A question for the mathematics oracle

At the Workshop on Infinity and Truth in Singapore last year, we had a special session in which the speakers were asked to imagine that they had been granted an audience with an all-knowing mathematical oracle, given the opportunity to ask a single yes-or-no question, to be truthfully answered.  These questions will be gathered together and published in the conference volume.  Here is my account.

 

A question for the mathematics oracle

Joel David Hamkins, The City University of New York

 

Granted an audience with an all-knowing mathematics oracle, we may ask a single yes-or-no question, to be truthfully answered……

I might mischievously ask the question my six-year-old daughter Hypatia often puts to our visitors:  “Answer yes or no.  Will you answer `no’?” They stammer, caught in the liar paradox, as she giggles. But my actual question is:

Are we correct in thinking we have an absolute concept of the finite?

An absolute concept of the finite underlies many mathematician’s understanding of the nature of mathematical truth. Most mathematicians, for example, believe that we have an absolute concept of the finite, which determines the natural numbers as a unique mathematical structure—$0,1,2,$ and so on—in which arithmetic assertions have definitive truth values. We can prove after all that the second-order Peano axioms characterize $\langle\mathbb{N},S,0\rangle$ as the unique inductive structure, determined up to isomorphism by the fact that $0$ is not a successor, the successor function $S$ is one-to-one and every set containing $0$ and closed under $S$ is the whole of $\mathbb{N}$. And to be finite means simply to be equinumerous with a proper initial segment of this structure. Doesn’t this categoricity proof therefore settle the matter?

I don’t think so. The categoricity proof, which takes place in set theory, seems to my way of thinking merely to push the absoluteness question for finiteness off to the absoluteness question for sets instead. And surely this is a murkier realm, where already mathematicians do not universally agree that we have a single absolute background concept of set. We know by forcing and other means how to construct alternative set concepts, which seem fully as legitimate and set-theoretic as the set concepts from which they are derived. Thus, we have a plurality of set concepts, and our confidence in a unique absolute set-theoretic background is weakened. How then can we sensibly base our confidence in an absolute concept of the finite on set theory? Perhaps this absoluteness is altogether illusory.

My worries are put to rest if the oracle should answer positively. A negative answer, meanwhile, would raise alarms. A negative answer could indicate, on the one hand, that our understanding of the finite is simply incoherent, a catastrophe, where our cherished mathematical theories are all inconsistent. But, more likely in my view, a negative answer could also mean that there is an undiscovered plurality of concepts of the finite. I imagine technical developments arising that would provide us with tools to modify the arithmetic of a model of set theory, for example, with the same power and flexibility that forcing currently allows us to modify higher-order features, while not providing us with any reason to prefer one arithmetic to another (unlike our current methods with non-standard models). The discovery of such tools would be an amazing development in mathematics and lead to radical changes in our conception of mathematical truth.

Let’s have some fun—please post your question for the oracle in the comment fields below.

A question for the math oracle (pdf) | My talk at the Workshop

The least weakly compact cardinal can be unfoldable, weakly measurable and nearly $\theta$-supercompact, New York, September 14, 2012

This will be a talk for the CUNY Set Theory seminar on September 14, 2012.

Abstract.  Starting from suitable large cardinal hypothesis, I will explain how to force the least weakly compact cardinal to be unfoldable, weakly measurable and, indeed, nearly $\theta$-supercompact.  These results, proved in joint work with Jason Schanker, Moti Gitik and Brent Cody, exhibit an identity-crises phenomenon for weak compactness, similar to the phenomenon identified by Magidor for the case of strongly compact cardinals.

 

Recent progress on the modal logic of forcing and grounds, CUNY Logic Workshop, September 2012

This will be a talk for the CUNY Logic Workshop on September 7, 2012.

Abstract. The modal logic of forcing arises when one considers a model of set theory in the context of all its forcing extensions, with “true in all forcing extensions” and“true in some forcing extension” as the accompanying modal operators. In this modal language one may easily express sweeping general forcing principles, such asthe assertion that every possibly necessary statement is necessarily possible, which is valid for forcing, orthe assertion that every possibly necessary statement is true, which is the maximality principle, a forcing axiom independent of but equiconsistent with ZFC.  Similarly, the dual modal logic of grounds concerns the modalities “true in all ground models” and “true in some ground model”.  In this talk, I shall survey the recent progress on the modal logic of forcing and the modal logic of grounds. This is joint work with Benedikt Loewe and George Leibman.

 

Moving up and down in the generic multiverse

[bibtex key=HamkinsLoewe2013:MovingUpAndDownInTheGenericMultiverse]

In this extended abstract we investigate the modal logic of the generic multiverse, which is a bimodal logic with operators corresponding to the relations “is a forcing extension of”‘ and “is a ground model of”. The fragment of the first relation is the modal logic of forcing and was studied by us in earlier work. The fragment of the second relation is the modal logic of grounds and will be studied here for the first time. In addition, we discuss which combinations of modal logics are possible for the two fragments.

The main theorems are as follows:

Theorem.  If  ZFC is consistent, then there is a model of  ZFC  whose modal logic of forcing and modal logic of grounds are both S4.2.

Theorem.  If  the theory “$L_\delta\prec L+\delta$ is inaccessible” is consistent, then there is a model of set theory whose modal logic of forcing is S4.2 and whose modal logic of grounds is S5.

Theorem.  If  the theory “$L_\delta\prec L+\delta$ is inaccessible” is consistent, then there is a model of set theory whose modal logic of forcing is S5 and whose modal logic of grounds is S4.2.

Theorem. There is no model of set theory such that both its modal logic of forcing and its modal logic of grounds are S5.

The current article is a brief extended abstract (10 pages).  A fuller account with more detailed proofs and further information will be provided in a subsequent articl

eprints:  ar$\chi$iv | NI12059-SAS | Hamburg #450

Brent Cody

Brent Cody earned his Ph.D. under my supervision at the CUNY Graduate Center in June, 2012.  Brent’s dissertation work began with the question of finding the exact consistency strength of the GCH failing at a cardinal $\theta$, when $\kappa$ is $\theta$-supercompact.  The answer turned out to be a $\theta$-supercompact cardinal that was also $\theta^{++}$-tall.  After this, he quickly dispatched more general instances of what he termed the Levinski property for a variety of other large cardinals, advancing his work towards a general investigation of the Easton theorem phenomenon in the large cardinal context, which he is now undertaking.  Brent held a post-doctoral position at the Fields Institute in Toronto, afterwards taking up a position at the University of Prince Edward Island.  He is now at Virginia Commonwealth University.

Brent Cody

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Brent Cody, “Some Results on Large Cardinals and the Continuum Function,” Ph.D. dissertation for The Graduate Center of the City University of New York, June, 2012.

Abstract.  Given a Woodin cardinal $\delta$, I show that if $F$ is any Easton function with $F”\delta\subseteq\delta$ and GCH holds, then there is a cofinality preserving forcing extension in which $2^\gamma= F(\gamma)$ for each regular cardinal $\gamma<\delta$, and in which $\delta$ remains Woodin.

I also present a new example in which forcing a certain behavior of the continuum function on the regular cardinals, while preserving a given large cardinal, requires large cardinal strength beyond that of the original large cardinal under consideration. Specifically, I prove that the existence of a $\lambda$-supercompact cardinal $\kappa$ such that GCH fails at $\lambda$ is equiconsistent with the existence of a cardinal $\kappa$ that is $\lambda$-supercompact and $\lambda^{++}$-tall.

I generalize a theorem on measurable cardinals due to Levinski, which says that given a measurable cardinal, there is a forcing extension preserving the measurability of $\kappa$ in which $\kappa$ is the least regular cardinal at which GCH holds. Indeed, I show that Levinski’s result can be extended to many other large cardinal contexts. This work paves the way for many additional results, analogous to the results stated above for Woodin cardinals and partially supercompact cardinals.

