Student talks on infinitary computability

Students in my Infinitary Computability course will give talks on their term papers.  Talks will be held at the CUNY Graduate Center, Room 3307, 9:30-11:30.

Monday, December 3rd

  • Miha Habič will speak on “Cardinal-Recognizing Infinite Time Turing Machines”, in which he develops the theory of infinite time Turing machines that are given information about when they have reached cardinal time.
  • Erin Carmody will speak on “Non-deterministic infinite time Turing machines”, in which she develops the theory of non-deterministic ITTM computation.
  • Alexy Nikolaev will speak on “Equivalence of ITTMs, and their simultation on a finite time computer,” in which we proves the equivalence of various formalizations of ITTMs.

Monday, December 10th

  • Manuel Alves will speak on infinite time computable model theory.
  • Syed Ali Ahmed will speak on the relation between Büchi automata and infinite time Turing machines, including $\omega$-regular languages and generalizations to longer transfinite strings.

Pluralism in set theory: does every mathematical statement have a definite truth value? GC Philosophy Colloquium, 2012

This will be my talk for the CUNY Graduate Center Philosophy Colloquium on November 28, 2012.

I will be speaking on topics from some of my recent articles:

I shall give a summary account of some current issues in the philosophy of set theory, specifically, the debate on pluralism and the question of the determinateness of set-theoretical and mathematical truth.  The traditional Platonist view in set theory, what I call the universe view, holds that there is an absolute background concept of set and a corresponding absolute background set-theoretic universe in which every set-theoretic assertion has a final, definitive truth value.  What I would like to do is to tease apart two often-blurred aspects of this perspective, namely, to separate the claim that the set-theoretic universe has a real mathematical existence from the claim that it is unique.  A competing view, which I call the multiverse view, accepts the former claim and rejects the latter, by holding that there are many distinct concepts of set, each instantiated in a corresponding set-theoretic universe, and a corresponding pluralism of set-theoretic truths.  After framing the dispute, I shall argue that the multiverse position explains our experience with the enormous diversity of set-theoretic possibility, a phenomenon that is one of the central set-theoretic discoveries of the past fifty years and one which challenges the universe view. In particular, I shall argue that the continuum hypothesis is settled on the multiverse view by our extensive knowledge about how it behaves in the multiverse, and as a result it can no longer be settled in the manner formerly hoped for.

Slides

The countable models of set theory are linearly pre-ordered by embeddability, Rutgers, November 2012

This will be a talk for the Rutgers Logic Seminar on November 19, 2012.

Abstract.  I will speak on my recent theorem that every countable model of set theory $M$, including every well-founded model, is isomorphic to a submodel of its own constructible universe. In other words, there is an embedding $j:M\to L^M$ that is elementary for quantifier-free assertions. The proof uses universal digraph combinatorics, including an acyclic version of the countable random digraph, which I call the countable random $\mathbb{Q}$-graded digraph, and higher analogues arising as uncountable Fraisse limits, leading to the hypnagogic digraph, a set-homogeneous, class-universal, surreal-numbers-graded acyclic class digraph, closely connected with the surreal numbers. The proof shows that $L^M$ contains a submodel that is a universal acyclic digraph of rank $\text{Ord}^M$. The method of proof also establishes that the countable models of set theory are linearly pre-ordered by embeddability: for any two countable models of set theory, one of them is isomorphic to a submodel of the other.  Indeed, the bi-embeddability classes form a well-ordered chain of length $\omega_1+1$.  Specifically, the countable well-founded models are ordered by embeddability in accordance with the heights of their ordinals; every shorter model embeds into every taller model; every model of set theory $M$ is universal for all countable well-founded binary relations of rank at most $\text{Ord}^M$; and every ill-founded model of set theory is universal for all countable acyclic binary relations. Finally, strengthening a classical theorem of Ressayre, the same proof method shows that if $M$ is any nonstandard model of PA, then every countable model of set theory—in particular, every model of ZFC—is isomorphic to a submodel of the hereditarily finite sets $HF^M$ of $M$. Indeed, $HF^M$ is universal for all countable acyclic binary relations.

