The rearrangement number, CUNY set theory seminar, November 2015

This will be a talk for the CUNY Set Theory Seminar on November 6, 2015.

The Riemann rearrangement theorem states that a convergent real series $\sum_n a_n$ is absolutely convergent if and only if the value of the sum is invariant under all rearrangements $\sum_n a_{p(n)}$ by any permutation $p$ on the natural numbers; furthermore, if the series is merely conditionally convergent, then one may find rearrangements for which the new sum $\sum_n a_{p(n)}$ has any desired (extended) real value or which becomes non-convergent.  In recent joint work with Andreas Blass, Will Brian, myself, Michael Hardy and Paul Larson, based on an exchange in reply to a Hardy’s MathOverflow question on the topic, we investigate the minimal size of a family of permutations that can be used in this manner to test an arbitrary convergent series for absolute convergence.

Specifically, we define the rearrangement number $\newcommand\rr{\mathfrak{rr}}\rr$ (“double-r”), a new cardinal characteristic of the continuum, to be the smallest cardinality of a set $P$ of permutations of the natural numbers, such that if a convergent real series $\sum_n a_n$ remains convergent and with the same sum after all rearrangements $\sum_n a_{p(n)}$ by a permutation $p\in P$, then it is absolutely convergent. The corresponding rearrangement number for sums, denoted $\newcommand\rrsum{\rr_{\scriptscriptstyle\Sigma}}
\rrsum$, is the smallest cardinality of a family $P$ of permutations, such that if a series $\sum_n a_n$ is conditionally convergent, then there is a rearrangement $\sum_n a_{p(n)}$, by some permutation $p \in P$, which converges to a different sum. We investigate the basic properties of these numbers, and explore their relations with other cardinal characteristics of the continuum. Our main results are that $\mathfrak{b}\leq\rr\leq\mathop{\bf non}(\mathcal{M})$, that $\mathfrak{d}\leq \rrsum$, and that $\mathfrak{b}<\rr$ is relatively consistent.

MathOverflow question | CUNY Set Theory Seminar

Open determinacy for games on the ordinals is stronger than ZFC, CUNY Logic Workshop, October 2015

This will be a talk for the CUNY Logic Workshop on October 2, 2015.

Abstract. The principle of open determinacy for class games — two-player games of perfect information with plays of length $\omega$, where the moves are chosen from a possibly proper class, such as games on the ordinals — is not provable in Zermelo-Fraenkel set theory ZFC or Gödel-Bernays set theory GBC, if these theories are consistent, because provably in ZFC there is a definable open proper class game with no definable winning strategy. In fact, the principle of open determinacy and even merely clopen determinacy for class games implies Con(ZFC) and iterated instances Con(Con(ZFC)) and more, because it implies that there is a satisfaction class for first-order truth, and indeed a transfinite tower of truth predicates $\text{Tr}_\alpha$ for iterated truth-about-truth, relative to any class parameter. This is perhaps explained, in light of the Tarskian recursive definition of truth, by the more general fact that the principle of clopen determinacy is exactly equivalent over GBC to the principle of elementary transfinite recursion ETR over well-founded class relations. Meanwhile, the principle of open determinacy for class games is provable in the stronger theory GBC+$\Pi^1_1$-comprehension, a proper fragment of Kelley-Morse set theory KM.

This is joint work with Victoria Gitman, with the helpful participation of Thomas Johnstone.

Related article and posts:

 

 

Upward closure in the generic multiverse of a countable model of set theory, RIMS 2015, Kyoto, Japan

Philosophers Walk Kyoto Japan (summer)This will be a talk for the conference Recent Developments in Axiomatic Set Theory at the Research Institute for Mathematical Sciences (RIMS) in Kyoto, Japan, September 16-18, 2015.

