J. D. Hamkins and B. Yao, “Reflection in second-order set theory with abundant urelements bi-interprets a supercompact cardinal,” Mathematics arXiv, 2022. [Bibtex]

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Abstract. After reviewing various natural bi-interpretations in urelement set theory, including second-order set theories with urelements, we explore the strength of second-order reflection in these contexts. Ultimately, we prove, second-order reflection with the abundant atom axiom is bi-interpretable and hence also equiconsistent with the existence of a supercompact cardinal. The proof relies on a reflection characterization of supercompactness, namely, a cardinal $\kappa$ is supercompact if and only if every $\Pi^1_1$ sentence true in a structure $M$ (of any size) containing $\kappa$ in a language of size less than $\kappa$ is also true in a substructure $m\prec M$ of size less than $\kappa$ with $m\cap\kappa\in\kappa$.

Abstract. I consider the natural infinitary variations of the games Wordle and Mastermind, as well as their game-theoretic variations Absurdle and Madstermind, considering these games with infinitely long words and infinite color sequences and allowing transfinite game play. For each game, a secret codeword is hidden, which the codebreaker attempts to discover by making a series of guesses and receiving feedback as to their accuracy. In Wordle with words of any size from a finite alphabet of $n$ letters, including infinite words or even uncountable words, the codebreaker can nevertheless always win in $n$ steps. Meanwhile, the mastermind number 𝕞, defined as the smallest winning set of guesses in infinite Mastermind for sequences of length $\omega$ over a countable set of colors without duplication, is uncountable, but the exact value turns out to be independent of ZFC, for it is provably equal to the eventually different number $\frak{d}({\neq^*})$, which is the same as the covering number of the meager ideal $\text{cov}(\mathcal{M})$. I thus place all the various mastermind numbers, defined for the natural variations of the game, into the hierarchy of cardinal characteristics of the continuum.

Abstract. We introduce the game of infinite Hex, extending the familiar finite game to natural play on the infinite hexagonal lattice. Whereas the finite game is a win for the first player, we prove in contrast that infinite Hex is a draw—both players have drawing strategies. Meanwhile, the transfinite game-value phenomenon, now abundantly exhibited in infinite chess and infinite draughts, regrettably does not arise in infinite Hex; only finite game values occur. Indeed, every game-valued position in infinite Hex is intrinsically local, meaning that winning play depends only on a fixed finite region of the board. This latter fact is proved under very general hypotheses, establishing the conclusion for all simple stone-placing games.

A joint paper with Davide Leonessi, in which we prove that every countable ordinal arises as the game value of a position in infinite draughts, and this result is optimal for games having countably many options at each move. In short, the omega one of infinite draughts is true omega one.

J. D. Hamkins and D. Leonessi, “Transfinite game values in infinite draughts,” Mathematics arXiv, 2021. [Bibtex]

@ARTICLE{HamkinsLeonessi:Transfinite-game-values-in-infinite-draughts,
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title = {Transfinite game values in infinite draughts},
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Abstract. Infinite draughts, or checkers, is played just like the finite game, but on an infinite checkerboard extending without bound in all four directions. We prove that every countable ordinal arises as the game value of a position in infinite draughts. Thus, there are positions from which Red has a winning strategy enabling her to win always in finitely many moves, but the length of play can be completely controlled by Black in a manner as though counting down from a given countable ordinal.

Abstract. We show that there is an arithmetical formula $\varphi$ such that ZF proves that $\varphi$ is independent of PA and yet, unlike other arithmetical independent statements, the truth value of $\varphi$ cannot at present be established in ZF or in any other trusted metatheory. In fact we can choose an example of such a formula $\varphi$ such that ZF proves that $\varphi$ is equivalent to the twin prime conjecture. We conclude with a discussion of notion of trustworthy theory and a sharper version of the result.