Article | Rutgers Logic Seminar

A multiverse perspective on the axiom of constructiblity

[bibtex key=Hamkins2014:MultiverseOnVeqL]

This article expands on an argument that I made during my talk at the Asian Initiative for Infinity: Workshop on Infinity and Truth, held July 25–29, 2011 at the Institute for Mathematical Sciences, National University of Singapore, and will be included in a proceedings volume that is being prepared for that conference.

Abstract. I argue that the commonly held $V\neq L$ via maximize position, which rejects the axiom of constructibility $V=L$ on the basis that it is restrictive, implicitly takes a stand in the pluralist debate in the philosophy of set theory by presuming an absolute background concept of ordinal. The argument appears to lose its force, in contrast, on an upwardly extensible concept of set, in light of the various facts showing that models of set theory generally have extensions to models of $V=L$ inside larger set-theoretic universes.

In section two, I provide a few new criticisms of Maddy’s proposed concept of `restrictive’ theories, pointing out that her concept of fairly interpreted in is not a transitive relation: there is a first theory that is fairly interpreted in a second, which is fairly interpreted in a third, but the first is not fairly interpreted in the third.  The same example (and one can easily construct many similar natural examples) shows that neither the maximizes over relation, nor the properly maximizes over relation, nor the strongly maximizes over relation is transitive.  In addition, the theory ZFC + “there are unboundedly many inaccessible cardinals” comes out as formally restrictive, since it is strongly maximized by the theory ZF + “there is a measurable cardinal, with no worldly cardinals above it.”

To support the main philosophical thesis of the article, I survey a series of mathemtical results,  which reveal various senses in which the axiom of constructibility $V=L$ is compatible with strength in set theory, particularly if one has in mind the possibility of moving from one universe of set theory to a much larger one.  Among them are the following, which I prove or sketch in the article:

Observation. The constructible universe $L$ and $V$ agree on the consistency of any constructible theory. They have models of the same constructible theories.

Theorem. The constructible universe $L$ and $V$ have transitive models of exactly the same constructible theories in the language of set theory.

Corollary. (Levy-Shoenfield absoluteness theorem)  In particular, $L$ and $V$ satisfy the same $\Sigma_1$ sentences, with parameters hereditarily countable in $L$. Indeed, $L_{\omega_1^L}$ and $V$ satisfy the same such sentences.

Theorem. Every countable transitive set is a countable transitive set in the well-founded part of an $\omega$-model of V=L.

Theorem. If there are arbitrarily large $\lambda<\omega_1^L$ with $L_\lambda\models\text{ZFC}$, then every countable transitive set $M$ is a countable transitive set inside a structure $M^+$  that is a pointwise-definable model of ZFC + V=L, and $M^+$ is well founded as high in the countable ordinals as desired.

Theorem. (Barwise)  Every countable model of  ZF has an end-extension to a model of ZFC + V=L.

Theorem. (Hamkins, see here)  Every countable model of set theory $\langle M,{\in^M}\rangle$, including every transitive model, is isomorphic to a submodel of its own constructible universe $\langle L^M,{\in^M}\rangle$. In other words,  there is an embedding $j:M\to L^M$, which is elementary for quantifier-free assertions.

Another way to say this is that every countable model of set theory is a submodel of a model isomorphic to $L^M$. If we lived inside $M$, then by adding new sets and elements, our universe could be transformed into a copy of the constructible universe $L^M$.

(Plus, the article contains some nice diagrams.)

Related Singapore links:

Every countable model of set theory is isomorphic to a submodel of its own constructible universe, Barcelona, December, 2012

This will be a talk for a set theory workshop at the University of Barcelona on December 15, 2012, organized by Joan Bagaria.

Vestíbul Universitat de Barcelona

Abstract. Every countable model of set theory $M$, including every well-founded model, is isomorphic to a submodel of its own constructible universe. In other words, there is an embedding $j:M\to L^M$ that is elementary for quantifier-free assertions. The proof uses universal digraph combinatorics, including an acyclic version of the countable random digraph, which I call the countable random $\mathbb{Q}$-graded digraph, and higher analogues arising as uncountable Fraisse limits, leading to the hypnagogic digraph, a set-homogeneous, class-universal, surreal-numbers-graded acyclic class digraph, closely connected with the surreal numbers. The proof shows that $L^M$ contains a submodel that is a universal acyclic digraph of rank $\text{Ord}^M$. The method of proof also establishes that the countable models of set theory are linearly pre-ordered by embeddability: for any two countable models of set theory, one of them is isomorphic to a submodel of the other.  Indeed, the bi-embeddability classes form a well-ordered chain of length $\omega_1+1$.  Specifically, the countable well-founded models are ordered by embeddability in accordance with the heights of their ordinals; every shorter model embeds into every taller model; every model of set theory $M$ is universal for all countable well-founded binary relations of rank at most $\text{Ord}^M$; and every ill-founded model of set theory is universal for all countable acyclic binary relations. Finally, strengthening a classical theorem of Ressayre, the same proof method shows that if $M$ is any nonstandard model of PA, then every countable model of set theory—in particular, every model of ZFC—is isomorphic to a submodel of the hereditarily finite sets $HF^M$ of $M$. Indeed, $HF^M$ is universal for all countable acyclic binary relations.

Article | Barcelona research group in set theory

Richard Laver, 1942 – 2012

Richard Laver (October 20, 1942 — September 19, 2012).  Richard Joseph Laver, celebrated mathematician, climber, bridge player, chess master, pick-up basketball player, and friend was born in Los Angeles, California to Alma Laver Makinen and Richard Burgess Laver.  Wednesday, September 19, 2012 at 2:52 in the morning in Boulder, Colorado, Rich passed away due to complications of Parkinson’s disease.  He was surrounded by loved ones.

An informal open house gathering for friends, colleagues, and associates will be held Sunday, September 23, 2012 1pm to 5pm at Rich’s house.  A memorial will be held in the more distant future.  (Contact Sheila Miller sheila.miller@colorado.edu.)

A more detailed notice will follow.

Math Reviews of Laver’s work |  MathSciNet profile | Zentralblatt reviews

Google scholar entry | Wikipedia entry |  Math geneology

A question for the mathematics oracle

At the Workshop on Infinity and Truth in Singapore last year, we had a special session in which the speakers were asked to imagine that they had been granted an audience with an all-knowing mathematical oracle, given the opportunity to ask a single yes-or-no question, to be truthfully answered.  These questions will be gathered together and published in the conference volume.  Here is my account.

 

A question for the mathematics oracle

Joel David Hamkins, The City University of New York

 

Granted an audience with an all-knowing mathematics oracle, we may ask a single yes-or-no question, to be truthfully answered……

I might mischievously ask the question my six-year-old daughter Hypatia often puts to our visitors:  “Answer yes or no.  Will you answer `no’?” They stammer, caught in the liar paradox, as she giggles. But my actual question is:

Are we correct in thinking we have an absolute concept of the finite?

An absolute concept of the finite underlies many mathematician’s understanding of the nature of mathematical truth. Most mathematicians, for example, believe that we have an absolute concept of the finite, which determines the natural numbers as a unique mathematical structure—$0,1,2,$ and so on—in which arithmetic assertions have definitive truth values. We can prove after all that the second-order Peano axioms characterize $\langle\mathbb{N},S,0\rangle$ as the unique inductive structure, determined up to isomorphism by the fact that $0$ is not a successor, the successor function $S$ is one-to-one and every set containing $0$ and closed under $S$ is the whole of $\mathbb{N}$. And to be finite means simply to be equinumerous with a proper initial segment of this structure. Doesn’t this categoricity proof therefore settle the matter?

I don’t think so. The categoricity proof, which takes place in set theory, seems to my way of thinking merely to push the absoluteness question for finiteness off to the absoluteness question for sets instead. And surely this is a murkier realm, where already mathematicians do not universally agree that we have a single absolute background concept of set. We know by forcing and other means how to construct alternative set concepts, which seem fully as legitimate and set-theoretic as the set concepts from which they are derived. Thus, we have a plurality of set concepts, and our confidence in a unique absolute set-theoretic background is weakened. How then can we sensibly base our confidence in an absolute concept of the finite on set theory? Perhaps this absoluteness is altogether illusory.

My worries are put to rest if the oracle should answer positively. A negative answer, meanwhile, would raise alarms. A negative answer could indicate, on the one hand, that our understanding of the finite is simply incoherent, a catastrophe, where our cherished mathematical theories are all inconsistent. But, more likely in my view, a negative answer could also mean that there is an undiscovered plurality of concepts of the finite. I imagine technical developments arising that would provide us with tools to modify the arithmetic of a model of set theory, for example, with the same power and flexibility that forcing currently allows us to modify higher-order features, while not providing us with any reason to prefer one arithmetic to another (unlike our current methods with non-standard models). The discovery of such tools would be an amazing development in mathematics and lead to radical changes in our conception of mathematical truth.

Let’s have some fun—please post your question for the oracle in the comment fields below.

A question for the math oracle (pdf) | My talk at the Workshop

The least weakly compact cardinal can be unfoldable, weakly measurable and nearly $\theta$-supercompact, New York, September 14, 2012

This will be a talk for the CUNY Set Theory seminar on September 14, 2012.

Abstract.  Starting from suitable large cardinal hypothesis, I will explain how to force the least weakly compact cardinal to be unfoldable, weakly measurable and, indeed, nearly $\theta$-supercompact.  These results, proved in joint work with Jason Schanker, Moti Gitik and Brent Cody, exhibit an identity-crises phenomenon for weak compactness, similar to the phenomenon identified by Magidor for the case of strongly compact cardinals.

 

MAMLS at Rutgers, October 6-7, 2012

The Fall 2012 MAMLS Meeting will take place at Rutgers University on October 6-7, 2012. The invited speakers include Clinton Conley, Andrew Marks, Antonio Montalban, Justin Moore, Saharon Shelah, Dima Sinapova and Anush Tserunyan.

The lectures will take place in Room 216 in Scott Hall on College Avenue Campus. For those of you who are coming by train, Scott Hall is a short walk from the train station.

For further information, visit:

http://www.math.rutgers.edu/~sthomas/RU2012.html

Recent progress on the modal logic of forcing and grounds, CUNY Logic Workshop, September 2012

This will be a talk for the CUNY Logic Workshop on September 7, 2012.

Abstract. The modal logic of forcing arises when one considers a model of set theory in the context of all its forcing extensions, with “true in all forcing extensions” and“true in some forcing extension” as the accompanying modal operators. In this modal language one may easily express sweeping general forcing principles, such asthe assertion that every possibly necessary statement is necessarily possible, which is valid for forcing, orthe assertion that every possibly necessary statement is true, which is the maximality principle, a forcing axiom independent of but equiconsistent with ZFC.  Similarly, the dual modal logic of grounds concerns the modalities “true in all ground models” and “true in some ground model”.  In this talk, I shall survey the recent progress on the modal logic of forcing and the modal logic of grounds. This is joint work with Benedikt Loewe and George Leibman.

 

Moving up and down in the generic multiverse

[bibtex key=HamkinsLoewe2013:MovingUpAndDownInTheGenericMultiverse]

In this extended abstract we investigate the modal logic of the generic multiverse, which is a bimodal logic with operators corresponding to the relations “is a forcing extension of”‘ and “is a ground model of”. The fragment of the first relation is the modal logic of forcing and was studied by us in earlier work. The fragment of the second relation is the modal logic of grounds and will be studied here for the first time. In addition, we discuss which combinations of modal logics are possible for the two fragments.

The main theorems are as follows:

Theorem.  If  ZFC is consistent, then there is a model of  ZFC  whose modal logic of forcing and modal logic of grounds are both S4.2.

Theorem.  If  the theory “$L_\delta\prec L+\delta$ is inaccessible” is consistent, then there is a model of set theory whose modal logic of forcing is S4.2 and whose modal logic of grounds is S5.

Theorem.  If  the theory “$L_\delta\prec L+\delta$ is inaccessible” is consistent, then there is a model of set theory whose modal logic of forcing is S5 and whose modal logic of grounds is S4.2.

Theorem. There is no model of set theory such that both its modal logic of forcing and its modal logic of grounds are S5.

The current article is a brief extended abstract (10 pages).  A fuller account with more detailed proofs and further information will be provided in a subsequent articl

eprints:  ar$\chi$iv | NI12059-SAS | Hamburg #450

Brent Cody

Brent Cody earned his Ph.D. under my supervision at the CUNY Graduate Center in June, 2012.  Brent’s dissertation work began with the question of finding the exact consistency strength of the GCH failing at a cardinal $\theta$, when $\kappa$ is $\theta$-supercompact.  The answer turned out to be a $\theta$-supercompact cardinal that was also $\theta^{++}$-tall.  After this, he quickly dispatched more general instances of what he termed the Levinski property for a variety of other large cardinals, advancing his work towards a general investigation of the Easton theorem phenomenon in the large cardinal context, which he is now undertaking.  Brent held a post-doctoral position at the Fields Institute in Toronto, afterwards taking up a position at the University of Prince Edward Island.  He is now at Virginia Commonwealth University.

Brent Cody

web page | math genealogy | MathSciNet | ar$\chi$iv | related posts

Brent Cody, “Some Results on Large Cardinals and the Continuum Function,” Ph.D. dissertation for The Graduate Center of the City University of New York, June, 2012.

Abstract.  Given a Woodin cardinal $\delta$, I show that if $F$ is any Easton function with $F”\delta\subseteq\delta$ and GCH holds, then there is a cofinality preserving forcing extension in which $2^\gamma= F(\gamma)$ for each regular cardinal $\gamma<\delta$, and in which $\delta$ remains Woodin.

I also present a new example in which forcing a certain behavior of the continuum function on the regular cardinals, while preserving a given large cardinal, requires large cardinal strength beyond that of the original large cardinal under consideration. Specifically, I prove that the existence of a $\lambda$-supercompact cardinal $\kappa$ such that GCH fails at $\lambda$ is equiconsistent with the existence of a cardinal $\kappa$ that is $\lambda$-supercompact and $\lambda^{++}$-tall.

I generalize a theorem on measurable cardinals due to Levinski, which says that given a measurable cardinal, there is a forcing extension preserving the measurability of $\kappa$ in which $\kappa$ is the least regular cardinal at which GCH holds. Indeed, I show that Levinski’s result can be extended to many other large cardinal contexts. This work paves the way for many additional results, analogous to the results stated above for Woodin cardinals and partially supercompact cardinals.

Jason Schanker

Jason Aaron Schanker earned his Ph.D. under my supervision at the CUNY Graduate Center in June, 2011.  Jason’s dissertation introduces several interesting new large cardinal notions, investigating their interaction with forcing, indestructibility, the Generalized Continuum Hypothesis and other topics.  He defines that a cardinal $\kappa$ is weakly measurable, for example, if any family of $\kappa^+$ many subsets of $\kappa$ can be measured by a $\kappa$-complete filter.  This is equivalent to measurability under the GCH, of course, but the notions are not equivalent in general, although they are equiconsistent.  The weak measurability concept can be viewed as a generalization of weak compactness, and there are myriad equivalent formulations, including elementary embedding characterizations using transitive domains of size $\kappa^+$.  It was known classically that the failure of the GCH at a measurable cardinal has consistency strength strictly greater than a measurable cardinal, but Jason proved that the corresponding fact is not true for the weakly measurable cardinals.  Generalizing this notion, Jason introduced the near supercompactness hierarchy, which refines and extends the usual supercompactness hierarchy in a way that adapts well to many existing forcing arguments.  Jason holds a faculty position at Manhattanville College in Purchase, New York.

Jason Schanker

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Jason Schanker, “Weakly Measurable Cardinals and Partial Near Supercompactness,”  Ph.D. dissertation for the Graduate Center of the City University of New York, June, 2011.

Abstract.  I will introduce a few new large cardinal concepts. A weakly measurable cardinal is a new large cardinal concept obtained by weakening the familiar concept of a measurable cardinal. Specifically, a cardinal $\kappa$ is weakly measurable if for every collection $A$ containing at most $\kappa^+$ many subsets of $\kappa$, there exists a nonprincipal $\kappa$-complete filter on $\kappa$ measuring all sets in $A$. Every measurable cardinal is weakly measurable, but a weakly measurable cardinal need not be measurable. Moreover, while the GCH cannot fail first at a measurable cardinal, I will show that it can fail first at a weakly measurable cardinal. More generally, if $\kappa$ is measurable, then we can make its weak measurability indestructible by the forcing $\text{Add}(\kappa,\eta)$ for all $\eta$ while forcing the GCH to hold below $\kappa$. Nevertheless, I shall prove that weakly measurable v cardinals and measurable cardinals are equiconsistent.

A cardinal κ is nearly $\theta$-supercompact if for every $A\subset\theta$, there exists a transitive $M\models\text{ZFC}^-$ closed under ${<}\kappa$ sequences with $A,\kappa,\theta\in M$, a transitive $N$, and an elementary embedding $j : M \to  N$ with critical point $\kappa$ such that $j(\kappa) > \theta$ and $j”\theta\in N$. This concept strictly refines the $\theta$-supercompactness hierarchy as every $\theta$-supercompact cardinal is nearly $\theta$-supercompact, and every nearly $2^{\theta^{{<}\kappa}}$-supercompact cardinal $\kappa$ is $\theta$-supercompact. Moreover, if $\kappa$ is a $\theta$-supercompact cardinal for some $\theta$ such that $\theta^{{<}\kappa}=\theta$, we can move to a forcing extension preserving all cardinals below $\theta^{++}$ where $\kappa$ remains $\theta$-supercompact but is not nearly $\theta^+$-supercompact. I will also show that if $\kappa$ is nearly $\theta$-supercompact for some $\theta\geq 2^\kappa$ such that $\theta^{{<}\theta}=\theta$, then there exists a forcing extension preserving all cardinals at or above $\kappa$ where $\kappa$ is nearly $\theta$-supercompact but not measurable. These types of large cardinals also come equipped with a nontrivial indestructibility result, and I will prove that if $\kappa$ is nearly $\theta$-supercompact for some $\theta\geq\kappa$ such that $\theta^{{<}\theta}=\theta$, then there is a forcing extension where its near $\theta$-supercompactness is preserved and indestructible by any further ${<}\kappa$-directed closed $\theta$-c.c. forcing of size at most $\theta$. Finally, these cardinals have high consistency strength. Specifically, I will show that if $\kappa$ is nearly $\theta$-supercompact for some $\theta\geq\kappa^+$ for which $\theta^{{<}\theta}=\theta$, then AD holds in $L(\mathbb{R})$. In particular, if $\kappa$ is nearly $\kappa^+$-supercompact and $2^\kappa=\kappa^+$, then AD holds in $L(\mathbb{R})$.

Ansten Mørch-Klev

Ansten Mørch-Klev earned his M.Sc. degree under my direction at Universiteit van Amsterdam in July, 2007.   For his thesis, Ansten undertook to investigate the infinite-time analogue of Kleene’s $\mathcal{O}$, the natural extension of Kleene’s concept to the case of infinite time Turing machines.  The result was a satisfying and robust theory, which revealed (as predicted by Philip Welch) the central importance of the eventually writable ordinals in the theory of infinite time computability.  This work eventually appeared as:  Ansten Mørch-Klev, “Infinite time analogues of Kleene’s $\mathcal{O}$,” Archive for Mathematical Logic, 48(7):2009, p. 691-703, DOI:10.1007/s00153-009-0146-2.

Ansten Mørch Klev

web page | DBLP | google scholar

Ansten Mørch-Klev, “Extending Kleene’s O Using Infinite Time Turing Machines, or How With Time She Grew Taller and Fatter”, M.Sc. thesis for Institute of Logic, Language and Computation, Universiteit van Amsterdam, July, 2007.  ILLC publication

Abstract.  We define two successive extensions of Kleene’s $\mathcal{O}$ using infinite time Turing machines. The first extension, $\mathcal{O}^+$, is proved to code a tree of height $\lambda$, the supremum of the writable ordinals, while the second extension, $\mathcal{O}^{++}$, is proved to code a tree of height $\zeta$, the supremum of the eventually writable ordinals. Furthermore, we show that $\mathcal{O}^+$ is computably isomorphic to $h$, the lightface halting problem of infinite time Turing machine computability, and that $\mathcal{O}^{++}$ is computably isomorphic to $s$, the set of programs that eventually writes a real. The last of these results implies, by work of Welch, that $\mathcal{O}^{++}$ is computably isomorphic to the $\Sigma_2$ theory of $L_\zeta$, and, by work of Burgess, that $\mathcal{O}^{++}$ is complete with respect to the class of the arithmetically quasi-inductive sets. This leads us to conjecture the existence of a parallel of hyperarithmetic theory at the level of $\Sigma_2(L_\zeta)$, a theory in which $\mathcal{O}^{++}$ plays the role of $\mathcal{O}$, the arithmetically quasi-inductive sets play the role of $\Pi^1_1$, and the eventually writable reals play the role of $\Delta^1_1$.

 

Victoria Gitman

Victoria Gitman earned her Ph.D. under my supervision at the CUNY Graduate Center in June, 2007.  For her dissertation work, Victoria had chosen a very difficult problem, the 1962 question of Dana Scott to characterize the standard systems of models of Peano Arithmetic, a question in the field of models of arithmetic that had been open for over forty years. Victoria was able to make progress, now published in several papers, by using an inter-disciplinary approach, applying set-theoretic ideas—including a use of the proper forcing axiom PFA—to the problem in the area of models of arithmetic, where such methods hadn’t often yet arisen.  Ultimately, she showed under PFA that every arithmetically closed proper Scott set is the standard system of a model of PA.  This result extends the classical result to a large new family of Scott sets, providing for these sets an affirmative solution to Scott’s problem.  In other dissertation work, Victoria untangled the confusing mass of ideas surrounding various Ramsey-like large cardinal concepts, ultimately separating them into a beautiful hierarchy, a neighborhood of the vast large cardinal hierarchy intensely studied by set theorists.  (Please see the diagram in her dissertation.)  Victoria holds a tenure-track position at the New York City College of Technology of CUNY.

Victoria Gitman

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Victoria Gitman, “Applications of the Proper Forcing Axiom to Models of Peano Arithmetic,”  Ph.D. dissertation for the Graduate Center of the City University of New York, June 2007.

Abstract. In Chapter 1, new results are presented on Scott’s Problem in the subject of models of Peano Arithmetic. Some forty years ago, Dana Scott showed that countable Scott sets are exactly the countable standard systems of models of PA, and two decades later, Knight and Nadel extended his result to Scott sets of size $\omega_1$. Here it is shown that assuming the Proper Forcing Axiom, every arithmetically closed proper Scott set is the standard system of a model of PA. In Chapter 2, new large cardinal axioms, based on Ramsey-like embedding properties, are introduced and placed within the large cardinal hierarchy. These notions generalize the seldom encountered embedding characterization of Ramsey cardinals. I also show how these large cardinals can be used to obtain indestructibility results for Ramsey cardinals.