Abstract. Consider a countable model of set theory amongst its forcing extensions, the ground models of those extensions, the extensions of those models and so on, closing under the operations of forcing extension and ground model.  This collection is known as the generic multiverse of the original model.  I shall present a number of upward-oriented closure results in this context. For example, for a long-known negative result, it is a fun exercise to construct forcing extensions $M[c]$ and $M[d]$ of a given countable model of set theory $M$, each by adding an $M$-generic Cohen real, which cannot be amalgamated, in the sense that there is no common extension model $N$ that contains both $M[c]$ and $M[d]$ and has the same ordinals as $M$. On the positive side, however, any increasing sequence of extensions $M[G_0]\subset M[G_1]\subset M[G_2]\subset\cdots$, by forcing of uniformly bounded size in $M$, has an upper bound in a single forcing extension $M[G]$. (Note that one cannot generally have the sequence $\langle G_n\mid n<\omega\rangle$ in $M[G]$, so a naive approach to this will fail.)  I shall discuss these and related results, many of which appear in the “brief upward glance” section of my recent paper:  G. Fuchs, J. D. Hamkins and J. Reitz, Set-theoretic geology.


Universality and embeddability amongst the models of set theory, CTFM 2015, Tokyo, Japan

Tokyo Institute of TechnologyThis will be a talk for the Computability Theory and Foundations of Mathematics conference at the Tokyo Institute of Technology, September 7-11, 2015.  The conference is held in celebration of Professor Kazuyuki Tanaka’s 60th birthday.

Abstract. Recent results on the embeddability phenomenon and universality amongst the models of set theory are an appealing blend of ideas from set theory, model theory and computability theory. Central questions remain open.

A surprisingly vigorous embeddability phenomenon has recently been uncovered amongst the countable models of set theory. It turns out, for instance, that among these models embeddability is linear: for any two countable models of set theory, one of them embeds into the other. Indeed, one countable model of set theory $M$ embeds into another $N$ just in case the ordinals of $M$ order-embed into the ordinals of $N$. This leads to many surprising instances of embeddability: every forcing extension of a countable model of set theory, for example, embeds into its ground model, and every countable model of set theory, including every well-founded model, embeds into its own constructible universe.

V to LAlthough the embedding concept here is the usual model-theoretic embedding concept for relational structures, namely, a map $j:M\to N$ for which $x\in^M y$ if and only if $j(x)\in^N j(y)$, it is a weaker embedding concept than is usually considered in set theory, where embeddings are often elementary and typically at least $\Delta_0$-elementary. Indeed, the embeddability result is surprising precisely because we can easily prove that in many of these instances, there can be no $\Delta_0$-elementary embedding.

The proof of the embedding theorem makes use of universality ideas in digraph combinatorics, including an acyclic version of the countable random digraph, the countable random $\mathbb{Q}$-graded digraph, and higher analogues arising as uncountable Fraïssé limits, leading to the hypnagogic digraph, a universal homogeneous graded acyclic class digraph, closely connected with the surreal numbers. Thus, the methods are a blend of ideas from set theory, model theory and computability theory.

Results from Incomparable $\omega_1$-like models of set theory show that the embedding phenomenon does not generally extend to uncountable models. Current joint work of myself, Aspero, Hayut, Magidor and Woodin is concerned with questions on the extent to which the embeddings arising in the embedding theorem can exist as classes inside the models in question. Since the embeddings of the theorem are constructed externally to the model, by means of a back-and-forth-style construction, there is little reason to expect, for example, that the resulting embedding $j:M\to L^M$ should be a class in $M$. Yet, it has not yet known how to refute in ZFC the existence of a class embedding $j:V\to L$ when $V\neq L$. However, many partial results are known. For example, if the GCH fails at an uncountable cardinal, if $0^\sharp$ exists, or if the universe is a nontrivial forcing extension of some ground model, then there is no embedding $j:V\to L$. Meanwhile, it is consistent that there are non-constructible reals, yet $\langle P(\omega),\in\rangle$ embeds into $\langle P(\omega)^L,\in\rangle$.

CFTM 2015 extended abstract | Article | CFTM | Slides

The hypnagogic digraph, with applications to embeddings of the set-theoretic universe, JMM Special Session on Surreal Numbers, Seattle, January 2016

JMM 2016 SeattleThis will be an invited talk for the AMS-ASL special session on Surreal Numbers at the 2016 Joint Mathematics Meetings in Seattle, Washington, January 6-9, 2016.