In this insightful and remarkable work, Professor Novaes defends and explores at length the philosophical thesis that mathematical proof and deduction generally has a fundamentally dialogical nature, proceeding in a back-and-forth dialogue between two semi-adversarial but collaborative actors, the Prover and the Skeptic, who together aim to find mathematical insight. This view of proof-as-dialogue, she argues, carries explanatory power for the philosophy of mathematical practice, explaining diverse aspects of proof-writing, refereeing, and more, including the multifaceted roles of proof, including proof as verification, proof as certification, proof for communication and persuasion, proof as explanation, and proof as a driver of mathematical innovation.

In extensive, refined scholarly work, Novaes explores the historical and intellectual roots of the dialogical perspective on deduction, tracing the idea from ancient times through medieval philosophy and into the present day, including case studies of current mathematical developments, such as Mochizuki’s claimed proof of the abc conjecture, as well as recent psychological experiments on the role of group reasoning in resolving certain well-known disappointing failures of rationality, such as in the Wason card experiment. Truly fascinating.

On the basis of her work, I have nominated Novaes for the Lakatos Award (given annually “for an outstanding contribution to the philosophy of science, widely interpreted, in the form of a book published in English during the current year or the previous five years”). Lakatos himself, of course, was a friend of dialogical mathematics—his famous Proofs and Refutations proceeds after all in a dialogue between mathematicians of different philosophical outlooks. Novaes engages with Lakatos’s work explicitly, pointing out the obvious parallels, but also highlighting important differences between her Prover/Skeptic dialogical account and the kind of proof dialogues appearing in Proofs and Refutations. In light of this connection with Lakatos, I would find it especially fitting for Novaes to win the Lakatos Award.

This is currently a draft version only of my article-in-progress on the topic of linearity in the hierarchy of consistency strength, especially with large cardinals. Comments are very welcome, since I am still writing the article. Please kindly send me comments by email or just post here.

This article will be the basis of the Weeks 7 & 8 discussion in the Graduate Philosophy of Logic seminar I am currently running with Volker Halbach at Oxford in Hilary term 2021.

I present instances of nonlinearity and illfoundedness in the hierarchy of large cardinal consistency strength—as natural or as nearly natural as I can make them—and consider philosophical aspects of the question of naturality with regard to this phenomenon.

It is a mystery often mentioned in the foundations of mathematics, a fundamental phenomenon to be explained, that our best and strongest mathematical theories seem to be linearly ordered and indeed well-ordered by consistency strength. Given any two of the familiar large cardinal hypotheses, for example, generally one of them will prove the consistency of the other.

Why should it be linear? Why should the large cardinal notions line up like this, when they often arise from completely different mathematical matters? Measurable cardinals arise from set-theoretic issues in measure theory; Ramsey cardinals generalize ideas in graph coloring combinatorics; compact cardinals arise with compactness properties of infinitary logic. Why should these disparate considerations lead to principles that are linearly related by direct implication and consistency strength?

The phenomenon is viewed by many in the philosophy of mathematics as significant in our quest for mathematical truth. In light of Gödel incompleteness, after all, we must eternally seek to strengthen even our best and strongest theories. Is the linear hierarchy of consistency strength directing us along the elusive path, the “one road upward” as John Steel describes it, toward the final, ultimate mathematical truth? That is the tantalizing possibility.

Meanwhile, we do know as a purely formal matter that the hierarchy of consistency strength is not actually well-ordered—it is ill-founded, densely ordered, and nonlinear. The statements usually used to illustrate these features, however, are weird self-referential assertions constructed in the Gödelian manner via the fixed-point lemma—logic-game trickery, often dismissed as unnatural.

Many set theorists claim that amongst the natural assertions, consistency strengths remain linearly ordered and indeed well ordered. H. Friedman refers to “the apparent comparability of naturally occurring logical strengths as one of the great mysteries of [the foundations of mathematics].” Andrés Caicedo says,

It is a remarkable empirical phenomenon that we indeed have comparability for natural theories. We expect this to always be the case, and a significant amount of work in inner model theory is guided by this belief.

Stephen G. Simpson writes:

It is striking that a great many foundational theories are linearly ordered by <. Of course it is possible to construct pairs of artificial theories which are incomparable under <. However, this is not the case for the “natural” or non-artificial theories which are usually regarded as significant in the foundations of mathematics. The problem of explaining this observed regularity is a challenge for future foundational research.