Jason Schanker

Jason Aaron Schanker earned his Ph.D. under my supervision at the CUNY Graduate Center in June, 2011.  Jason’s dissertation introduces several interesting new large cardinal notions, investigating their interaction with forcing, indestructibility, the Generalized Continuum Hypothesis and other topics.  He defines that a cardinal $\kappa$ is weakly measurable, for example, if any family of $\kappa^+$ many subsets of $\kappa$ can be measured by a $\kappa$-complete filter.  This is equivalent to measurability under the GCH, of course, but the notions are not equivalent in general, although they are equiconsistent.  The weak measurability concept can be viewed as a generalization of weak compactness, and there are myriad equivalent formulations, including elementary embedding characterizations using transitive domains of size $\kappa^+$.  It was known classically that the failure of the GCH at a measurable cardinal has consistency strength strictly greater than a measurable cardinal, but Jason proved that the corresponding fact is not true for the weakly measurable cardinals.  Generalizing this notion, Jason introduced the near supercompactness hierarchy, which refines and extends the usual supercompactness hierarchy in a way that adapts well to many existing forcing arguments.  Jason holds a faculty position at Manhattanville College in Purchase, New York.

Jason Schanker

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Jason Schanker, “Weakly Measurable Cardinals and Partial Near Supercompactness,”  Ph.D. dissertation for the Graduate Center of the City University of New York, June, 2011.

Abstract.  I will introduce a few new large cardinal concepts. A weakly measurable cardinal is a new large cardinal concept obtained by weakening the familiar concept of a measurable cardinal. Specifically, a cardinal $\kappa$ is weakly measurable if for every collection $A$ containing at most $\kappa^+$ many subsets of $\kappa$, there exists a nonprincipal $\kappa$-complete filter on $\kappa$ measuring all sets in $A$. Every measurable cardinal is weakly measurable, but a weakly measurable cardinal need not be measurable. Moreover, while the GCH cannot fail first at a measurable cardinal, I will show that it can fail first at a weakly measurable cardinal. More generally, if $\kappa$ is measurable, then we can make its weak measurability indestructible by the forcing $\text{Add}(\kappa,\eta)$ for all $\eta$ while forcing the GCH to hold below $\kappa$. Nevertheless, I shall prove that weakly measurable v cardinals and measurable cardinals are equiconsistent.

A cardinal κ is nearly $\theta$-supercompact if for every $A\subset\theta$, there exists a transitive $M\models\text{ZFC}^-$ closed under ${<}\kappa$ sequences with $A,\kappa,\theta\in M$, a transitive $N$, and an elementary embedding $j : M \to  N$ with critical point $\kappa$ such that $j(\kappa) > \theta$ and $j”\theta\in N$. This concept strictly refines the $\theta$-supercompactness hierarchy as every $\theta$-supercompact cardinal is nearly $\theta$-supercompact, and every nearly $2^{\theta^{{<}\kappa}}$-supercompact cardinal $\kappa$ is $\theta$-supercompact. Moreover, if $\kappa$ is a $\theta$-supercompact cardinal for some $\theta$ such that $\theta^{{<}\kappa}=\theta$, we can move to a forcing extension preserving all cardinals below $\theta^{++}$ where $\kappa$ remains $\theta$-supercompact but is not nearly $\theta^+$-supercompact. I will also show that if $\kappa$ is nearly $\theta$-supercompact for some $\theta\geq 2^\kappa$ such that $\theta^{{<}\theta}=\theta$, then there exists a forcing extension preserving all cardinals at or above $\kappa$ where $\kappa$ is nearly $\theta$-supercompact but not measurable. These types of large cardinals also come equipped with a nontrivial indestructibility result, and I will prove that if $\kappa$ is nearly $\theta$-supercompact for some $\theta\geq\kappa$ such that $\theta^{{<}\theta}=\theta$, then there is a forcing extension where its near $\theta$-supercompactness is preserved and indestructible by any further ${<}\kappa$-directed closed $\theta$-c.c. forcing of size at most $\theta$. Finally, these cardinals have high consistency strength. Specifically, I will show that if $\kappa$ is nearly $\theta$-supercompact for some $\theta\geq\kappa^+$ for which $\theta^{{<}\theta}=\theta$, then AD holds in $L(\mathbb{R})$. In particular, if $\kappa$ is nearly $\kappa^+$-supercompact and $2^\kappa=\kappa^+$, then AD holds in $L(\mathbb{R})$.

Victoria Gitman

Victoria Gitman earned her Ph.D. under my supervision at the CUNY Graduate Center in June, 2007.  For her dissertation work, Victoria had chosen a very difficult problem, the 1962 question of Dana Scott to characterize the standard systems of models of Peano Arithmetic, a question in the field of models of arithmetic that had been open for over forty years. Victoria was able to make progress, now published in several papers, by using an inter-disciplinary approach, applying set-theoretic ideas—including a use of the proper forcing axiom PFA—to the problem in the area of models of arithmetic, where such methods hadn’t often yet arisen.  Ultimately, she showed under PFA that every arithmetically closed proper Scott set is the standard system of a model of PA.  This result extends the classical result to a large new family of Scott sets, providing for these sets an affirmative solution to Scott’s problem.  In other dissertation work, Victoria untangled the confusing mass of ideas surrounding various Ramsey-like large cardinal concepts, ultimately separating them into a beautiful hierarchy, a neighborhood of the vast large cardinal hierarchy intensely studied by set theorists.  (Please see the diagram in her dissertation.)  Victoria holds a tenure-track position at the New York City College of Technology of CUNY.

Victoria Gitman

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Victoria Gitman, “Applications of the Proper Forcing Axiom to Models of Peano Arithmetic,”  Ph.D. dissertation for the Graduate Center of the City University of New York, June 2007.

Abstract. In Chapter 1, new results are presented on Scott’s Problem in the subject of models of Peano Arithmetic. Some forty years ago, Dana Scott showed that countable Scott sets are exactly the countable standard systems of models of PA, and two decades later, Knight and Nadel extended his result to Scott sets of size $\omega_1$. Here it is shown that assuming the Proper Forcing Axiom, every arithmetically closed proper Scott set is the standard system of a model of PA. In Chapter 2, new large cardinal axioms, based on Ramsey-like embedding properties, are introduced and placed within the large cardinal hierarchy. These notions generalize the seldom encountered embedding characterization of Ramsey cardinals. I also show how these large cardinals can be used to obtain indestructibility results for Ramsey cardinals.

Thomas Johnstone

Thomas Johnstone earned his Ph.D. under my supervision in June, 2007 at the CUNY Graduate Center.  Tom likes to get thoroughly to the bottom of a problem, and this indeed is what he did in his dissertation work on the forcing-theoretic aspects of unfoldable cardinals.  He seemed to want always to dig deeper, seeking out the unstated general phenomenon behind the results.  His characteristic style of giving a seminar talk—pure mathematical pleasure to attend—is to explain not only why the mathematical fact is true, but also why the proof must be the way that it is.  Thomas holds a tenure-track position at the New York City College of Technology of CUNY.

Thomas A. Johnstone

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Thomas A. Johnstone, “Strongly unfoldable cardinals made indestructible,” Ph.D. dissertation, The Graduate Center of the City University of New York, June 2007.

Abstract. I provide indestructibility results for weakly compact, indescribable and strongly unfoldable cardinals. In order to make these large cardinals indestructible, I assume the existence of a strongly unfoldable cardinal $\kappa$, which is a hypothesis consistent with $V=L$. The main result shows that any strongly unfoldable cardinal $\kappa$ can be made indestructible by all ${<}\kappa$-closed forcing which does not collapse $\kappa^{+}$. As strongly unfoldable cardinals strengthen both indescribable and weakly compact cardinals, I obtain indestructibility for these cardinals also, thereby reducing the large cardinal hypothesis of previously known indestructibility results for these cardinals significantly. Finally, I use the developed methods to show the consistency of a weakening of the Proper Forcing Axiom $\rm PFA$ relative to the existence of a strongly unfoldable cardinal.

Jonas Reitz

Jonas Reitz earned his Ph.D under my supervision in June, 2006 at the CUNY Graduate Center.  He was truly a pleasure to supervise. From the earliest days of his dissertation research, he had his own plan for the topic of the work: he wanted to “undo” forcing, to somehow force backwards, from the extension to the ground model. At first I was skeptical, but in time, ideas crystalized around the ground axiom (now with its own Wikipedia entry), formulated using a recent-at-the-time result of Richard Laver.  Along with Laver’s theorem, Jonas’s dissertation was the beginning of the body of work now known as set-theoretic geology.  Jonas holds a tenured position at the New York City College of Technology of CUNY.

Jonas Reitz


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Jonas Reitz, “The ground axiom,” Ph.D. dissertation, CUNY Graduate Center, June, 2006.  ar$\chi$iv

Abstract.  A new axiom is proposed, the Ground Axiom, asserting that the universe is not a nontrivial set-forcing extension of any inner model. The Ground Axiom is first-order expressible, and any model of ZFC has a class-forcing extension which satisfies it. The Ground Axiom is independent of many well-known set-theoretic assertions including the Generalized Continuum Hypothesis, the assertion V=HOD that every set is ordinal definable, and the existence of measurable and supercompact cardinals. The related Bedrock Axiom, asserting that the universe is a set-forcing extension of a model satisfying the Ground Axiom, is also first-order expressible, and its negation is consistent. As many of these results rely on forcing with proper classes, an appendix is provided giving an exposition of the underlying theory of proper class forcing.

George Leibman

George Joseph Leibman earned his Ph.D. under my supervision in June, 2004 at the CUNY Graduate Center. He was my first Ph.D. student. Being very interested both in forcing and in modal logic, it was natural for him to throw himself into the emerging developments at the common boundary of these topics.  He worked specifically on the natural extensions of the maximality principle where when one considers a fixed definable class $\Gamma$ of forcing notions.  This research engaged with fundamental questions about the connection between the forcing-theoretic properties of the forcing class $\Gamma$ and the modal logic of its forcing validities, and was a precursor of later work, including joint work, on the modal logic of forcing.

George Leibman

George Leibman

 

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George Leibman, “Consistency Strengths of Modified Maximality Principles,” Ph.D. thesis, CUNY Graduate Center, 2004.  ar$\chi$iv

Abstract. The Maximality Principle MP is a scheme which states that if a sentence of the language of ZFC is true in some forcing extension $V^{\mathbb{P}}$, and remains true in any further forcing extension of $V^{\mathbb{P}}$, then it is true in all forcing extensions of $V$.  A modified maximality principle $\text{MP}_\Gamma$ arises when considering forcing with a particular class $\Gamma$ of forcing notions. A parametrized form of such a principle, $\text{MP}_\Gamma(X)$, considers formulas taking parameters; to avoid inconsistency such parameters must be restricted to a specific set $X$ which depends on the forcing class $\Gamma$ being considered. A stronger necessary form of such a principle, $\square\text{MP}_\Gamma(X)$, occurs when it continues to be true in all $\Gamma$ forcing extensions.

This study uses iterated forcing, modal logic, and other techniques to establish consistency strengths for various modified maximality principles restricted to various forcing classes, including ccc, COHEN, COLL (the forcing notions that collapse ordinals to $\omega$), ${\lt}\kappa$ directed closed forcing notions, etc., both with and without parameter sets. Necessary forms of these principles are also considered.

Fields Institute, Toronto, Scientific Researcher, 2012

During August 2012, I was a visiting Scientific Researcher at the Fields Institute at the University of Toronto, participating in their thematic program on Forcing and it Applications.

Structural connections between a forcing class and its modal logic

[bibtex key=HamkinsLeibmanLoewe2015:StructuralConnectionsForcingClassAndItsModalLogic]

The modal logic of forcing arises when one considers a model of set theory in the context of all its forcing extensions, interpreting $\square$ as “in all forcing extensions” and $\Diamond$ as “in some forcing extension”. In this modal language one may easily express sweeping general forcing principles, such as $\Diamond\square\varphi\to\square\Diamond\varphi$, the assertion that every possibly necessary statement is necessarily possible, which is valid for forcing, or $\Diamond\square\varphi\to\varphi$, the assertion that every possibly necessary statement is true, which is the maximality principle, a forcing axiom independent of but equiconsistent with ZFC (see A simple maximality principle).

Every definable forcing class similarly gives rise to the corresponding forcing modalities, for which one considers extensions only by forcing notions in that class. In previous work, we proved that if ZFC is consistent, then the ZFC-provably valid principles of the class of all forcing are precisely the assertions of the modal theory S4.2 (see The modal logic of forcing). In this article, we prove that the provably valid principles of collapse forcing, Cohen forcing and other classes are in each case exactly S4.3; the provably valid principles of c.c.c. forcing, proper forcing, and others are each contained within S4.3 and do not contain S4.2; the provably valid principles of countably closed forcing, CH-preserving forcing and others are each exactly S4.2; and the provably valid principles of $\omega_1$-preserving forcing are contained within S4.tBA. All these results arise from general structural connections we have identified between a forcing class and the modal logic of forcing to which it gives rise, including the connection between various control statements, such as buttons, switches and ratchets, and their corresponding forcing validities. These structural connections therefore support a forcing-only analysis of other diverse forcing classes.

Preprints available at:  ar$\chi$iv | NI12055-SAS | UvA ILLC PP-2012-19 | HBM 446

Must there be numbers we cannot describe or define? Pointwise definability and the Math Tea argument, Bristol, April 2012

This is a talk I plan to give to the set theory seminar at the University of Bristol on April 18, 2012.

An old argument, heard at a good math tea, proceeds: “there must be some real numbers that we can neither describe nor define, since there are uncountably many reals, but only countably many definitions.” Does it withstand scrutiny? In this talk, I will discuss the phenomenon of pointwise definable models of set theory, in which every object is definable without parameters. In addition to classical and folklore results on the existence of pointwise definable models of set theory, the main new theorem is that every countable model of ZFC and indeed of GBC has an extension to a model of set theory with the same ordinals, in which every set and class is definable without parameters. This is joint work with Jonas Reitz and David Linetsky, and builds on work of S. Simpson, R. Kossak, J. Schmerl, S. Friedman and A. Enayat.

slides | article

The automorphism tower problem for groups, Bristol 2012

Isaac Newton 20th Anniversary Lecture.  This is a talk I shall give at the University of Bristol, School of Mathematics, April 17, 2012, at the invitation of Philip Welch.

The automorphism tower of a group is obtained by computing its automorphism group, the automorphism group of that group, and so on, iterating transfinitely. The question, known as the automorphism tower problem, is whether the tower ever terminates, whether there is eventually a fixed point, a group that is isomorphic to its automorphism group by the natural map. Wielandt (1939) proved the classical result that the automorphism tower of any finite centerless group terminates in finitely many steps. This was successively generalized to larger and larger collections of groups until Thomas (1985) proved that every centerless group has a terminating automorphism tower.  Building on this, I proved (1997) that every group has a terminating automorphism tower.  After giving an account of this theorem, I will give an overview of my work with Simon Thomas, as well as newer work with Gunter Fuchs and work of Philipp Lücke, which reveal a set-theoretic essence for the automorphism tower of a group: the very same group can have wildly different towers in different models of set theory.

slides | list of my articles on automorphism towers | abstract at Bristol