Abstract. The hypnagogic digraph, a proper-class analogue of the countable random $\mathbb{Q}$-graded digraph, is a surreal-numbers-graded acyclic digraph exhibiting the set-pattern property (a form of existential-closure), making it set-homogeneous and universal for all class acyclic digraphs. A natural copy of this canonical structure arises during the course of the usual construction of the surreal number line, using as vertices the surreal-number numerals $\{\ A \mid B\ \}$.  I shall explain the construction and elementary theory of the hypnagogic digraph and describe recent uses of it in connection with embeddings of the set-theoretic universe, such as in the proof that the countable models of set theory are linearly pre-ordered by embeddability.

Slides | schedule | related article | surreal numbers (Wikipedia)

The absolute truth about non-absolute truth, JAF – Weak Arithmetics Days, New York, July 2015

This will be a talk for the Journées sur les Arithmétiques Faibles – Weak Arithmetics Days conference, held in New York at the CUNY Graduate Center, July 7 – 9, 2015.

Abstract. I will discuss several fun theorems and folklore results illustrating that the satisfaction relation of first-order logic is less absolute than one might have expected. Two models of set theory, for example, can have the same natural numbers $\langle\mathbb{N},+,\cdot,0,1,<\rangle$, yet disagree on their theories of arithmetic truth; two models of set theory can have the same natural numbers and a computable linear order in common, yet disagree on whether it is a well-order and hence disagree about $\omega_1^{CK}$; two models of set theory can have the same natural numbers and the same reals, yet disagree on projective truth; two models of set theory can have a rank initial segment of the universe $\langle V_\delta,{\in}\rangle$ in common, yet disagree about whether it is a model of ZFC. These theorems and others can be proved with elementary classical model-theoretic methods. Indefinite arithmetic truthOn the basis of these observations, Ruizhi Yang (Fudan University, Shanghai) and I have argued that the definiteness of the theory of truth for a structure, even in the case of arithmetic, cannot be seen as arising solely from the definiteness of the structure itself in which that truth resides, but rather is a higher-order ontological commitment.

Slides |  Main article: Satisfaction is not absolute

The weakly compact embedding property, Apter-Gitik celebration, CMU 2015

This will be a talk at the Conference in honor of Arthur W. Apter and Moti Gitik at Carnegie Mellon University, May 30-31, 2015.  I am pleased to be a part of this conference in honor of the 60th birthdays of two mathematicians whom I admire very much.

Moti GitikArthur W. Apter

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Abstract. The weakly compact embedding property for a cardinal $\kappa$ is the assertion that for every transitive set $M$ of size $\kappa$ with $\kappa\in M$, there is a transitive set $N$ and an elementary embedding $j:M\to N$ with critical point $\kappa$. When $\kappa$ is inaccessible, this property is one of many equivalent characterizations of $\kappa$ being weakly compact, along with the weakly compact extension property, the tree property, the weakly compact filter property and many others. When $\kappa$ is not inaccessible, however, these various properties are no longer equivalent to each other, and it is interesting to sort out the relations between them. In particular, I shall consider the embedding property and these other properties in the case when $\kappa$ is not necessarily inaccessible, including interesting instances of the embedding property at cardinals below the continuum, with relations to cardinal characteristics of the continuum.

This is joint work with Brent Cody, Sean Cox, myself and Thomas Johnstone.

Slides | Article | Conference web site

Carnegie Mellon University, College of Fine Arts

The continuum hypothesis and other set-theoretic ideas for non-set-theorists, CUNY Einstein Chair Seminar, April, 2015

At Dennis Sullivan’s request, I shall speak on set-theoretic topics, particularly the continuum hypothesis, for the Einstein Chair Mathematics Seminar at the CUNY Graduate Center, April 27, 2015, in two parts:

  • An introductory background talk at 11 am, Room GC 6417
  • The main talk at 2 – 4 pm, Room GC 6417

I look forward to what I hope will be an interesting and fruitful interaction. There will be coffee/tea and lunch between the two parts.

Abstract. I shall present several set-theoretic ideas for a non-set-theoretic mathematical audience, focusing particularly on the continuum hypothesis and related issues.

At the introductory background talk, in the morning (11 am), I shall discuss and prove the Cantor-Bendixson theorem, which asserts that every closed set of reals is the union of a countable set and a perfect set (a closed set with no isolated points), and explain how it led to Cantor’s development of the ordinal numbers and how it establishes that the continuum hypothesis holds for closed sets of reals. We’ll see that there are closed sets of arbitrarily large countable Cantor-Bendixson rank. We’ll talk about the ordinals, about $\omega_1$, the long line, and, time permitting, we’ll discuss Suslin’s hypothesis.

At the main talk, in the afternoon (2 pm), I’ll begin with a discussion of the continuum hypothesis, including an explanation of the history and logical status of this axiom with respect to the other axioms of set theory, and establish the connection between the continuum hypothesis and Freiling’s axiom of symmetry. I’ll explain the axiom of determinacy and some of its applications and its rich logical situation, connected with large cardinals. I’ll briefly mention the themes and goals of the subjects of cardinal characteristics of the continuum and of Borel equivalence relation theory.  If time permits, I’d like to explain some fun geometric decompositions of space that proceed in a transfinite recursion using the axiom of choice, mentioning the open questions concerning whether there can be such decompositions that are Borel.

Dennis has requested that at some point the discussion turn to the role of set theory in the foundation for mathematics, compared for example to that of category theory, and I would look forward to that. I would be prepared also to discuss the Feferman theory in comparison to Grothendieck’s axiom of universes, and other issues relating set theory to category theory.

I know that you know that I know that you know…., CSI Undergraduate Conference on Research, Scholarship, and Performance, April 2015

UGCI shall give the plenary talk at the CSI Undergraduate Conference on Research, Scholarship, and Performance, April 30, 2015. My presentation will be followed by a musical performance.

This is a conference where undergraduate students show off their various scholarly and creative research projects, spanning all disciplines.

In my talk, I’ll present various logic puzzles that involve reasoning about knowledge, including knowledge of knowledge or knowledge of the lack of knowledge.  I’ll discuss the solution of Cheryl’s birthday problem, recently in the news, as well as other classic puzzles and some new ones.

It will be fun!

Slides

Embeddings of the universe into the constructible universe, current state of knowledge, CUNY Set Theory Seminar, March 2015

This will be a talk for the CUNY Set Theory Seminar, March 6, 2015.

I shall describe the current state of knowledge concerning the question of whether there can be an embedding of the set-theoretic universe into the constructible universe.

V to L

Question.(Hamkins) Can there be an embedding $j:V\to L$ of the set-theoretic universe $V$ into the constructible universe $L$, when $V\neq L$?

The notion of embedding here is merely that $$x\in y\iff j(x)\in j(y),$$ and such a map need not be elementary nor even $\Delta_0$-elementary. It is not difficult to see that there can generally be no $\Delta_0$-elementary embedding $j:V\to L$, when $V\neq L$.

Nevertheless, the question arises very naturally in the context of my previous work on the embeddability phenomenon, Every countable model of set theory embeds into its own constructible universe, where the title theorem is the following.

Theorem.(Hamkins) Every countable model of set theory $\langle M,\in^M\rangle$, including every countable transitive model of set theory, has an embedding $j:\langle M,\in^M\rangle\to\langle L^M,\in^M\rangle$ into its own constructible universe.

The methods of proof also established that the countable models of set theory are linearly pre-ordered by embeddability: given any two models, one of them embeds into the other; or equivalently, one of them is isomorphic to a submodel of the other. Indeed, one model $\langle M,\in^M\rangle$ embeds into another $\langle N,\in^N\rangle$ just in case the ordinals of the first $\text{Ord}^M$ order-embed into the ordinals of the second $\text{Ord}^N$. (And this implies the theorem above.)

In the proof of that theorem, the embeddings $j:M\to L^M$ are defined completely externally to $M$, and so it was natural to wonder to what extent such an embedding might be accessible inside $M$. And I realized that I could not generally refute the possibility that such a $j$ might even be a class in $M$.

Currently, the question remains open, but we have some partial progress, and have settled it in a number of cases, including the following, on which I’ll speak:

  • If there is an embedding $j:V\to L$, then for a proper class club of cardinals $\lambda$, we have $(2^\lambda)^V=(\lambda^+)^L$.
  • If $0^\sharp$ exists, then there is no embedding $j:V\to L$.
  • If $0^\sharp$ exists, then there is no embedding $j:V\to L$ and indeed no embedding $j:P(\omega)\to L$.
  • If there is an embedding $j:V\to L$, then the GCH holds above $\aleph_0$.
  • In the forcing extension $V[G]$ obtained by adding $\omega_1$ many Cohen reals (or more), there is no embedding $j:V[G]\to L$, and indeed, no $j:P(\omega)^{V[G]}\to V$. More generally, after adding $\kappa^+$ many Cohen subsets to $\kappa$, for any regular cardinal $\kappa$, then in $V[G]$ there is no $j:P(\kappa)\to V$.
  • If $V$ is a nontrivial set-forcing extension of an inner model $M$, then there is no embedding $j:V\to M$. Indeed, there is no embedding $j:P(\kappa^+)\to M$, if the forcing has size $\kappa$. In particular, if $V$ is a nontrivial forcing extension, then there is no embedding $j:V\to L$.
  • Every countable set $A$ has an embedding $j:A\to L$.

This is joint work of myself, W. Hugh Woodin, Menachem Magidor, with contributions also by David Aspero, Ralf Schindler and Yair Hayut.

See my related MathOverflow question: Can there be an embedding $j:V\to L$ from the set-theoretic universe $V$ to the constructible universe $L$, when $V\neq L$?

Talk Abstract

An introduction to the theory of infinite games, with examples from infinite chess, University of Connecticut, December 2014


This will be a talk for the interdisciplinary Group in Philosophical and Mathematical Logic at the University of Connecticut in Storrs, on December 5, 2014.

Value omega cubedAbstract. I shall give a general introduction to the theory of infinite games, with a focus on the theory of transfinite ordinal game values. These ordinal game values can be used to show that every open game — a game that, when won for a particular player, is won after finitely many moves — has a winning strategy for one of the players. By means of various example games, I hope to convey the extremely concrete game-theoretic meaning of these game values for various particular small infinite ordinals. Some of the examples will be drawn from infinite chess, which is chess played on a chessboard stretching infinitely without boundary in every direction, and the talk will include animations of infinite chess positions having large numbers of pieces (or infinitely many) with hundreds of pieces making coordinated attacks on the chessboard. Meanwhile, the exact value of the omega one of chess, denoted $\omega_1^{\mathfrak{Ch}_{\!\!\!\!\sim}}$, is not currently known.

Slides | Transfinite game values in infinite chess | The mate-in-n problem of infinite chess is decidable

Does definiteness-of-truth follow from definiteness-of-objects? NY Philosophical Logic Group, NYU, November 2014

This will be a talk for the New York Philosophical Logic Group, November 10, 2014, 5-7pm, at the NYU Philosophy Department, 5 Washington Place, Room 302.

Indefinite arithmetic truth

Abstract. This talk — a mix of mathematics and philosophy — concerns the extent to which we may infer definiteness of truth in a mathematical context from definiteness of the underlying objects and structure of that context. The philosophical analysis is based in part on the mathematical observation that the satisfaction relation for model-theoretic truth is less absolute than often supposed.  Specifically, two models of set theory can have the same natural numbers and the same structure of arithmetic in common, yet disagree about whether a particular arithmetic sentence is true in that structure. In other words, two models can have the same arithmetic objects and the same formulas and sentences in the language of arithmetic, yet disagree on their corresponding theories of truth for those objects. Similarly, two models of set theory can have the same natural numbers, the same arithmetic structure, and the same arithmetic truth, yet disagree on their truths-about-truth, and so on at any desired level of the iterated truth-predicate hierarchy.  These mathematical observations, for which I shall strive to give a very gentle proof in the talk (using only elementary classical methods), suggest that a philosophical commitment to the determinate nature of the theory of truth for a structure cannot be seen as a consequence solely of the determinateness of the structure in which that truth resides. The determinate nature of arithmetic truth, for example, is not a consequence of the determinate nature of the arithmetic structure N = {0,1,2,…} itself, but rather seems to be an additional higher-order commitment requiring its own analysis and justification.