John Steel writes “The large cardinal hypotheses [the ones we know] are themselves wellordered by consistency strength,” and he formulates what he calls the “vague conjecture” asserting that

If T is a natural extension of ZFC, then there is an extension H axiomatized by large cardinal hypotheses such that T ≡ Con H. Moreover, ≤ Con is a prewellorder of the natural extensions of ZFC. In particular, if T and U are natural extensions of ZFC, then either T ≤ Con U or U ≤ Con T.

Peter Koellner writes

Remarkably, it turns out that when one restricts to those theories that “arise in nature” the interpretability ordering is quite simple: There are no descending chains and there are no incomparable elements—the interpretability ordering on theories that “arise in nature” is a wellordering.

Let me refer to this position as the natural linearity position, the assertion that all natural assertions of mathematics are linearly ordered by consistency strength. The strong form of the position, asserted by some of those whom I have cited above, asserts that the natural assertions of mathematics are indeed well-ordered by consistency strength. By all accounts, this view appears to be widely held in large cardinal set theory and the philosophy of set theory.

Despite the popularity of this position, I should like in this article to explore the contrary view and directly to challenge the natural linearity position.

Main Question. Can we find natural instances of nonlinearity and illfoundedness in the hierarchy of consistency strength?

I shall try my best.

You have to download the article to see my candidates for natural instances of nonlinearity in the hierarchy of large cardinal consistency strength, but I can tease you a little by mentioning that there are various cautious enumerations of the ZFC axioms which actually succeed in enumerating all the ZFC axioms, but with a strictly weaker consistency strength than the usual (incautious) enumeration. And similarly there are various cautious versions of the large cardinal hypothesis, which are natural, but also incomparable in consistency strength.

(Please note that it was Uri Andrews, rather than Uri Abraham, who settled question 16 with the result of theorem 17. I have corrected this from an earlier draft.)

J. D. Hamkins, Proof and the Art of Mathematics: Examples and Extensions, MIT Press, 2021. [Bibtex]

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The best way to learn mathematics is to dive in and do it. Don’t just listen passively to a lecture or read a book—you have got to take hold of the mathematical ideas yourself! Mount your own mathematical analysis. Formulate your own mathematical assertions. Consider your own mathematical examples. I recommend play—adopt an attitude of playful curiosity about mathematical ideas; grasp new concepts by exploring them in particular cases; try them out; understand how the mathematical constructions from your proofs manifest in your examples; explore all facets, going beyond whatever had been expected. You will find vast new lands of imagination. Let one example generalize to a whole class of examples; have favorite examples. Ask questions about the examples or about the mathematical idea you are investigating. Formulate conjectures and test them with your examples. Try to prove the conjectures—when you succeed, you will have proved a theorem. The essential mathematical activity is to make clear claims and provide sound reasons for them. Express your mathematical ideas to others, and practice the skill of stating matters well, succinctly, with accuracy and precision. Don’t be satisfied with your initial account, even when it is sound, but seek to improve it. Find alternative arguments, even when you already have a solid proof. In this way, you will come to a deeper understanding. Test the statements of others; ask for further explanation. Look into the corner cases of your results to probe the veracity of your claims. Set yourself the challenge either to prove or to refute a given statement. Aim to produce clear and correct mathematical arguments that logically establish their conclusions, with whatever insight and elegance you can muster.

This book is offered as a companion volume to my book Proof and the Art of Mathematics, which I have described as a mathematical coming-of-age book for students learning how to write mathematical proofs.

Spanning diverse topics from number theory and graph theory to game theory and real analysis, Proof and the Art shows how to prove a mathematical theorem, with advice and tips for sound mathematical habits and practice, as well as occasional reflective philosophical discussions about what it means to undertake mathematical proof. In Proof and the Art, I offer a few hundred mathematical exercises, challenges to the reader to prove a given mathematical statement, each a small puzzle to figure out; the intention is for students to develop their mathematical skills with these challenges of mathematical reasoning and proof.

Here in this companion volume, I provide fully worked-out solutions to all of the odd-numbered exercises, as well as a few of the even-numbered exercises. In many cases, the solutions here explore beyond the exercise question itself to natural extensions of the ideas. My attitude is that, once you have solved a problem, why not push the ideas harder to see what further you can prove with them? These solutions are examples of how one might write a mathematical proof. I hope that you will learn from them; let us go through them together. The mathematical development of this text follows the main book, with the same chapter topics in the same order, and all theorem and exercise numbers in this text refer to the corresponding statements of the main text.

Philosophical conundrums pervade mathematics, from fundamental questions of mathematical ontology—What is a number? What is infinity?—to questions about the relations among truth, proof, and meaning. What is the role of figures in geometric argument? Do mathematical objects exist that we cannot construct? Can every mathematical question be solved in principle by computation? Is every truth of mathematics true for a reason? Can every mathematical truth be proved?

This book is an introduction to the philosophy of mathematics, in which we shall consider all these questions and more. I come to the subject from mathematics, and I have strived in this book for what I hope will be a fresh approach to the philosophy of mathematics—one grounded in mathematics, motivated by mathematical inquiry or mathematical practice. I have strived to treat philosophical issues as they arise organically in mathematics. Therefore, I have organized the book by mathematical themes, such as number, infinity, geometry, and computability, and I have included some mathematical arguments and elementary proofs when they bring philosophical issues to light.

This is joint work with Wojciech Aleksander Wołoszyn, who is about to begin as a DPhil student with me in mathematics here in Oxford. We began and undertook this work over the past year, while he was a visitor in Oxford under the Recognized Student program.

J. D. Hamkins and W. A. Wołoszyn, “Modal model theory,” Mathematics ArXiv, 2020. [Bibtex]

@ARTICLE{HamkinsWoloszyn:Modal-model-theory,
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Abstract. We introduce the subject of modal model theory, where one studies a mathematical structure within a class of similar structures under an extension concept that gives rise to mathematically natural notions of possibility and necessity. A statement $\varphi$ is possible in a structure (written $\Diamond\varphi$) if $\varphi$ is true in some extension of that structure, and $\varphi$ is necessary (written $\Box\varphi$) if it is true in all extensions of the structure. A principal case for us will be the class $\text{Mod}(T)$ of all models of a given theory $T$—all graphs, all groups, all fields, or what have you—considered under the substructure relation. In this article, we aim to develop the resulting modal model theory. The class of all graphs is a particularly insightful case illustrating the remarkable power of the modal vocabulary, for the modal language of graph theory can express connectedness, $k$-colorability, finiteness, countability, size continuum, size $\aleph_1$, $\aleph_2$, $\aleph_\omega$, $\beth_\omega$, first $\beth$-fixed point, first $\beth$-hyper-fixed-point and much more. A graph obeys the maximality principle $\Diamond\Box\varphi(a)\to\varphi(a)$ with parameters if and only if it satisfies the theory of the countable random graph, and it satisfies the maximality principle for sentences if and only if it is universal for finite graphs.

Follow through the arXiv for a pdf of the article.

J. D. Hamkins and W. A. Wołoszyn, “Modal model theory,” Mathematics ArXiv, 2020. [Bibtex]

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J. D. Hamkins and R. Solberg, “Categorical large cardinals and the tension between categoricity and set-theoretic reflection,” Mathematics ArXiv, 2020. [Bibtex]

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Abstract. Inspired by Zermelo’s quasi-categoricity result characterizing the models of second-order Zermelo-Fraenkel set theory $\text{ZFC}_2$, we investigate when those models are fully categorical, characterized by the addition to $\text{ZFC}_2$ either of a first-order sentence, a first-order theory, a second-order sentence or a second-order theory. The heights of these models, we define, are the categorical large cardinals. We subsequently consider various philosophical aspects of categoricity for structuralism and realism, including the tension between categoricity and set-theoretic reflection, and we present (and criticize) a categorical characterization of the set-theoretic universe $\langle V,\in\rangle$ in second-order logic.

Categorical accounts of various mathematical structures lie at the very core of structuralist mathematical practice, enabling mathematicians to refer to specific mathematical structures, not by having carefully to prepare and point at specially constructed instances—preserved like the one-meter iron bar locked in a case in Paris—but instead merely by mentioning features that uniquely characterize the structure up to isomorphism.

The natural numbers $\langle \mathbb{N},0,S\rangle$, for example, are uniquely characterized by the Dedekind axioms, which assert that $0$ is not a successor, that the successor function $S$ is one-to-one, and that every set containing $0$ and closed under successor contains every number. We know what we mean by the natural numbers—they have a definite realness—because we can describe features that completely determine the natural number structure. The real numbers $\langle\mathbb{R},+,\cdot,0,1\rangle$ similarly are characterized up to isomorphism as the unique complete ordered field. The complex numbers $\langle\mathbb{C},+,\cdot\rangle$ form the unique algebraically closed field of characteristic $0$ and size continuum, or alternatively, the unique algebraic closure of the real numbers. In fact all our fundamental mathematical structures enjoy such categorical characterizations, where a theory is categorical if it identifies a unique mathematical structure up to isomorphism—any two models of the theory are isomorphic. In light of the Löwenheim-Skolem theorem, which prevents categoricity for infinite structures in first-order logic, these categorical theories are generally made in second-order logic.

In set theory, Zermelo characterized the models of second-order Zermelo-Fraenkel set theory $\text{ZFC}_2$ in his famous quasi-categoricity result:

Theorem. (Zermelo, 1930) The models of $\text{ZFC}_2$ are precisely those isomorphic to a rank-initial segment $\langle V_\kappa,\in\rangle$ of the cumulative set-theoretic universe $V$ cut off at an inaccessible cardinal $\kappa$.

It follows that for any two models of $\text{ZFC}_2$, one of them is isomorphic to an initial segment of the other. These set-theoretic models $V_\kappa$ have now come to be known as Zermelo-Grothendieck universes, in light of Grothendieck’s use of them in category theory (a rediscovery several decades after Zermelo); they feature in the universe axiom, which asserts that every set is an element of some such $V_\kappa$, or equivalently, that there are unboundedly many inaccessible cardinals.

In this article, we seek to investigate the extent to which Zermelo’s quasi-categoricity analysis can rise fully to the level of categoricity, in light of the observation that many of the $V_\kappa$ universes are categorically characterized by their sentences or theories.

Question. Which models of $\text{ZFC}_2$ satisfy fully categorical theories?

If $\kappa$ is the smallest inaccessible cardinal, for example, then up to isomorphism $V_\kappa$ is the unique model of $\text{ZFC}_2$ satisfying the first-order sentence “there are no inaccessible cardinals.” The least inaccessible cardinal is therefore an instance of what we call a first-order sententially categorical cardinal. Similar ideas apply to the next inaccessible cardinal, and the next, and so on for quite a long way. Many of the inaccessible universes thus satisfy categorical theories extending $\text{ZFC}_2$ by a sentence or theory, either in first or second order, and we should like to investigate these categorical extensions of $\text{ZFC}_2$.

In addition, we shall discuss the philosophical relevance of categoricity and point particularly to the philosophical problem posed by the tension between the widespread support for categoricity in our fundamental mathematical structures with set-theoretic ideas on reflection principles, which are at heart anti-categorical.

Our main theme concerns these notions of categoricity:

Main Definition.

A cardinal $\kappa$ is first-order sententially categorical, if there is a first-order sentence $\sigma$ in the language of set theory, such that $V_\kappa$ is categorically characterized by $\text{ZFC}_2+\sigma$.

A cardinal $\kappa$ is first-order theory categorical, if there is a first-order theory $T$ in the language of set theory, such that $V_\kappa$ is categorically characterized by $\text{ZFC}_2+T$.

A cardinal $\kappa$ is second-order sententially categorical, if there is a second-order sentence $\sigma$ in the language of set theory, such that $V_\kappa$ is categorically characterized by $\text{ZFC}_2+\sigma$.

A cardinal $\kappa$ is second-order theory categorical, if there is a second-order theory $T$ in the language of set theory, such that $V_\kappa$ is categorically characterized by $\text{ZFC}_2+T$.

Follow through to the arxiv for the pdf to read more:

J. D. Hamkins and R. Solberg, “Categorical large cardinals and the tension between categoricity and set-theoretic reflection,” Mathematics ArXiv, 2020. [Bibtex]

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R. Cutolo and J. D. Hamkins, “Choiceless large cardinals and set-theoretic potentialism,” Mathematics ArXiv, p. 10 pages, 2020. [Bibtex]

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title = {Choiceless large cardinals and set-theoretic potentialism},
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}

Abstract. We define a potentialist system of ZF-structures, that is, a collection of possible worlds in the language of ZF connected by a binary accessibility relation, achieving a potentialist account of the full background set-theoretic universe $V$. The definition involves Berkeley cardinals, the strongest known large cardinal axioms, inconsistent with the Axiom of Choice. In fact, as background theory we assume just ZF. It turns out that the propositional modal assertions which are valid at every world of our system are exactly those in the modal theory S4.2. Moreover, we characterize the worlds satisfying the potentialist maximality principle, and thus the modal theory S5, both for assertions in the language of ZF and for assertions in the full potentialist language.

J. D. Hamkins, R. Miller, and K. J. Williams, “Forcing as a computational process,” Mathematics ArXiv, 2020. [Bibtex]

@ARTICLE{HamkinsMillerWilliams:Forcing-as-a-computational-process,
author = {Joel David Hamkins and Russell Miller and Kameryn J. Williams},
title = {Forcing as a computational process},
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Abstract. We investigate how set-theoretic forcing can be seen as a computational process on the models of set theory. Given an oracle for information about a model of set theory $\langle M,\in^M\rangle$, we explain senses in which one may compute $M$-generic filters $G\subseteq\mathbb{P}\in M$ and the corresponding forcing extensions $M[G]$. Specifically, from the atomic diagram one may compute $G$, from the $\Delta_0$-diagram one may compute $M[G]$ and its $\Delta_0$-diagram, and from the elementary diagram one may compute the elementary diagram of $M[G]$. We also examine the information necessary to make the process functorial, and conclude that in the general case, no such computational process will be functorial. For any such process, it will always be possible to have different isomorphic presentations of a model of set theory $M$ that lead to different non-isomorphic forcing extensions $M[G]$. Indeed, there is no Borel function providing generic filters that is functorial in this sense.

Appearing in The Martlet, Issue 11, Spring 2020, University College, Oxford.

My view of Univ

“I came to Oxford last year, leaving an established career in New York, and found a welcoming new home, an ideal environment for research and intellectual stimulation. Through the big wooden door to the Main Quad, I enter the College each day to find fascinating new conversations with historians, classicists, geologists, political scientists, medical scientists, mathematicians, philosophers, artists and even Egyptologists. What a life! I take on Oxford like a fine wool coat, enveloping me, suiting me perfectly.”

Professor Joel David Hamkins, Sir Peter Strawson Fellow in Philosophy at Univ and Professor of Logic at Oxford

A coming-of-age book for mathematicians aspiring to write proofs.

J. D. Hamkins, Proof and the Art of Mathematics, MIT Press, 2020. [Bibtex]

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author = {Joel David Hamkins},
title = {Proof and the {Art} of {Mathematics}},
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This is a mathematical coming-of-age book, for students on the cusp, who are maturing into mathematicians, aspiring to communicate mathematical truths to other mathematicians in the currency of mathematics, which is: proof. This is a book for students who are learning—perhaps for the first time in a serious way—how to write a mathematical proof. I hope to show how a mathematician makes an argument establishing a mathematical truth.

Proofs tell us not only that a mathematical statement is true, but also why it is true, and they communicate this truth. The best proofs give us insight into the nature of mathematical reality. They lead us to those sublime yet elusive Aha! moments, a joyous experience for any mathematician, occurring when a previously opaque, confounding issue becomes transparent and our mathematical gaze suddenly penetrates completely through it, grasping it all in one take. So let us learn together how to write proofs well, producing clear and correct mathematical arguments that logically establish their conclusions, with whatever insight and elegance we can muster. We shall do so in the context of the diverse mathematical topics that I have gathered together here in this book for the purpose.