# Universality, saturation and the surreal number line, Shanghai, June 2013

This will be a short lecture series given at the conclusion of the graduate logic class in the Mathematical Logic group at Fudan University in Shanghai, June 13, 18 (or 20), 2013.

I will present an elementary introduction to the theory of universal orders and relations and saturated structures.  We’ll start with the classical fact, proved by Cantor, that the rational line is the universal countable linear order.  But what about universal partial orders, universal graphs and other mathematical structures?  Is there a computable universal partial order?  What is the countable random graph? Which orders embed into  the power set of the natural numbers under the subset relation $\langle P(\mathbb{N}),\subset\rangle$? Proceeding to larger and larger universal orders, we’ll eventually arrive at the surreal numbers and the hypnagogic digraph.

# Playful paradox with large numbers, infinity and logic, Shanghai, June 2013

This will be a talk at Fudan University in Shanghai, China, June 11, 2013, sponsored by the group in Mathematical Logic at Fudan, for a large audience of students.

Abstract: For success in mathematics and science, I recommend an attitude of playful curiosity about one’s subject. We shall accordingly explore a number of puzzling conundrums at the foundations of mathematics concerning issues with large numbers, infinity and logic. These are serious issues—and we’ll have serious things to say—while still having fun. Can one complete a task involving infinitely many steps? Are there some real numbers that in principle cannot be described? Is every true statement provable? Does every mathematical problem ultimately reduce to computational procedure? What is the largest natural number that can be written or described in ordinary type on an index card? Which is bigger, a googol-bang-plex or a googol-plex-bang? Is every natural number interesting? Is every sentence either true or false or neither true nor false? We will explore these and many other puzzles and paradoxes involving large numbers, logic and infinity, and along the way, learn some interesting mathematics and philosophy.

# In memory, Clark John Hamkins (1930- 2013)

Clark John Hamkins at            Hoyerswort, 2005

My father, Clark John Hamkins (1930 – 2013) passed away May 11, 2013 at his home in Brunswick, Maine. He was a good man, witty, kind, intelligent, honest, hard-working, caring, curious, patient, philosophical, mathematical, practical, fair.  The world has just lost a great human being. He was a loving family man, married to my mother, Monica, for 55 years (their wedding anniversary was yesterday), with six children and thirteen grandchildren.

US Patent 3756058

He was an engineer’s engineer, one who could take apart any machine and put it back together and tell you all about the ways in which the design was flawed or how it was clever.  I think of his work as a kind of meta-engineering, for he designed the machines for manufacturing a product, bending pipes and twisting wire, rather than the product itself.   He held a number of patents for his inventions, including some for his design of a manufacturing apparatus for winding semi-toroidal transformers. When I was a kid, he designed and built in his wood shop a hand-crank centrifugal honey-extractor, which we used to harvest the crop from our bee hives.  He taught all his kids their way around a wood shop, how to cut, saw, nail, drill, screw, sand, bore, file, buff, solder, join, plane, dowel, glue, measure, how to use all manner of hand tools and the jig saw, the band saw, the table saw, the mitre saw, the drill press, the belt sander. He was beyond serious, with a lathe in his shop.  “Use the right tool for the job,” I can still hear him say, and “measure twice, cut once; measure once, cut twice,” a warning to those who would rush their work.  He made all manner of toys for his children and then for his grandchildren.  He made cabinets, tools, furniture, items of all kinds, large and small, fine and plain.  He kept and used a wood shop his entire adult life, insisting even in his final days that he go down into it.  One of his final projects was to design and build a beautiful, melodious whale-motif dulcimer.

He was an artist, and as a young man produced oil paintings, which move me to this day.  Long ago, before having kids, he made architectural drawings for the family home he had planned, and it is clear in retrospect that he hadn’t planned at that time on having such a large family.  (The joke in our family is that Dad wanted four kids and Mom wanted two, and they both got their wish!)  Later, he would inevitably win our family games of pictionary, where one is given the task to draw the meaning of a word selected randomly from the dictionary. His drawings always started with a clear simple line, capturing the essence of the concept, which was then fleshed out in fuller artistic flair until his partner said the word.  I found an old math book of his, from his own school days, with a chapter on Polar Coordinates in which he had drawn a wonderful Eskimo, carrying a harpoon and fish, and an igloo.

He was a teacher at heart.  He explained the slide rule to me when I was young, and gave a lesson on logarithms and log tables and the accompanying explanation of linear interpolation.  He explained to me as a child what $x^2$ and $x^3$ meant, and then, with a twinkle in his eye, as I listened wide-eyed and dumbstruck, about what $x^{2.3}$ meant.  Some of my fondest young memories with him include viewings of the moon and planets through a telescope, as I shivered in my pajamas in the cool night air, pondering the craters and drinking hot cocoa. He would discuss the various historical astronomical theories, comparing Copernicus with Ptolemy and the role of Tycho Brahe.  He loved a good scientific controversy, and liked even more to figure things out himself.  He liked to put a scientific explanation in a historical context.

He was a programmer, programming computers in the earliest days. I brought his cast-off computer cards, punched paper tapes and so on into my third-grade classroom for show-and-tell.  I remember him poring over expansive flowcharts spread across the kitchen table in the evenings. He made sure that his kids were learning how to program.

He was a voracious reader, consuming books in science, philosophy, literature, history, archeology, biology, physics, mathematics. You name it; he read it.

He was a skeptic.

He was a rebel physicist, refusing to accept the conclusion of the Michelson-Morley experiment on relativistic length foreshortening and time contraction.  And he backed up his beliefs by writing an account of this part of physics, re-developing the theory from an alternative perspective of his own invention, involving a notion of time translation, which avoided the need for those paradoxical conclusions, but ended up deriving the same fundamental equations.

I will miss him.

# Algebraicity and implicit definability in set theory, CUNY, May 2013

This is a talk May 10, 2013 for the CUNY Set Theory Seminar.

Abstract.  An element a is definable in a model M if it is the unique object in M satisfying some first-order property. It is algebraic, in contrast, if it is amongst at most finitely many objects satisfying some first-order property φ, that is, if { b | M satisfies φ[b] } is a finite set containing a. In this talk, I aim to consider the situation that arises when one replaces the use of definability in several parts of set theory with the weaker concept of algebraicity. For example, in place of the class HOD of all hereditarily ordinal-definable sets, I should like to consider the class HOA of all hereditarily ordinal algebraic sets. How do these two classes relate? In place of the study of pointwise definable models of set theory, I should like to consider the pointwise algebraic models of set theory. Are these the same? In place of the constructible universe L, I should like to consider the inner model arising from iterating the algebraic (or implicit) power set operation rather than the definable power set operation. The result is a highly interesting new inner model of ZFC, denoted Imp, whose properties are only now coming to light. Is Imp the same as L? Is it absolute? I shall answer all these questions at the talk, but many others remain open.

This is joint work with Cole Leahy (MIT).

# The theory of infinite games, with examples, including infinite chess

This will be a talk on April 30, 2013 for a joint meeting of the Yeshiva University Mathematics Club and the  Yeshiva University Philosophy Club.  The event will take place in 5:45 pm in Furst Hall, on the corner of Amsterdam Ave. and 185th St.

Abstract. I will give a general introduction to the theory of infinite games, suitable for mathematicians and philosophers.  What does it mean to play an infinitely long game? What does it mean to have a winning strategy for such a game?  Is there any reason to think that every game should have a winning strategy for one player or another?  Could there be a game, such that neither player has a way to force a win?  Must every computable game have a computable winning strategy?  I will present several game paradoxes and example infinitary games, including an infinitary version of the game of Nim, and several examples from infinite chess.

# Norman Lewis Perlmutter

Norman Lewis Perlmutter successfully defended his dissertation under my supervision and will earn his Ph.D. at the CUNY Graduate Center in May, 2013.  His dissertation consists of two parts.  The first chapter arose from the observation that while direct limits of large cardinal embeddings and other embeddings between models of set theory are pervasive in the subject, there is comparatively little study of inverse limits of systems of such embeddings.  After such an inverse system had arisen in Norman’s joint work on Generalizations of the Kunen inconsistency, he mounted a thorough investigation of the fundamental theory of these inverse limits. In chapter two, he investigated the large cardinal hierarchy in the vicinity of the high-jump cardinals.  During this investigation, he ended up refuting the existence of what are now called the excessively hypercompact cardinals, which had appeared in several published articles.  Previous applications of that notion can be made with a weaker notion, what is now called a hypercompact cardinal.

web page | math geneology | MathSciNet | ar$\chi$iv | related posts

Norman Lewis Perlmutter, “Inverse limits of models of set theory and the large cardinal hierarchy near a high-jump cardinal”  Ph.D. dissertation for The Graduate Center of the City University of New York, May, 2013.

Abstract.  This dissertation consists of two chapters, each of which investigates a topic in set theory, more specifically in the research area of forcing and large cardinals. The two chapters are independent of each other.