This work is based on my recent paper, Satisfaction is not absolute, joint with Ruizhi Yang (Fudan University, Shanghai).

When does every definable set have a definable member? CUNY Set Theory Seminar, October 2014

This will be a talk for the CUNY set theory seminar, October 10, 2014, 12pm  GC 6417.

Abstract. Although the concept of `being definable’ is not generally expressible in the language of set theory, it turns out that the models of ZF in which every definable nonempty set has a definable element are precisely the models of V=HOD.  Indeed, V=HOD is equivalent to the assertion merely that every $\Pi_2$-definable set has an ordinal-definable element. Meanwhile, this is not true in the case of $\Sigma_2$-definability, because every model of ZFC has a forcing extension satisfying $V\neq\text{HOD}$ in which every $\Sigma_2$-definable set has an ordinal-definable element.

This is joint work with François G. Dorais and Emil Jeřábek, growing out of some questions and answers on MathOverflow, namely,

Definable collections without definable members
A question asked by Ashutosh five years ago, in which François and I gradually came upon the answer together.
Is it consistent that every definable set has a definable member?
A similar question asked last week by (anonymous) user38200
Can $V\neq\text{HOD}$ if every $\Sigma_2$-definable set has an ordinal-definable member?
A question I had regarding the limits of an issue in my answer to the previous question.

In this talk, I shall present the answers to all these questions and place the results in the context of classical results on definability, including a review of basic concepts for graduate students.

The theory of infinite games: how to play infinite chess and win, VCU Math Colloquium, November 2014

Releasing the hordesI shall speak at the Virginia Commonwealth University Math Colloquium on November 21, 2014.

Abstract. I shall give a general introduction to the theory of infinite games, using infinite chess—chess played on an infinite chessboard stretching without bound in every direction—as a central example. Since chess, when won, is always won at a finite stage of play, infinite chess is an example of what is known technically as an open game, and such games admit the theory of transfinite ordinal game values, which provide a measure in a position of the distance remaining to victory. I shall exhibit several interesting positions in infinite chess with very high transfinite ordinal game values. Some of these positions involve large numbers of pieces, and the talk will include animations of infinite chess in play, with hundreds of pieces (or infinitely many) making coordinated attacks on the board. Meanwhile, the precise ordinal value of the omega one of chess is an open mathematical question.

Slides | Transfinite game values in infinite chess | The mate-in-n problem of infinite chess is decidable

The span of infinity, roundtable discussion at The Helix Center, October 2014

I was a panelist at The Span of Infinity, a roundtable discussion held at The Helix Center, at the New York Psychoanalytic Society & Institute, 247 E 82nd Street, on October 25, 2014, 2:30 – 4:30 pm.

The Helix Center describes the discussion topic as:

Perhaps no thing conceived in the mind has enjoyed a greater confluence of cosmological, mathematical, philosophical, psychological, and theological inquiry than the notion of the infinite. The epistemological tension between the concrete and the ideal, between the phenomenological and the ontological, is nowhere clearer in outline yet more obscure in content. These inherent paradoxes limn the vital, eternal questions we will explore about humankind’s place in the universe and the comprehensibility of existence.

The Helix Center Roundtable Series is described by:

Our roundtable format is designated the Theaetetus Table, an extempore discussion among five participants, all leaders in their respective fields, and named for the classical Greek mathematician and eponym for the Platonic dialogue investigating the nature of knowledge, who proved that there are five regular convex polyhedra, or Platonic solids. Each Theaetetus Table aspires to emulate the dialogue’s unhurried search for wisdom; and, like the five Platonic solids held to be the fundamental building blocks of the classical elements, the contributions of our five participants become the fundamental constituents of interdisciplinary insights emerging in the alchemy of the roundtable, insights that, in turn, transform the elemental thinking of those participants. The gathering of five discussants also symbolizes the five interrelated qualities of mind our interdisciplinary forums are intended to facilitate in our participants, and inculcate in our audience: curiosity, playfulness, inspiration, reflection, and wonder.

The video of the actual event is now available: