, since a position may admit a winning strategy without any bound on the number of moves required. This issue is connected with transfinite game values in infinite chess, and the exact value of the omega one of chess $\omega_1^{\rm chess}$ is not known.  I will also discuss recent joint work with C. D. A. Evans and W. Hugh Woodin showing that the omega one of infinite positions in three-dimensional infinite chess is true $\omega_1$: every countable ordinal is realized as the game value of such a position.

 

article | slides | streaming videoprogram of abstracts

Is the dream solution of the continuum hypothesis attainable?

[bibtex key=Hamkins2015:IsTheDreamSolutionToTheContinuumHypothesisAttainable]

Many set theorists yearn for a definitive solution of the continuum problem, what I call a  dream solution, one by which we settle the continuum hypothesis (CH) on the basis of a new fundamental principle of set theory, a missing axiom, widely regarded as true, which determines the truth value of CH.  In an earlier article, I have described the dream solution template as proceeding in two steps: first, one introduces the new set-theoretic principle, considered obviously true for sets in the same way that many mathematicians find the axiom of choice or the axiom of replacement to be true; and second, one proves the CH or its negation from this new axiom and the other axioms of set theory. Such a situation would resemble Zermelo’s proof of the ponderous well-order principle on the basis of the comparatively natural axiom of choice and the other Zermelo axioms. If achieved, a dream solution to the continuum problem would be remarkable, a cause for celebration.

In this article, however, I argue that a dream solution of CH has become impossible to achieve. Specifically, what I claim is that our extensive experience in the set-theoretic worlds in which CH is true and others in which CH is false prevents us from looking upon any statement settling CH as being obviously true. We simply have had too much experience by now with the contrary situation. Even if set theorists initially find a proposed new principle to be a natural, obvious truth, nevertheless once it is learned that the principle settles CH, then this preliminary judgement will evaporate in the face of deep experience with the contrary, and set-theorists will look upon the statement merely as an intriguing generalization or curious formulation of CH or $\neg$CH, rather than as a new fundamental truth. In short, success in the second step of the dream solution will inevitably undermine success in the first step.

This article is based upon an argument I gave during the course of a three-lecture tutorial on set-theoretic geology at the summer school Set Theory and Higher-Order Logic: Foundational Issues and Mathematical Development, at the University of London, Birkbeck in August 2011.  Much of the article is adapted from and expands upon the corresponding section of material in my article The set-theoretic multiverse.

The hierarchy of equivalence relations on $\mathbb{N}$ under computable reducibility, New York March 2012

I gave a talk at the CUNY MAMLS conference March 9-10, 2012 at the City University of New York.

This talk will be about a generalization of the concept of Turing degrees to the hierarchy of equivalence relations on $\mathbb{N}$ under computable reducibility.  The idea is to develop a computable analogue of the enormously successful theory of equivalence relations on $\mathbb{R}$ under Borel reducibility, a theory which has led to deep insights on the complexity hierarchy of classification problems arising throughout mathematics. In the computable analogue, we consider the corresponding reduction notion in the context of Turing computability for relations on $\mathbb{N}$.  Specifically, one relation $E$ is computably reducible to another, $F$, if there is a computable function $f$ such that $x\mathrel{E} y$ if and only if $f(x)\mathrel{F} f(y)$.  This is a very different concept from mere Turing reducibility of $E$ to $F$, for it sheds light on the comparative difficulty of the classification problems corresponding to $E$ and $F$, rather than on the difficulty of computing the relations themselves.  In particular, the theory appears well suited for an analysis of equivalence relations on classes of c.e. structures, a rich context with many natural examples, such as the isomorphism relation on c.e. graphs or on computably presented groups. In this regard, our exposition extends earlier work in the literature concerning the classification of computable structures. An abundance of open questions remain.  This is joint work with Sam Coskey and Russell Miller.

articleslides | abstract on conference web page | related talk Florida MAMLS 2012 | Sam’s post on this topic

Isaac Newton Institute of Mathematical Sciences, Cambridge, Visiting Fellow, 2012

I held a Visiting Fellow position at the Isaac Newton Institute for Mathematical Sciences in Cambridge during March — April and June 2012, where I participated in the workshop on Logical Approaches to Barriers in Complexity II, March 26-30, 2012, a part of the program Semantics and Syntax: A Legacy of Alan Turing.

This visit was extremely productive mathematically for me, and it was at the Isaac Newton Institute that I proved the main part of my theorems on embeddings of countable models of set theory.

Panel discussion on the unity and diversity of logic, New York, March 2012

As a part of the Spring 2012 Mid-Atlanatic Mathematical Logic Seminar, to be held March 9-10, 2012 at the CUNY Graduate Center, I shall participate in the following panel discussion.

Panel discussion: The unity and diversity of logic

Abstract.  The field of mathematical logic sometimes seems to be fracturing into ever-finer subdisciplines, with little connection between them, and many logicians now identify themselves by their specific subdiscipline.  On the other hand, certain new themes have appeared which tend to unify the diverse discoveries of the many subdisciplines.  This discussion will address these trends and ask whether one is likely to dominate the other in the long term.  Will logic remain a single field, or will it split into many unrelated branches?

The panelists will be Prof. Gregory Cherlin, myself, Prof. Rohit Parikh, and Prof. Jouko Väänänen, with the discussion moderated by Prof. Russell Miller. Questions and participation from the audience are encouraged.

As preparation for this panel discussion, please suggest points or topics that might brought up at the panel discussion, by posting suitable comments below.  Perhaps we’ll proceed with our own pre-discussion discussion here!

The mate-in-n problem of infinite chess is decidable

[bibtex key=BrumleveHamkinsSchlicht2012:TheMateInNProblemOfInfiniteChessIsDecidable]

Infinite chess is chess played on an infinite edgeless chessboard. The familiar chess pieces move about according to their usual chess rules, and each player strives to place the opposing king into checkmate. The mate-in-$n$ problem of infinite chess is the problem of determining whether a designated player can force a win from a given finite position in at most $n$ moves. A naive formulation of this problem leads to assertions of high arithmetic complexity with $2n$ alternating quantifiers—*there is a move for white, such that for every black reply, there is a countermove for white*, and so on. In such a formulation, the problem does not appear to be decidable; and one cannot expect to search an infinitely branching game tree even to finite depth.

Nevertheless, the main theorem of this article, confirming a conjecture of the first author and C. D. A. Evans, establishes that the mate-in-$n$ problem of infinite chess is computably decidable, uniformly in the position and in $n$. Furthermore, there is a computable strategy for optimal play from such mate-in-$n$ positions. The proof proceeds by showing that the mate-in-$n$ problem is expressible in what we call the first-order structure of chess, which we prove (in the relevant fragment) is an automatic structure, whose theory is therefore decidable. Unfortunately, this resolution of the mate-in-$n$ problem does not appear to settle the decidability of the more general winning-position problem, the problem of determining whether a designated player has a winning strategy from a given position, since a position may admit a winning strategy without any bound on the number of moves required. This issue is connected with transfinite game values in infinite chess, and the exact value of the omega one of chess $\omega_1^{\frak{Ch}}$ is not known.

Richard Stanley’s question on mathoverflow: Decidability of chess on infinite board?