The first chapter analyzes the existence, structure, and preservation by forcing of inverse limits of inverse-directed systems in the category of elementary embeddings and models of set theory. Although direct limits of directed systems in this category are pervasive in the set-theoretic literature, the inverse limits in this same category have seen less study. I have made progress towards fully characterizing the existence and structure of these inverse limits. Some of the most important results are as follows. If the inverse limit exists, then it is given by either the entire thread class or a rank-initial segment of the thread class. Given sufficient large cardinal hypotheses, there are systems with no inverse limit, systems with inverse limit given by the entire thread class, and systems with inverse limit given by a proper subset of the thread class. Inverse limits are preserved in both directions by forcing under fairly general assumptions. Prikry forcing and iterated Prikry forcing are important techniques for constructing some of the examples in this chapter.

The second chapter analyzes the hierarchy of the large cardinals between a supercompact cardinal and an almost-huge cardinal, including in particular high-jump cardinals. I organize the large cardinals in this region by consistency strength and implicational strength. I also prove some results relating high-jump cardinals to forcing.  A high-jump cardinal is the critical point of an elementary embedding $j: V \to M$ such that $M$ is closed under sequences of length $\sup\{\ j(f)(\kappa) \mid f: \kappa \to \kappa\ \}$.  Two of the most important results in the chapter are as follows. A Vopenka cardinal is equivalent to an Woodin-for-supercompactness cardinal. The existence of an excessively hypercompact cardinal is inconsistent.

# Joining the Doctoral Faculty in Philosophy

I am recently informed that I shall be joining the Doctoral Faculty of the Philosophy Program at the CUNY Graduate Center, in addition to my current appointments in Mathematics and in Computer Science.  This means I shall now be able to teach graduate courses in philosophy at the Graduate Center and also to supervise Ph.D. dissertations in philosophy there.  I am pleased to become a part of the GC Philosophy Program, which is so highly ranked in the area of mathematical logic, and I look forward to making a positive contribution to the program.

# Interviewed by Richard Marshall at 3:AM Magazine

I was recently interviewed by Richard Marshall at 3:AM Magazine, which was a lot of fun. You can see that his piece starts out, however, rather over-the-top…

# playing infinite chess

Joel David Hamkins interviewed by Richard Marshall.

Joel David Hamkins is a maths/logic hipster, melting the logic/maths hive mind with ideas that stalk the same wild territory as Frege, Tarski, Godel, Turing and Cantor. He thinks we all can go there and that we all should. He gives tips about the Moebius strip to six year olds and plays around with his sons homework. He has discovered all sorts of wonders involving supertasks, infinite-time Turing machines, black-hole computations, the mathematics of the uncountable, the lost melody phenomenon of infintary computability (which really should be the name of a band), set theory and multiverses, infinite utilitarianism, and infinite chess. He’s also thinking about whether we really have an absolute notion of the finite and doubts if any of this is brain melting, which is just a testimony to his modesty. He also thinks that although maths is open to all he thinks mathematicians could use more metaphors and silly terminology to get their ideas across better than they do. All in all, this is the grooviest of the hard core maths/logic groovsters. Bodacious!

→ continue to the rest of the interview

# Pluralism in mathematics: the multiverse view in set theory and the question of whether every mathematical statement has a definite truth value, Rutgers, March 2013

This is a talk for the Rutgers Logic Seminar on March 25th, 2013.  Simon Thomas specifically requested that I give a talk aimed at philosophers.

Abstract.  I shall describe the debate on pluralism in the philosophy of set theory, specifically on the question of whether every mathematical and set-theoretic assertion has a definite truth value. A traditional Platonist view in set theory, which I call the universe view, holds that there is an absolute background concept of set and a corresponding absolute background set-theoretic universe in which every set-theoretic assertion has a final, definitive truth value. I shall try to tease apart two often-blurred aspects of this perspective, namely, to separate the claim that the set-theoretic universe has a real mathematical existence from the claim that it is unique. A competing view, the multiverse view, accepts the former claim and rejects the latter, by holding that there are many distinct concepts of set, each instantiated in a corresponding set-theoretic universe, and a corresponding pluralism of set-theoretic truths. After framing the dispute, I shall argue that the multiverse position explains our experience with the enormous diversity of set-theoretic possibility, a phenomenon that is one of the central set-theoretic discoveries of the past fifty years and one which challenges the universe view. In particular, I shall argue that the continuum hypothesis is settled on the multiverse view by our extensive knowledge about how it behaves in the multiverse, and as a result it can no longer be settled in the manner formerly hoped for.

Some of this material arises in my recent articles: